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BORROWER’S
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PAK COLONIALISM IN
EAST BENGAL
D. R. MANKEKAR
SOMAIYA PUBLICATIONS PVT LTD
BOMBAY
NEW DELHI
© 1971 by D. R. MANKEKAR
f PITTED IN INDIA
tv E P. SAMANT AT Tllr. TOOK CEj.TPn PVT LTD (PP
Mvru poad. mon past romrav-22 and punished
M.r: :<-atidn S pvt. ltd.. 172 naigaum cposs poad
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BY HIM POP. SOMAIVA
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Preface
A family likeness between the British imperialism of 200 years
ago and the West Pakistani colonialism today, in the same region,
prompted this project It traces the common modus operandi,
techniques and methods of exploitation, and the callous im-
perviousness to the needs and grievances of the victim popula-
tion, even though two centuries separated them.
The remarkable thing about the West Pakistanis’ daring
adventure in the line is that they should have embarked on it so
late in the day-two centuries too late, in an age when colonialism
has gone extinct m the world and been reduced to no more than
an ugly memory.
And there is of course another distinction that Islamabad scores
over its British predecessors: the West Pakistani colonialists
seem to show less compunction in exploiting their victims and
less evidence of conscience in enforcing their massive, ruthless
measures of repression. Compared with the current goary goings-
on in East Bengal, the Jalhanwalla Bagh tragedy, perpetrated by
the British 52 years ago. in which 400 were killed and 1200
wounded, seems like a scrimmage at a football game. The criminals
of Jallianwalla Bagh massacre were pilloried by British public
opinion and impeached in British Parliament. The butchers of
Bangla Desh have been publicly blessed and patted on the back
by Pakistan’s President.
This study of the straggk of the East Bettgsh Mashms Arr
VI
PREFACE
economic emancipation and political identity is also the stirring
story of the confrontation between majority Bengalis and minority
West Pakistanis, between forces of democracy and those of auto-
cracy. between Right and Might— a tussle in which, for the
moment, at any rate, the dice seems heavily loaded against
Bengalis, democracy and Right, though there can be no doubt
that ultimately virtue will triumph over evil, and that the Yahya
regime’s days are numbered.
A fact to be noted however is that the present antagonism
between the East Bengali Muslims and West Pakistani Muslims
(called “Upper India Muslims”, in the pre-partition days) is not
a new phenomenon, and goes back to some sixty years. Under
the powerful stimuli of neglect, humiliating discrimination and
West Pakistani arrogance and lack of statesmanship, that
antagonism flared up into a veritable racial feud and burst out
in a heroic struggle for liberation from Pakistani colonialist yoke.
It is also interesting to note the intensity of the Pakistanis’ (both
in the West and the East) yearning for a return to democracy,
as expressed in the columns of the Pakistan Press by editorials,
politicans and non-politicians, during the period between im-
mediately after the December 1970 elections and the ‘burst-up’
of March 25, 1971.
Equally significant, but less known outside Pakistan, is the fact
that until March 25, 1971, and the imposition of censorship which
stifled all expression, the Press as well as almost all political
leaders (Bhutto excepted) passionately desired that President
Yahya Khan should bow to the verdict of the ballot box and
hand over power to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on latter’s terms
and usher in the long-awaited democracy in the land.
Editorial opinion, including that of Pakistan Times and Dawn,
had reconciled itself to Mujib’s Six Points and a Bengali and
Awami League Government ruling the country. Even such
Punjabi-chauvinists as Mumtaz Daultana and Shaukat Hyat Khan
exhorted the President to settle with Mujib on the basis of his
Six Points. And so did Khan Abdul Oayum Khan of NWFP
until March 25. Most other political leaders in West Pakistan
joined the clamour and demonstrated their sympathy, in public
statements, resolutions and meetings, with Mujib’s demand for
a new constitution with a larger quantum of autonomy for the
P‘ >.mccs and a weak federal centre.
PREFACE
vii
From all the evidence available from Pakistan, it is dear,
therefore, that President Yahya Khan's repressive action against
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his party did not have the approval
of the people and majority of the political leaders of West
Pakistan.
In compiling this study I have largely depended upon Pakistani
official and non-official documents and other literature and the
Pakistani and foreign Press In particular, a study of the columns
of the Pakistan Times and Dawn during the critical period of
the first five months of 1971 provided a valuable insight and
perspective to the cataclysmic events in East Bengal and their
impact on West Pakistan
When the British found that a handful of Englishmen could
no more rule the Indian sub-continent, and that Indians as a
whole refused to accept them, they decided to quit
But not so the West Pakistanis The latter when faced with a
mass rebellion, decided to do the impossible crush the mass
rebellion with machine-guns and tanks and establish a military
regime to reinforce their colonialist rule!
New Delhi.
September, 1971
D R. M.
Contents
Preface v
1. Stranger Than Fiction 1
2. Ex-colonial Turns Colonialist 10
3. Yahya’s Unsubtle Methods 25
4. A Cultural Revolution 34
5. Gulf of Distrust 46
6. Might Versus Right 62
7. A Sergeant-Major’s Regime 74
8 Yahya’s Samson Act 87
9. Ruling Clique’s Perversity 101
10. Filibuster Taixs 114
11. An Anticlimax and Crackdown 123
12. Buried Under Corpses 134
13. Why Did He Do It? 143
14. The Pakistan that Was 155
15. King Canutes of India 166
16. The Refugee Explosion 175
APPENDIXES
1. Solution of Ills: Muiibur Rahman’s R. T. C , Speech 181
X
CONTENTS
2. Promise or Transfer of Power 189
3. Our Struggle Must Go On 195
4. Proclamation of the Government 206
5. To the People of Bangla Desh 209
6. Challenge of Response 216
7. Indian Policy 228
8. Identical Values 230
9. Text of Indo-Soviet Treaty 232
10. Indo-Sovjet Communique and Gromyko’s Talks
with Indian Leaders 236
11. India and Russia Cali, for Political Solution 241
1
Stranger than Fiction
Tn the post-Second World War era of the United Nations, the
Four Freedoms and Human Rights, the nineteenth century brand
of colonialism — exploitation, blatant and predatory, of one people
by another — was presumed to be dead as a dodo Nobody would
therefore bring himself to believe that it could happen now —
much less that an ex-colonial country could turn colonialist and
rival in barbarity the free-booters of the East India Company
of 200 years ago.v ^
vThat was the first "credibility gap” that the Bangla Desh Move-
ment were up against in making the world lend its ears to their
story fThe Bangla Desh cause had to break through other barriers
too before it could make any impress on international public
opinion.
First, it was difficult to believe that President Yahya Khan,
who had earlier displayed so much good sense and ordered the
first ever free general elections in the country, preliminary to a
return to democracy, should commit the blunder of refusing to
bow to the verdict of those elections and of pitting armed force
against 75 million people. For thereby he had assured for himself
a place in history as the disrupter of Pakistan.
Thereafter, incredible as it may seem, in a sort of rake’s
progress, Yahya Khan plunged from one blunder into another.
To justify his first mistake, Yahya Khan went on to commit his
next, by trying to enforce the "final solution'” that would make
9
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
Hitler turn in his grave with envy and admiration and put My Lai
in the shade. Verily, those whom God wants to destroy. He first
drives them mad !
Hitler’s war criminals had to face a historic trial at Nuremberg
and receive staggering sentences. In the case of the Viet Nam out-
rage, public opinion in the United States saw to it that the culprits
did not go unpunished. Nor did the perpetrators of the Amritsar
tragedy go uncensured at the hands of British and Indian public
opinion. Indeed, Jallianwalla Bagh proved a major nail in the
coffin of British imperialism in India.
Then again, the larger-than-life dimensions of the tragedy being
enacted in East Bengal by Yahya Khan boggled imagina-
tion and served further to undermine credibility, where, it later
turned out, facts were stranger than fiction.
The first reports of a genocide launched in that country by
Yahya ’s Army were frankly taken with a pinch of salt by the
outside world — how could he do such a thing in these seventies,
people asked themselves, and dismissed the reports as partisan
propaganda. Subsequently, authenticated eye-witness accounts
from foreign correspondents confirmed the incredible facts.
These news dispatches spoke of a cold-blooded operation
launched by the Pak Army to wipe out today’s and tomorrow’s
leadership in the land by systematically liquidating the intellectual
classes students, teachers, politicians and professional men, and
indeed any one who appeared to be a politically-conscious
Bengali.
Similarly, when earlier reports stated 10,000 people were killed
in Dacca or two lakh casualties suffered in the entire province
in the first week of tire holocaust, many considered the figures as
propagandist exaggeration. Reliable reports received later how-
ever indicated that those figures were an underestimate.
It was difficult to believe that the Pak Army would in the
mi e of the night ram tanks into hostel dormitories in the
campus o Dacca University and mow down with machinegun
t ' U an ^ tcac ^ ers asleep, or set ablaze rows of inhabited
! n , 10 “ Ses or wan tonly carry out cold-blooded pogroms
- <*«, .owns ana
Y lllC exotius of nine million refugees
“• " C " nE frora dcalh a* -error, as a penultimate act in
STRANGER THAN FICTION 3
this bizarre drama, enacted by Yahya Khan’s Army in East
Bengal.
Yet another blunder, from his own standpoint, committed by
Yahya Khan was summarily to throw some 35 foreign cor'
respondents out of Dacca, after stripping them of their notebooks
and exposed films, following a two-day confinement in their hotel
under pain of being shot dead if they ventured out.
These angry correspondents flooded the columns of the world’s
press with descriptive stories of the frightful events in Dacca on
the night of 25-26 March 1971, which bore eloquent testimony
to the unprovoked butchery committed by the Pak Army on a
sleeping populace.
Later dispatches from correspondents who sneaked into East
Bengal and saw things for themselves belied the hope that the
massacre would halt after the first flush of a rampaging campaign
Now it looked as though the Army had embarked upon a
deliberate, preplanned operation of extirpation of “undesirable”
population to make room for loyal people to be transplanted
from West Pakistan
The operation was now specially directed against the Hindu
community, who were systematically dispossessed and shot en
masse. Those whom the Army could not kill, were chased across
the Indian border. It was apparent that there was a diabolical
plot on the part of the Pak authorities to liquidate altogether the
Hindu minority, numbering 80 lakh s, and generally to reduce
East Bengal’s total population from its majority status to that
of a minority in Pakistan as a whole (at present East Bengal’s
population constitutes 56 per cent of the total population of
Pakistan) Such a story was, again, hard to believe until several
correspondents gave eye-witness accounts to corroborate jt.
Truth, like murder, it is said, will be out. Indeed, the grisly
truth about the happenings in East Bengal proved unconcealable.
The foreign correspondents later token around that province on
a conducted tour by the Army, could not be deceived and
confirmed earlier reports, notwithstanding the prodigious efforts
by the authorities to white-wash the tell-tale marks in public and
private places. These correspondents’ news dispatches gave a direct
lie to the Pakistan army authorities’ claim that everything was
normal in East Bengal
The most authentic, and therefore most damaging, evidence
4
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
of the outrageous events being enacted by Yahya’s men in that
hapless land was however provided by a very senior Pakistani
journalist, whose conscience revolted against the savagery
perpetrated by the Pak Army against the Bengalis and by the
fiendish plans — truly Hitlerian in their conception— of integrating
East Bengal into Pakistan.
Anthony Mascarenhas, who was senior Assistant Editor of the
Government-controlled Morning News of Karachi (and alsc
Karachi correspondent of the Sunday Times of London) fell
impelled to throw up his job, career and Pakistani citizenship
to tell the world the horrible truth that was stranger than fiction
In an unprecedented two-and-a-half page story in the Sunday
Times, Mascarenhas confirmed the world’s worst fears about the
events in East Bengal. He was one of the journalists taken on
a ten-day conducted tour of East Bengal by the Pak authorities,
with a mandate to tell West Pakistanis and the world, through
his dispatches, that everything was normal in East Bengal, that
the trouble was created by “miscreants”, “anti-social elements”
and “Indian infiltrators” and that it had all been stamped out.
In his Sunday Times story, Mascarenhas commented
“Reacting to the almost successful breakaway of the province
(East Bengal) which has more than half the counlry’s population.
General Yahya Khan’s military Government is pushing through
its own ‘final solution’ of the East Bengal problem.”
Senior military and civil officers in Dacca and Comilla
repeatedly told Mascarenhas: “We arc determined to cleanse East
Pakistan once and for all of the threat of secession, even if it
means killing off two million people and ruling the province as
a colony for 30 years.”
That notwithstanding all this tell-tale evidence from eye-
witnesses, the conscience of the international community should
lave proved so slow and grudging in reacting to the ghastly
in ast Bengal, was indeed exasperating to those struggling
gainst odds in their battle against the Pakistani oppressors in
v nr d M k! i Cir sym P athiscrs >‘n India and the rest of the
t h„ M | 1 1Crc wcrc £00c i rcas ons for the sluggishness ol
me world s conscience Ttm «r,„. bb
suffering Bengalis. ' P °° r isolation for the
STRANGER THAN FICTION
5
The “third world", comprising the developing nations, them-
selves going through the growing pains, confronted with difficult
problems of integration and secessionist threats, were inevitably
chary of expressing sympathy for an East Bengal seeking to
break away from its parent state. They tended to compare the
Bangla Desh issue with the abortive Biafra rebellion. They
however failed to see that there could be no comparison between
what happened in Nigeria in the late sixties and the develop-
ments in East Bengal.
In the first place, the rebel Ibos constituted a tiny minority
of the Nigerian population, with their region lying contiguous
to the rest of Nigeria They struck for independence and secession
from the Nigerian Federation without any prior attempt to
negotiate with Lagos a peaceful political accommodation foe
them within the framework of the Nigerian constitution.
On the other hand, in Pakistan the Bengalis form the majority
population of the country, and therefore, as their leader. Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman put it, “the majority cannot secede from the
minority." Nor was theirs a secessionist movement
East Bengal is not even contiguous to the rest of Pakistan.
Separated by 3200 miles of Indian territory, its people have
nothing, apart from religion, in common with West Pakistanis.
They differ from the latter in race, temper, language, culture,
physiognomy, dietary, geography, climate, flora and fauna, and
even history.
Criss-crossed by a myriad rivers and streams, East Bengal,
though one-fifth the size of West Pakistan, has a population den-
sity of 1290 per square metre — one of the heaviest in the world
— as against 200 in West Pakistan and cultivates 63 3 per cent
of its land surface as compared with 24 5 per cent m West Pakis-
tan.
For 20 jears and more the Bengalis have agitated in a con-
stitutional manner for the reform of their country’s constitution
so as to get redress of their legitimate grievances against a
Central Government based in distant Islamabad, a thousand
miles away. All that the Bengalis demanded was a full quantum
of autonomy for their province by a transfer of certain fiscal
powers from the Central to the provincial government.
All those years, their cry fell on deaf ears. A despotic Central
Government denied them even representative popular government
6
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
and they were ruled by a non-Bengali bureaucracy that rode
rough-shod over their political susceptibilities and economic
interests.
In December 1970, at the first-ever free general elections held
in the country'. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s Av/ami League won
an overwhelming victory on the electoral plank of greater
provincial autonomy and a weaker federal centre. The party
captured 167 out of 169 seats from East Bengal in the National
Assembly. Such a victory indeed amounted to a referendum
verdict on East Bengal’s fundamental demand. Now Mujibur
Rahman was in a position to get adopted in the National
Assembly any constitution he chose, thanks to his absolute
majority in it.
But however just, legitimate and democratic the demand, a
constitution of the Awami League’s conception was utterly
distasteful and unacceptable to the West Pakistani ruling clique.
For that would have meant divesting them, at one stroke, of
their political, economic and administrative domination in Pakistan
in general and in the foreign-exchange earning East Bengal in
particular. Worse, that would have meant passing the reins of
power on to the Bengalis whom they had bossed over and pushed
around all these years and whose distrust and hatred they had
incurred.
Indeed, such a reversal of roles was too bitter a pill to swallow
for the military-burcaucratic-industrial complex that had mono-
polised power in Pakistan and commanded all the sanctions to
enforce their will on the country. With that paramountcy over the
country’s destinies, they had managed to deny the Pakistani
people a genuine democratic system of Government, to retain
power in their own hands and keep the majority Bengalis at
arm’s length.
President Yahya Khan, the symbol of the military-bureaucratic-
industrial complex, now it seemed, had ordered the general
elections under the miscalculation that the Bengali Av/ami League
would emerge from the poll, at the most, as the largest single
party and therefore could easily be kept under leash and that
the current power equation could be maintained undisturbed even
under a parliamentary facade.
Thus when the Awami League captured an absolute majority
in the National Assembly, there was a terrific flutter in the
STRANGER THAN FICTION
7
dovecotes of Islamabad The powerful ruling clique decided that,
come what may, Mujibur Rahman could never be permitted to
form the Government at the Centre on the basis of his Six-Point
Programme, as that would prove fatal to their interests. If allowed
to come into power, Mujib would, as sure as fate, axe the
extravagant defence budget and cut the Army to size; clip the
wings of the bureaucracy that hitherto ruled the roost; and shift
the economic centre of gravity to East Bengal by insisting upon
a proportionate share of revenues, foreign exchange earnings and
aid as well as industrial development in the Eastern Wing
In a desperate bid, Yahya Khan launched on a manoeuvre to
browbeat Sheikh Mujibur Rahman into modifying his Six-Point
Programme so as not to disturb the grip of the military-
bureaucratic clique at the Centre
When he found that Mujib could not be got round, Yahya
Khan grimly decided to give democracy the go-by and unloose
an unprecedented reign of terror in East Bengal calculated to
crush out, once and for all, what he considered as political
recalcitrance and fissiparous trends in the East Wing
To the strange catalogue of incredible and odd events must be
added the imperviousness displayed by the international com-
munity which seemed to hide their heads behind the alibi of the
UN. Charter’s “Domestic Jurisdiction" clause and look away
from the unpleasant events in East Bengal
The West Asian Arab countries, for example, stubbornly
refused to believe a sister Islamic state could commit such
barbarities on its citizens and in any case considered it impolitic
to take cognisance of the inequity committed by a sister Islamic
country. Indeed, many Arabs firmly believed that East Bengal
was non-Muslim and therefore beyond the pale of Islamic human
sympathy!
The major powers of the world, in cynical pursuit of their
respective geopolitical interests, seem even more averse to disturb
the status quo, lest it upset the existing balance of power, bringing
in its train new problems.
It is this apprehension that prompts, for example, Washington
to strive to keep Pakistan intact in its present form, for an
independent East Bengal might completely disturb the power
equation in the region they had so assiduously sought and worked
for, by weakening Pakistan and creating a non-aligned and
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
8
possibly leftist state in East Bengal, unamenable to US influence
and ultimately slipping under Peking’s hegemony.
Only Britain, in response to public opinion in the country
has veered round to a stand against Yahya Khan’s misrule in
East Bengal and has stopped aid to Pakistan until a political
settlement is found in East Bengal.
China supports Pakistan because the two have a common
enemy in India, while confident that if ultimately East Bengal
breaks away from Pakistan, Peking has nothing to lose but
everything to gain, as the new State was destined to come under
Peking’s influence.
The Soviet Union is the only major power that has un-
hesitatingly and promptly come out to condemn Yahya Khan’s
reign of terror and anti-people action in East Bengal — which
action is indeed in full consonance with Moscow’s foreign policy
of containing Chinese influence in the Indian sub-continent and
trying to prevent an independent East Bengal passing under
Chinese hegemony.
Besides, a common enemy — China — brings the Soviet Union
on the side of India in a feud with Pakistan, whom China backs.
A silver lining is the demonstration the world has witnessed
of the power of the mass media to influence and mobilise inter-
national public opinion in favour of a great cause to the point
of prodding their governments to come out in its support.
With the UN’s sole aim and task now reduced to preventing
a breach of the international peace, at any price — ensuring
justice to the aggrieved of the world and protecting the weak
against the strong is no more considered its worry — that world
body seemed to be in no mood whatsoever to respond to East
Bengal’s desperate SOS. It is by now well known that that
international body never acts unless prompted by one of the
major powers whose foreign policy interests are involved in the
dispute.
President Yahya Khan gratefully grabbed at the plank of
Domestic Jurisdiction and used it as a shield behind which
to carrj out his genocide against a people whose sole sin was
that they had asserted their Human Rights, believing that they
had been guaranteed by the U.N.
In that frame of mind, the international
realise that what the military dictatorship
community failed to
was perpetrating in
STRANGER THAN FICTION
East Bengal, by the very gigantic scale of its operation and
brutality, had stepped out of the “Domestic Jurisdiction” into
the wider sphere of Human Rights and impinged on the Genocide
Declaration of (he United Nations.
Article 2, para 7 of the Nuremberg Charter clearly states that
a matter which becomes serious enough to threaten international
peace and security would, ipso facto, cease to be essentially
“domestic”. As Mr RahmaiuUah Khan 1 points out, if the UN
wished to declare the struggle in Bangla Desh as a matter of
“international concern”, it would have a better case than m any
of the precedents (Apartheid, UDI in Rhodesia, the Soviet pro-
hibition of marriages of Russian girls to foreigners, etc).
Under Article 99 of the UN Charter, the Secretary-General has
discretionary power to bring to the notice of the Security Council
any dispute or situation which in his opinion is likely to endanger
international peace and security This discretionary power was
used by the UN Secretary-General in the case of Congo
The tragic event m East Bengal threatened a breach of the inter-
national peace in the entire South-East Asian region, fully war-
ranting the UN's intervention It is indeed morally incumbent
upon the Security Council to step in and call Islamabad to order
and bind the wound before it becomes a running, gangrenous
sore.
Of the UN’s capability to resolve international disputes, how-
ever, Dr. Salvador Madariaga once quipped
“If a dispute before the UN is between two small nations, the
dispute disappears.
If the dispute is between a small country and a big power,
the small country disappears.
If the dispute is between two Big Powers, the UN disappears ”
How true?
1 In Bangla Desh — A Struggle for Nationhood
2
Ex-Colonial Tunis Colonialist
Lightning, it is said, docs not strike the same spot a second
time Nor should colonialism, one would like to presume, hit the
same country twice within the space of 200 years. For the victim
is incapable of going through all over again the traumatic
experience and the moral and material strain involved.
Yet there seems to be a family resemblance between the
methods employed in East Bengal by the British imperialists in
the nineteenth century and the West Pakistani colonialism im-
posed on the same country in the latter decades of the twentieth.
Indeed in the scale of its brutality and its remorselessness, the
Pakistani variety, particularly in its later phase, beat the ways
of the East India Company.
Commenting upon the ravages of British imperialism inflicted
upon India, Jawaharlal Nehru in his book Discovery of India ob-
serves that the longer the span of colonial rule in a region, greater
is the poverty of its people. And when he made that observation
he had particularly Bengal’s extreme poverty in mind — British
imperialism had the longest innings in that region, apart from
the city of Madras.
In the same book, Nehru describes the techniques employed
b> British colonialism in India in the nineteenth century in
these words :
“The classic type of modem colonial
India becoming an agricultural colony
10
economy was built up,
of industrial England,
EX-COLONIAL TURNS COLONIALIST 11
supplying raw materials and providing markets for England’s
industrial goods.”
In East Bengal the tragic history is repeating itself The charge
levelled against industrial England vis-a-vis agricultural India of
200 years ago is today equally true of West Pakistan in its
attitude towards East Bengal
In the 19th Century, the British East India Company deliberately
destroyed the highly advanced handloom industry — -even cut the
thumbs of the famous Dacca weavers of the incomparably fine
world renowned Dacca muslins in order to force India’s teaming
millions to buy the goods produced by Britain’s new textile
industry in Lancashire, which otherwise could never compete
with Indian goods That rendered thousands of people
unemployed.
In the 18th century the needs of the Industrial Revolution in
England demanded the creation of a sure market for the flood
of manufactured goods By 1720 the import of Indian silk and
printed calicos into England was banned and heavy duties were
imposed on all Indian manufactured cotton goods At the same
time, in colonial India, tariff discrimination was introduced
against Indian manufacturers that was designed to build up the
British textile industry
Between 1814-1835 British cotton manufactures exported to
India rose from less than one million yards to over 51 million
yards In the same period Indian piecegoods imported into
Britain fell from 1$ million pieces to 306,000 pieces and by 1844
to 63,000 pieces. Machine-made goods from England ruined
the weavers, spinners and smiths The old populous towns of
Dacca and Murshidabad were in a few years rendered desolate.
In 1787 the exports of Dacca muslin to England amounted to
Rs. 30 lakhs. In 1817 they had ceased altogether. The arts of
spinning and weaving now grew extinct and hundreds of artisans
were rendered idle.
“The liquidation of the artisan class led to unemployment on
a prodigious scale," remarks Nehru 1 on the episode. “All these
hordes of artisans and craftsmen had no job, no work, and all
their ancient skill was useless. They drifted to the land, for the
land was still there. But the land was fully occupied and could
1 Nehru, Discovery of India
12
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
not possibly absorb them profitably. So they became a burden
on the land. The burden grew, and with it grew the poverty of
the country, and the standard of living fell to incredibly low
levels.”
A British Governor-General of India of the times, Lord
Bentinck, reported in 1834, “The misery (stemming from the
situation thus created) hardly finds a parallel in the history of
commerce. The bones of the cotton-weavers are bleaching on the
plains of India.”
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s description of the fate of the hand-
loom weavers of East Bengal today recalls what the British
exploiters did to their ancestors.
Replying to an address at a reception given in his honour by
the Dacca Chamber of Commerce, following his overwhelming
victory at the December 1970 general elections, the supreme
leader of the Awami League declared that deliberate measures
were taken by the Central Government of Pakistan to kill the
flourishing handloom industry of Bangla Desh, resulting in the
unemployment of 20 lakhs of people in order to “ensure a
protected market for the finished goods of West Pakistan’s
industry.”
“In the name of protection,” he said, “the people of Bangla
Desh have to purchase cloth at a price six times higher than
that of imported cloth from Japan and other countries.”
Perhaps the greatest evil from which the country suffered under
British Colonial rule in the 18th and the 19th centuries was the
continuous economic drain from Bengal, wrote one historian.
Figures available showed that nearly one-third of the net revenues
of Bengal was annually remitted out of the country. But the
actual drain from the country was much larger. A larger per-
centage of the civil and military expenses consisted of the pay of
European officers who sent all their savings out of India. The
actual drain from Bengal was perhaps more correctly represented
in the figures for imports and exports of the times, which indicated
that Bengal sent out about ten times what it imported.
The economic strain modem East Bengal has had to put up
wti has b_en almost equally debilitating for the province. For
V' m p-w WCSlW . arc * com P r * sc d an adverse trade balance with
in th» ,ar '^ s Protecting West Pakistani manufactures
-ast ^-ngal market, the diversion of a disproportionate
EX-COLONIAL TURNS COLONIALIST
13
share of the East wing’s foreign exchange earnings for the
industrial development of the West wing, the syphoning of foreign
trade to Karachi, the utilisation of major proportion of foreign
aid in the West, remittances of civil and military salaries of West
Pakistanis based in East Bengal and direct transfers of profits
and other forms of wealth earned m the East wing by West
Pakistanis
Muzaffar Ahmed of Dacca University stated. “East Pakistan
lost Rs. 34,12,50,000 every year from 1947-48 to 1954-55. It
means that East Bengal sends out goods in return for which she
gets nothing It means continuous drain of a magnitude and
dimension unknown in any civilised country East Bengal is being
sucked dry of the life-blood of her economy."
The guiding motive of Pakistan Government’s policies was to
protect and promote the interests of West Pakistani industrialists
at the expense of East Bengal’s economy.
The mechanism of resource transfer from East to West Pakistan,
and of economic colonializatton of East Bengal, in general,
operated as follows : East Pakistan was the major foreign
exchange earner of the two wings, thanks to its jute. All foreign
exchange earned by the country had however to be surrendered
to the State Bank, to be allocated for imports according to
priorities determined by West Pakistani bureaucrats holding the
key central offices Foreign aid, likewise, was centrally negotiated
by the same bureaucracy.
The result was that, all along, the allocation of foreign
exchange, including foreign aid, to West Pakistan was two to
three times greater than to East Pakistan. This helped West
Pakistan in financing the import of vital machinery, technical
expertise and raw materials for its industrialisation, while
denying East Pakistan that facility.*
It is interesting to note that in appropriating the foreign
exchange earned by East Bengal for West Pakistan’s industrial
development. East Bengal was considered a component part of
the Pakistan nation But the province was not treated as such
when it was made to pay the price of a high tariff wall raised
to protect West Pakistan’s industries, as though the East Wing
was a foreign country.
1 Why Baugla Desk (Public Relations Department, Government of the
Peoples Republic of Bangla Desh)
14 PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
The desperate position of the jute cultivators in Bengal under
British rule was highlighted by the Bengal Jute Enquiry Report
of 1934. According to this report, the total value of marketable
crops in Bengal fell from an average of Rs. 724 million for the
decade 1920-21 to 1932-33 to Rs. 327 million in 1932-33, whereas
monetary liabilities actually rose from Rs. 729 million to Rs. 283
million. This meant that the free purchasing power of the
cultivator fell from Rs. 445 million to Rs. 44 million. The
Calcutta index of prices fell from an average of 223 to 126 for
the same periods, a fall of 44°,'., whereas the free purchasing
power fell by 90%.
In his Chamber of Commerce speech, quoted earlier. Mujibur
Rahman charged that jute, the “golden fibre”, Pakistan’s main
foreign exchange earner, was losing export market through a
“deliberate defective policy.” Tea, another lucrative traditional
export item, was no more exported from East Bengal as it found
its way to West Asian countries through the back-door. The
Sheikh claimed that as a result, 70 lakhs of Bengalis were
rendered unemployed and there was unending flight of rural
population to urban areas in search of employment and food.
Indeed, the treatment meted out by the West Pakistani rulers
to East Bengal’s jute growers, was a typical instance of callous
exploitation. The crass neglect of this vital commercial crop,
the very back-bone of the province’s economy, plummeted the
export trade in the fibre and ruined thousands of peasants.
“Jute has suffered from criminal neglect. A discriminatory
exchange rate and parasitic middlemen have denied to the jute-
growers a fair price,” charged Mujib in his evc-of-elcction broad-
cast of October 28, 1970. The Government took hardly any
measures to protect the jute-growers against their exploitation
by non-Bengali middlemen and money-lenders. Bengali leaders’
and legislators’ repeated plea to the Government for the pro-
tection of the jute-growers has fallen on deaf ears.
Pakistan s refusal to devalue its currency when India did in
1949, drastically cut down Indian purchases of jute and ruined
the East Bengal jute cultivators. But so long as it benefited West
Pakistani industrialists, the Government did not care. The
Pakistan Government did not move its little finger to ameliorate
the lot of millions of peasants in East Bengal ruined by huge
stocks of unsold jute on their hands.
EX-COLONIAL TURNS COLONIALIST 35
No wonder then that after this intensive economic drain and
devastation, spread over 250 years of colonial exploitation —
first by the British, and now by the West Pakistani rulers — two-
thirds of the population of East Bengal is undernourished *
Evidence of the colonial motivation is to be found in Pakistan’s
fiscal, trade and development policies and its mental attitudes
towards East Bengal. East Bengal’s charge against the Central
Government has been that its economic policy blatantly favoured
West Pakistan to the detriment of East Bengal Specifically, tariffs,
import controls and industrial licensing compelled East Bengal
to purchase commodities from West Pakistan which but for the
controls, they could obtain more cheaply in the world markets
A very recent study carried out by Edward S Mason, Robert
Dorfman and Stephen A. Margin, three eminent Harvard
professors who have studied Pakistan’s economic, political and
social problems on the spot, confirms that the "general economic
policy has dearly favoured West Pakistan. This has allowed the
development of inefficient industries in that region which have
ironically prospered largely because of tariffs and quotas that
have made East Pakistan a captive market Forty per cent of all
exports of West Pakistan are sold to East Pakistan In 1968-69
West Pakistan sold 50 per cent more to East Pakistan than it
bought from East Pakistan.”
The Harvard professors’ study remarks: “It is clear that
foreign exchange was allocated to the detriment of East Pakistan.
Over the last two decades East Pakistan’s share of total Pakistani
export earnings has varied between 50 per cent and 70 per cent,
while its share of imports has been in the range of 25 per cent to
30 per cent. Until 1963-64 East Pakistan has shown significant
surpluses on foreign account, which has changed in recent years
to small deficits By contrast. West Pakistan’s foreign trade has
shown substantial and chronic deficit that has absorbed virtually
all foreign exchange made available through foreign aid.”
The ruling class from West Pakistan laid down the trade and
commerce policy, and the West Pakistani business houses, as
the sole instruments of foreign trade, were the beneficiaries of
those poticies in terms of profits and industrial advancement.
The Harvard study further points out that with 60 per cent of
* Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in his address to the Round Table Confer-
ence, at Rawalpindi. March 10, 1969.
16
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
the population. East Pakistan’s share of Central Government
development expenditure has been as low as 20 per cent during
1950-51 to 1954-55, attaining a peak of 36 per cent during the
third five-year plan period 1965-66 to 1969-70. East Pakistan
received an even smaller share of private investment, less than
25 per cent.
According to official reports. 4 East Bengal has transferred
approximately $2.6 billion to West Pakistan over the period
1948-49 to 1968-69.
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman 1, has claimed that more than 80
per cent of all foreign aid has been utilised in West Pakistan
in addition to the transfer of a large proportion of East Pakistan’s
foreign exchange earnings to West Pakistan. This made it
possible for West Pakistan, over 20 years, to import Rs. 3,109
crores worth of goods against the total export earnings of
Rs. 1,337 crores, while during the same period East Pakistan
imported Rs. 1,210 crores worth of goods against its total export
earnings of Rs. 1,650 crores.
The second five-year plan admitted that after independence
immigrant capital, enterprise and technical skills flowed more
into West Pakistan than East Bengal. Yet the Government made
no attempt to correct the imbalance. During the first five-year
plan almost two-thirds of direct Central Government investment
went into West Pakistan. Besides, provincial government outlays
in West Pakistan amounted to Rs. 188.4 crores or almost twice
the Rs. 98 crores level of East Pakistan.
Investment by semi-government institutions showed the same
pattern/' The share of investment of the Industrial Development
Bank in East Bengal was 20 per cent, in West Pakistan 80 per
cent; that of the House-building Finance Corporation, East
Bengal’s percentage was 12 as against West Pakistan’s 88. The
Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation’s share of
investment in East Bengal was 24 per cent, in West Pakistan 76
per cent, the figures for Pakistan Industrial Development Corpora-
tion were 45 per cent for East Bengal and 55 per cent for West
Pakistan.
vlir^r Advir>0ry P : l " cl5 for ,he 4th Five Year Plan 1970-75,
Government of Pakistan, 1970.
SbctlJi Mujibur Rahmans address at the ftmmH *r ui r* c
,o - -*■ «
EX-COLONIAL TURNS COLONIALIST 17
The regional allocation of foreign loans and credits for the
period 1949-61 revealed that West Pakistan (including Karachi)
got $519,886,426. East Pakistan $127,876,527. ‘"Common”
$132,125,928 7
In this context the sneering reference of the well-fed Punjabi
Muslim — who has known less than 100 years of British colonial
rule and has indeed been a beneficiary of colonial patronage — to
the “inefficiency and lethargy” of the Bengal i indeed seems cruel
and smacks of typical colomalistic hauteur
The fact is that in Islamabad's scheme of things, West Pakistan
was to be built up as the metropolitan base, industrialised and
economically favoured, while East Bengal played the com-
plementary role of the producer of primary commodities to feed
the West wing’s industries and earn the valuable foreign exchange
and to serve as the ready-made market for West Pakistan’s
manufactures dumped on it at artificially inflated prices.
Pointing at the “gross economic injustice” done to East
Pakistan, Mujib charged,' “There has been a failure to discharge
the constitutional obligation to remove disparity between the
provinces in the shortest possible time ”
During the period 1950-70, out of the total revenue expendi-
ture of the Government, only about Rs. 1,500 crores (that is
only one-fifth of the total) was spent in East Bengal, as against
over Rs. 5,000 crores in West Pakistan Of the total development
expenditure during the same period, Rs 3,000 crores (that is only
one-third of the total) was spent in East Bengal, as against over
Rs. 6.000 crores in West Pakistan.
During the same period. West Pakistan imported goods worth
more than Rs 3,000 crores as against its own foreign exchange
earnings oE barely Rs. 1,300 crores. Imports into West Pakistan
have been three times the value of the imports into East Bengal.
Mujibur Rahman insisted 9 that the allocation to West Pakistan
of Rs. 500 crores of the foreign exchange earnings of East Bengal
and allowing it to utilise over 80 per cent of all foreign aid made
it possible for West Pakistan to import goods worth Rs. 2,000
crores in excess of its export earnings
* (A study by US Mission in Pakistan 1949-63) Pok Observer June 3,
1963
* Speech at Round Table Conference at Rawalpindi, March 10, 1969,
* Eve-of election broadcast on October 28, 1970.
18
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
The few industrial enterprises that have sprung up in East
Bengal are mostly owned by non-Bengalis — entrepreneurs from
West Pakistan and even from West Asia. The few Bengali busi-
nessmen that do manage to flourish in East Bengal, generally in
the secondary lines of trade and industry, have many obstacles
to negotiate, including having to run up all the way to Karachi
to obtain a permit or to accelerate the movement of their files
at the Secretariat.
According to Dr. Mahbub U1 Haq, Joint Chief Economist,
Pakistan Planning Commission." top twenty families of West
Pakistan control approximately 66 per cent of industrial assets,
70 per cent insurance funds and 80 per cent of bank assets in
Pakistan.
A study carried out by Dr. Gustav F. Papanek of the Centre for
International Affairs at Harvard University, reveals that Bengalis
fail to figure in the list of the top industrialists of Pakistan;
among the 29 largest industrial houses, there are only two Bengalis
and these two also happen to be near the bottom of the list. The
Bengalis are also absent from the economically significant sectors
of import trade.
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman states: “Eighty-two per cent of the
total bank advances arc concentrated in only 3 per cent of the
total accounts. The tax structure in existence is one of the most
regressive in the world. Only 2 per cent of the GNP is being
realised as direct taxes as against 6 per cent in other developing
countries, while oppressive indirect taxes'* are imposed on such
essential commodities as salt. Protected markets, tax holidays,
huge subsidies in the form of bonus vouchers, credits and grants
of foreign exchange at the artificially low official rate have created
specially favourable conditions for the growth of monopolies and
cartels.””
The aforementioned twenty families have such a firm grip
over the banks that they could open letters of credit over the
phone. The lop capitalists of West Pakistan were even allowed
to draw an overdraft in East Bengal while holding their deposits
in West Pakistan— another source of financial drain suffered by
East Bengal.
Four big banks controlled almost 75 per cent of the advances
ii L? a . v' P '. C „ ch . IO lhc Karachi Management Association.
ie> - Mujibur Rahman’s election broadcast on October 28, 1970.
EX-COLONIAL TURNS COLONIALIST 19
and deposits, according to the Far Eastern Economic Review
1971 Yearbook. For that reason “most of the political parties as
well as some planning experts agreed that the credit policy
could not be changed unless the banks were nationalised ”
Two-thirds of Pakistan’s industries are located in West
Pakistan, while even the head offices of quite a few of the
industries based in East Bengal are in Karachi, which has often
meant transfer of profits and funds from the East Wing to the
West.
The 1957 census of manufacturing industries showed that East
Bengal possessed only 18 per cent of the industrial establish-
ments in Pakistan, 26 per cent of ihe gross value of products
and 30 per cent of the average daily employment This disparity
between the two wings in industrialisation was reflected in the
pattern of trade between them East Bengal imported more from
the West Wing than it exported
The total impact of this intensive economic dram in the
westward direction — to which was added transfer of profits of
West Pakistani businessmen operating in East Bengal and the
remittances of West Pakistani civil and military personnel —
nearly crippled the East Wing’s economy.
ECAFE Survey for 1969 estimates West Pakistan’s growth rate
in 1968-69 at 6 8 per cent, “principally due to satisfactory
progress in agriculture,” as against a growth rate of only 2 6 per
cent (as against if 6 per cent in the preceding year) id East Bengal,
“the main reason being** the destruction of crops by floods”
Ayub Khan, when he took over, acknowledged the economic
injustice done to East Bengal, and took some measures to
mitigate it. But, as always in such matters, it was too late and
too little. Most of the pledges given by him remained on paper
or half-heartedly implemented, and they only served to whet
the appetite and irritate the recipients, while the dictator’s
unconcealed contempt for the “non-martial Bengalis added
fuel to the long-simmering discontent in the province.
There was discrimination all along the line In the sphere of
agriculture, the benefits of the green revolution all went to wheat-
producing West Pakistan; the nce-growing East Bengal remained
untouched by it.
According to the For Eastern Economic Review 1971 Year-
book. "During 1970 while the West Wing found itself in the
20
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
situation of wheat surplus, the overpopulated eastern province
continued to be deficit in rice. A shortage in the East of about
180,000 tons of foodgrains during the year was met by imports
from West Pakistan.”
“The production of rice in East Bengal has been almost
stagnant over the past six years,” says the ECAFE’s Economic
Survey of Asia and Far East, 1969. The basic Aman crop
showed no change, and the Aus crop, which accounts for one
quarter of the total production, showed only a slightly upward
trend, subject to annual variations.
Indeed, the situation worsened with a decline in the world
price of jutCj its primary commodity for export, and resulted
in unprecedented unemployment among landless labourers and
a marked fall in the per capita income of the agricultural popula-
tion of the region in the latter half of the 1960s, which went
down from Rs. 228 for the period 1949-50 to 1963-64 to Rs. 198
for the period 1964-65 to 1967-68.
In the first six years after Partition, of the funds allocated
to agricultural development, amounting to Rs. 966,670,000, 79.6
per cent went to West Pakistan. Of this, a major portion was
earmarked for Punjab and the federal territory of Karachi, while
Sind, North West Frontier and Baluchistan were treated as the
“poor cousins”.
Of the loans sanctioned by the Central Government during that
period. West Pakistan received Rs. 329,300,000, and East Pakistan
Rs. 164,100,000 (for various reasons, the former was able to use
only 83.9 per cent and latter 49.9 per cent respectively of those
loans).
The price index in East Pakistan remained higher right through
except in the 1964-65 period, when it was 1.28 points lower. In
1965-66, the price index showed 10.74 points higher in East
Bengal as compared with that of West Pakistan; in 1966-67 it
was 17.12 higher; in 1967-68 it was 3.70 higher; 1968-69 11.59
higher; in 1969-70 13.92 higher and March 1970 6.08 higher. 12
Even in the sphere of education there has been, far from any
progress, a marked decline. The general level of illiteracy has
remained stagnant at 80 per cent. During the period 1951-61.
t'dT "T aS ' n ^ c . sl ^ a ^' stan the number of matriculates rose by
pcr ccn1, in Easl Bengal the figure rose only by 6.3 per cent.
I’aV.htan Economic Survey 1969-70.
EX-COLONIAL TURNS COLONIALIST 21
As regards university education, the number of graduates in
East Bengal actually fell by 32.3 per cent and post-graduate
degree holders by 12 per cent, whereas in West Pakistan the
respective figures rose by 21 3 and 68 6 per cent 11
The per capita expenditure on education in East Bengal is
computed at Rs 5 63 per annum, whereas in West Pakistan at
Rs, 863
Between 1961 and 1966, forty-eight politechmcal institutes were
established in West Pakistan as against only 18 in East Bengal
Nor has there been any appreciable progress noted in the
sphere of health amenities in East Bengal In 1966, the number
of hospital beds in the East Wing was estimated at 6,900, whereas
in the West Wing the figure was 26,200
The power generating capacity in West Pakistan is five to six
times higher than in East Bengal In East Bengal, the hydro-
electric power capacity went up from 202 mw in 1964-65 to
488 mw in 1969-70. In contrast. West Pakistan, during the same
period, recorded an increase from 815 mw to 2012 mw. 1 *
Indeed, four-fifths of the federal budget is spent m West
Pakistan No wonder then that the income gap between the
wings should be widening In 1949-50, the disparity in per capita
income was only 9 per cent in favour of West Pakistan. The
figure rose to 32 per cent by 1959-60, 40 per cent by 1964-65
and 62 per cent by 1969-70.
ECAFE Survey for 1969 puts East Bengal’s per capita gross
income in 1968-69 at Rs. 300 against West Pakistan’s Rs. 500
During the entire decade 1959-60 to 1969-70, the annual rate of
growth of income in West Pakistan was 6 2 per cent, while it was
only 4 2 per cent in East Bengal
The rapid development of West Pakistan at the cost of East
Bengal is said to be mainly responsible for the widening disparity.
The structure of production in East Pakistan is a major con-
tributory factor to the province’s economic stagnation. During
the years 1950-51 and 1954-55, the share of large-scale manu-
factures in the gross provincial product was as small as 1.0 per
cent. Nor was there an appreciable improvement in the figure
at the end of the second five-year plan (1960-61 to 1964-65),
when large-scale manufactures stood at only 4 per cent in East
11 K. B Sayeed, Political System of Pakistan
H Far Eastern Economic Review 1971 Year Book
22
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
Bengal, as against West Pakistan’s 8.3 per cent.
Underlying such disparity, as Mujib pointed out in his famous
Round Table Conference speech of March 1969, is the dis-
parity in the general economic structure and infrastructure of the
two regions, in the rates of employment, in facilities for education,
in medical and welfare services.
The disparity in the prices of essential commodities in the two
wings is equally glaring. Rice costs Rs. 50 per maund in East
Bengal; only Rs. 25 per maund in West Pakistan; wheat Rs. 30
per maund in East Bengal, only Rs. 15 per maund in West
Pakistan and mustard oil Rs. 5 per seer in East Bengal, Rs. 2.50
per seer in the West Wing. In East Bengal the price of gold was
Rs. 170 for 180 grains; in West Pakistan Rs. 135 for 180 grains.
Inevitably, the disparity in the standard of living between the
two wings would be equally wide. An average West Pakistani
consumes 19 times as much electricity, ten times as many cars,
eight times as much tea and petrol, seven times as many radios,
six times as many cigarettes, three times as much cloth and
sugar and twice as much paper and coal as average East Bengali.
Such a thorough economic dominance of East Bengal by West
Pakistan has been made possible by the powerful grip on the
levers of power and decision-making held almost from the very
beginning by the ruling military-adminislralivc-industrial com-
plex, based in West Pakistan.
The military, the “ultimate sanction,” is at the apex of this
power structure, with its self-arrogated role of protector of the
Slate of Pakistan. The administrators running the government
for them, representing the second pillar, is perhaps the most
important element. The businessmen, providing the financial
sinews to the Government and in return benefiting from the
latter s patronage, is the third pillar of this power structure.
While the first pillar comprises Punjabis and Palhans, the
second is practically monopolised by the Punjabis, forming the
ack-bone of the Government. The third comprises the immigrant
Mernon^ Bohras and Khojas from West India as also the
th ^ r ° m Punjab ’ wbo bavc developed a vested interest in
c "sta lishment and arc therefore committed to its preservation.
thrn p S a .^ rcss t0 tbc Round Table Conference, convened by the
MuiibnrnT Ayub Khan at Rawalpindi on March 10, 1969,
a iman charged that the concentration of economic
EX-COLONIAL TURNS COLONIALIST
23
management had “steadily aggravated the existing economic
injustice to the point of crisis.” He referred to the 22 families
“who have achieved a considerable notoriety both at home and
abroad on account of concentration of wealth in their hands
resulting from their ready access to the corridors of powers."
East Bengal’s entire economy was thus geared to the colonial
pattern and self-interest of West Pakistan
The beneficiaries of this exploitation were not only West
Pakistan’s big business, but also its bureaucracy, big landed
interests and the generals of the army, who obtained handsome
tax-exemptions, salary hikes and subsidies of various sorts “to
enjoy a Jiving standard comparable to the highest anywhere in
the world ” u
If East Bengal is today among the eight poorest countries in
the world, it has to be partially attributed to the very fact that
it is part of Pakistan, writes Charles Smith in the Financial Times,
London, who points out that in 1947, at partition. East Bengal
was actually better off than the West Wing in a number of
important aspects
East Bengal’s jute crop, which even today is Pakistan's biggest
single source of foreign exchange, was at that time the only
product of any importance which either wing of Pakistan had to
offer to world trade Then again, the textile mills around Dacca
and Chittagong in East Bengal were almost the only industry in
Pakistan “As for the future,’’ wrote Smith, “East Pakistan’s
flat and well-watered countryside looked more promising for
development than the relatively arid West.”
The Financial Times Correspondent comments . “What East
Pakistan did not have, however, and has never possessed to any
significant extent until today, was political power — and it was
the exercise of power by the leadership in the West that started
the rot.”
u P. C. Verma of the Asia Research Centre, Institute of Economic
Growth, Delhi, in an article “East Bengal — Victim of Pakistan's Cotonial
Policy.”
3
Yahya’s Unsubtle Methods
The Central Government of Pakistan, as a Bengali pul it, is of
West Pakistanis, for West Pakistanis, by West Pakistanis. And
what is more, unlike the British imperialists of an earlier vintage,
the West Pakistanis arc unsubtle in their methods, and don’t
care who knows!
It is typical of a colonial power that it should dub a subject
people’s legitimate democratic urge as sedition, and quest for
identity as treason, and seek to supress them by brutal force.
If the local populace refuses to cooperate, the West Pakistani
overlords do not hesitate to physically liquidate their opposition
and import from the West Wing officials and policemen and even
inhabitants to run and populate a police state.
Anthony Mascarenhas has described in his article in the Sun-
day Times of London Islamabad’s present policy in that hapless
province, which betrays a crass colonialist mind. That policy, as
explained to Mascarenhas by the Pakistani authorities, is:
“(1) The Bengalis have proved themselves ‘unreliable’ and
must be ruled by West Pakistanis.
(2) Tire Bengalis will have to be re-educated along proper
Islamic lines. The ‘Islamisation of the masses’ is intended to
eliminate secessionist tendencies and provide a strong religious
bond with West Pakistan.
13) When the Hindus have been eliminated by death and
24
/
YAHYA’S UNSUBTLE METHODS
25
flight, their property will be bait to win over the Muslim middle
class. This will provide the base for erecting administrative and
political structures in the future.”
In its sheer diabolical thoroughness this policy evokes memories
of Hitler's incredible plans for rearing a “Master Race” and
disposing of the Jewish population in his Nazi empire The Nazis
had a plan of transplanting the entire population of Czecho-
slovakia to empty arid spaces in Brazil to make room for the
surplus of the “Master Race” in Germany
As early as February 25, 1948, a Bengali member burst out
in the Pakistan Constituent Assembly “A feeling is growing
among the East Pakistanis that East Pakistan is being neglected
and treated merely as a ‘colony’ of West Pakistan ”
The Bengalis saw the danger signal in 1949 when the Central
Government issued a Distribution of Revenues Order and im-
posed an upper limit on East Bengal’s share of jute export duty.
That was the first time that (he Bengalis suspected that their
province was being treated as a colony of West Pakistan
On March 18, 1952, Sahoodul Haque, a Bengali member of the
Constituent Assembly, declared on the floor of that body: “It is
no good concealing the fact that a feeling is rapidly growing in
the eastern zone of Pakistan that East Bengal is becoming a
colony for the people of the Western Zone ’’
A day later, another Bengali member, Syed Abdul Basher
Mahmud Husain was even more blunt "How long would you
exploit East Bengal in the name of Islamic brotherhood and
solidarity?’’ he exclaimed
The naked truth, as the East Bengalis saw it, was that their
land was economically exploited for the benefit and aggrandise-
ment of West Pakistan. The Bengalis’ genuine economic and
political grievances, repeatedly and loudly voiced on the public
platform, on the floor of the legislatures and in the columns of
the East Bengali press, fell on deaf ears When in despair they
! publicly demonstrated in support of their demands, they were
fired upon and their leaders arrested and charged with treason
1 and put in prison. These tactics are reminiscent of the methods
J British used against the Indian nationalist struggle.
Islamic solidarity and the Indian bogey were the two stimuli
the Pakistani rulers have constantly pressed into service to
26 PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
browbeat the Bengalis demanding autonomy for themselves-
But the rulers, with colonialist blinkers obstructing their vision,
failed to sec that the quest for political identity on the part of
an ethnic group within a nation is not secessionism but a
legitimate aspiration and an inevitable phase in the political
evolution of an emergent country. It is only when that legitimate
aspiration is sought to be suppressed that it bursts out into
secessionism. India learnt this lesson quite some while ago — the
compulsions of the democratic process brought home that
wisdom to Indians.
As it turned out, however, the slogan of Islamic solidarity
woefully failed to stem the powerful democratic urge for self-
identity. As Mr. G. Lachance, a member of a three-man Canadian
Parliamentary delegation that visited India in early July to study
the Bangla Desh refugee problem, pointed out, it is not a criminal
offence to believe in the self-determination, or even independence,
of East Bengal.
And as to the other stimulus, while the alleged Indian threat
to Pakistan’s integrity came in very handy in the West wing so
obsessed with the Kashmir question, the Bengalis had little
difficulty in seeing through the hollowness of the bogey, and
refused to be taken in by it.
But the main reason why these stimuli failed to have the
desired impact on the people was that the spiritual hunger for
self-identity and for the fulfilment of the expectations roused
by Independence can never be satiated by such negative slogans,
even as the common bond of hatred of an alien imperialist
ruler ultimately proves inadequate to keep a people together
and knit them into a nation, as many excolonial countries have
come to realise. A people will respond favourably only if the
new political urges and material expectations roused in them are
satisfied with positive and concrete measures.
Indeed, fulfilment of regional aspirations for identity arc the
essential first step to the attainment of national integrity. Karl
von Vorys 1 thus questions the validity of the Pakistan Govern-
ment’s assumption that “to the masses of citizens the nationality
is the focus of political and economic organisation.’’ “It is
difficult to explain the persistent insensitivity of the Pakistani
programme to the political and economic exigencies of the
In his book Political Development of Pakistan.
YAHYA'S UNSUBTLE METHODS
27
subnational (regional) entitles, and the consequent concentration
of public investment in one part of the country (West Pakistan),”
he concludes.
But then in a country where the democratic temper is lacking,
these fundamentals tend to be ignored, and then they have to
pay the price that Yahya Khan is paying — with the bloody
mess he has made in East Bengal
In a democratic system, as in India, there exist built-in safety-
valves and correctives to meet such eventualities which could
avert resort to the extreme step In a firmly-rooted democracy
the Government dare not contemplate overruling the supreme
verdict of the people as expressed at a general election But
where a society lacks the democratic tradition, as is the case in
Pakistan, an inconvenient electoral verdict is defied without
any compunction. In Pakistan it has been done before, and it
has been done once again, this time by the dictator Yahya
Khan
The Bengalis are made to feel at every point of their life that
they are being pushed around and discriminated against In the
last thirteen years, with the advent of military dictatorship, they
have been denied even the illusion of political participation in
their country’s affairs,
The Bengalis are ill-represented m the administration and
defence forces of the country. Their political leaders are kept
out of the decision-making processes both at the Central and
provincial levels. East Bengal’s industries and business are almost
exclusively in the hands of non-Bengalis from the West Wing
During the last 23 years no serious attempt has been made in
the top echelons to replace the Punjabi administrators with
Bengalis in East Bengal. And the Punjabi administrator’s
swaggering arrogance reinforced the Bengalis’ charge of
colonialism against the West Pakistanis
All senior military members of the administration have been
West Pakistanis, and 87 per cent of the top officers in the Central
administrative service are also West Pakistanis. The vital key
posts of the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission and
Finance Minister, apart from those of permanent secretaries at
the head of Ley departments, have always been monopolised by
West Pakistanis. There have however been three Bengali Prime
Ministers, who held their posts literally during the pleasure of
28
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
the Governor-General who could, and did. sack them at his
sweet will and whim.
At partition, in 1947, East Bengal contributed only one ICS
man to the administration of Pakistan. In 1958, ten years after
independence, of the 19 secretaries in the Central Government,
not one was a Bengali, and there were only two Bengali joint
secretaries; and ten among 135 deputy secretaries and 30 among
350 undersecretaries and 16 among 151 assistant secretaries were
Bengalis.
There was an improvement in the position under the Ayub
regime, when for the first time a Bengali was appointed Chief
Secretary in the East Wing and many Bengalis were given
accelerated promotions and put in charge of responsible posts.
As late as 1968, however. East Bengal’s representation in the
Civil Service was only 36 per cent.
In the armed forces, the position was even worse. According
to the Pakistan Observer of Dacca, the ratio between West
Pakistan and East Bengal was 25:1 in the case of jawans and
90:1 in the case of officers. Eightyfivc per cent of the Services
were West Pakistanis.
In the army, the Bengalis formed 5 per cent of the officers. The
sole Bengali lieutenant-general, Khwaja Wasiuddin, happened to
be the son of Khwaja Nazimuddin, one of the founding-fathers of
Pakistan and former Governor-General and Prime Minister.
Ninety per cent of the jawans were from West Pakistan.
In the navy, officer level, Bengal’s share was 19 per cent in
the technical cadre and nine per cent in non-technical cadre. The
proportion of Bengalis in other naval ranks was 28.5 per cent.
In the air force, in the officer cadre, 1 1 per cent of pilots, 27
per cent of navigators, 17 per cent of technical officers, 31 per
cent of administrative officers, and 13 per cent education officers
were Bengalis/
The fact that both the federal capital and the armed forces
headquarters were based in West Pakistan gave the Western Wing
a tremendous economic advantage, even as the fact that East
Bengal lay a thousand miles away from the State’s nerve-centre,
completely out of sight and therefore out of mind, put the East
Wing at a disadvantage, both politically and economically.
That meant that the bulk of the expenditure on defence
: Khalid R. Sayccd, The Role of Military in Pakistan.
yahya’s unsubtle methods
29
and civil administration, amounting to Rs. 270 crores or over
70 per cent of the Central Budget, was made in West Pakistan.
Industries and entrepreneurs were for that reason naturally
attracted to the West wing, and they wielded considerable
influence on the formulation and shaping of economic and com-
mercial policies of the Central Government. Indeed, the West
Pakistanis soon began to feel a sense of possessiveness over the
Central Government
The latter reciprocated by investing much of the foreign aid
and development funds in the West Wing — which has been a
major grievance nursed by East Bengal against the Central
Government.
The situation was further accentuated by the fact that hardly
any of the vast defence expenditure was incurred in East Bengal,
and because East Bengal’s representation in the armed forces was
marginal, the Bengalis did not even benefit from the remittances
of military pay and pensions to their province or from large-scale
military contracts.
The constitution of 1956 was supposed to grant the principle
of parity between the two wings But the provision failed to offer
any statutory safeguards for the economic interests of East Bengal
in the matter of distribution of foreign exchange, aid and develop-
ment grants from the Central Government. The constitution also
guaranteed parity of representation between the two wings in
all central services, which pledge was honoured more in the
breach.
Thus the Director-General and all four deputy directors-general,
26 out of 27 directors, 47 out of 49 deputy directors, 86 out of 98
assistant directors under the Central Government were West
Pakistanis.
The Chairman of the Pakistan Industrial Development Corpora-
tion was a non-Bengali and so were all its directors and secretary.
There was only one Bengali among the 90 officers in the PIDC
organisation m the East Wing, and only seven clerks and five
peons out of a total of 700 of the subordinate staff were Bengalis.
Of the 150 scholarships awarded by the PIDC only two were
given to Bengalis
The interviews for these jobs were all held in Karachi, and
Bengali candidates had to go all the way to Karachi at their own
expense, which limited the number of applicants.
30
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
Then again, all West Pakistani officers posted in the East Wing
were paid a special zonal allowance, but an East Pakistani working
in the West Wing got no such allowance.
The PIDC had promised the East Bengal Government that in
its establishment in the East Wing, it would employ local recruits
for 75 per cent of the vacancies. But it failed to honour it even
in regard to the lower cadre of labourers.
Speaking in the Constituent Assembly on March 21, 1956.
Mujibur Rahman said that out of 61 projects launched by the
PIDC, only 17 were planned for East Bengal. Even when an
industrial project was launched it was ultimately handed over to a
non-Bengali from West Pakistan. In the industries started by West
Pakistanis in East Bengal, indigenous labourers were discriminated
against, being paid lower wages as compared with those paid
to the non-Bengalis.
The Evening Tima of Karachi editorially sneered at the
Bengalis’ demand for political parity between the two wings as
a principle conceived by persons “who cannot see beyond their
noses, whose mental horizons spread no further than the thoughts
of their jobs.” The reason behind the demand for political parity,
explained the editorial, was “unmistakably the short stature and
the small calibre of the present Bengali leadership."
Another common charge levelled against the West Pakistani
rulers by the Bengalis was that the former failed to take interest
in the well-being and problems of the East Wing, and in support
of that charge, they pointed at the failure of the Central Govern-
ment to take any measures to avert frequent floods and famines
which had become endemic in East Bengal.
The Bengalis never forgave the late Liaqat Ali Khan, when
as Prime Minister in the early fifties, he failed to visit the famine-
stricken region of East Bengal or grant an interview to Maulana
Bhashani to discuss the problems created by the famine.
Ataur Rahman, a prominent Bengali leader, burst out in the
National Assembly: “You do not wish to spend a few crorcs of
rupees for the poor people of East Bengal when they arc suffering
from the ravages of flood. You have given only 25 to 30 lakhs
for the suffering humanity in that part of the country. You cannot
give two crorcs to the people of East Bengal who are suffering
under water, floating, suffering and dying of cholera. And you
have the pleasure and luxury of having the capital at a new place
YAJIVA’S UtiSUBTLE METHODS J J
spending several thousand crores of rupees, leaving the present
capital to West Pakistan ”
The indiflerence and inefficiency, if not callousness betrayed
by the Central Government in handling relief to the victims of
the unprecedented cyclone of October 1970 was the last straw on
the camel's back. The universal charge against the Government,
which foreign observers attested, was that international relief
organisations were more prompt and expeditious than the Pakistan
Government in reaching the cyclone victims with succour
Large quantities of relief material, including food and medicines
rushed to East Bengal by foreign agencies, were still lying un-
distributed, while the motorboats and helicopters supplied by
foreign governments for that purpose, were being utilised by the
Pakistani Army in their campaign against Bengalis demanding
autonomy
The Yahya Government’s sluggish reaction to the tenable
calamity in East Bengal must have indeed brought to Mujibur
Rahman’s Awami League thousands of votes in the subsequent
general elections.
It is interesting to note that here as elsewhere, the greatest
democracy m the world, namely, the United States of America,
has bolstered up dictatorship against the indigenous democratic
forces. To the U.S. Military Aid Pact of 1954 must be traced
the Pakistani Army’s political ambitions and growth of power —
a gross departure from the apolitical tradition in which its British
mentors nurtured it — which culminated in General Mahomed
Ayub Khan’s military takeover in Pakistan, with the full blessings
of Washington.
Indeed. Washington’s ‘‘favourite son" treatment and the
Pentagon’s single-minded backing to General Ayub Khan,
encouraged the Pakistan Army generals to take a leaf from
Turkey and the Arab states and arrogate to themselves the role
of “saving the country from the pohucians" by snuffing out
democracy! Now that the army has tasted power and begun to
like the taste, the temptation is all the greater for them to
perpetuate the military regime on one pretext or the other.
For the period between 1954 and 1965 the military aid given
by US to Pakistan is estimated at between SI. 5 to 2 billion. The
aid included F 104 star-fighters, Patton tanks, armoured personnel
carriers and automatic and recoilless infantry weapons. In
32 PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
October 1970 Washington promised as ‘'one-time” exception,
military aid comprising ape’s (300); maritime reconnaissance
aircraft (4), F 104 jet fighters (6) and B57 bombers (7).
In fact, the United States’ record in Pakistan, and for that
matter elsewhere in the world, is consistent. In 1954, at a moment
when authoritarianism and democracy were arrayed against each
other in Pakistan, U.S. military aid and patronage extended to
former tipped the scales against the democratic forces in that
country and helped to intensify tensions in the Indo-Pak sub-
continent. In the State Department and Pentagon that goes by
the name of “power balance in the region’’.
And if today. President Nixon chooses to back Yahya Khan
in the latter’s ruthless campaign against Bengali democratic
forces, in the face of murder of human rights and of genocide
perpetrated on unarmed people fighting for their rights, he is
following the traditional policy of the U.S.A.
Hence the Awamy League’s strong opposition to the US-Pak
alliance and Pakistan’s foreign policy. They are against the
Government’s obsession with Kashmir, because it has proved
highly detrimental to East Bengal’s interests and they want to
restore friendly relations with India for sound economic reasons.
Trade with India is vital for East Bengal’s economic health.
The Bengalis have no reason either to love the Americans or
be grateful for their military aid to Pakistan. For the highly
sophisticated weapons, received by Pakistan as member of the
SEATO and CENTO and intended to contain the tide of com-
munism in South-east and West Asia, were mostly used against
the Bengali agitators and demonstrators demanding autonomy and
economic justice. A powerful military' machine of the kind built
up by Islamabad could be possible only by diverting resources
from the much-needed development projects. This policy hurt
East Bengal more because it was more backward.
Far from benefiting from such colossal expenditure on defence,
in the 1965 India-Pakistan war. East Bengal found itself un-
defended and exposed to danger. There was no more than one
army division posted in the province to defend it against any
possible invasion by India. It was India’s self-imposed restraint
that saved East Bengal from war on that occasion.
The Indo-Pak war convinced the Bengalis more than ever be-
fore that their country was no more than an expendable colonial
kaiiya’s UNSUBTLE methods 33
appendage of West Pakistan, who considered a war gamble over
Kashmir deserving of a priority higher than that of ensuring the
external security of East Bengal The then Foreign Minister
Zulflkar Ah Bhutto’s explanation to the indignant Bengalis that
under a mutual understanding, the security of East Bengal had
been entrusted to China rubbed salt into the wound.
“The total impact of such discrimination on many fronts has
been that the economy of East Bengal is today in a state of
imminent collapse,” declared Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in his
clection-evc broadcast on Oct 28. 1970
A Cultural Revolution
East Bengal Muslim nationalism was incessantly fed and
prodded by the stimuli provided by West Pakistani colonialist
repression. Provoked and threatened with the erosion of their very
identity, the Bengalis reacted sharply. In the resultant struggle for
“emancipation”, as Mujibur Rahman called it, they clutched at
every mark of Bengali individuality.
Giving the depth of feeling and background to the Bengalis’
determination to overthrow West Pakistani colonial rule in his
land, an “Observer” 1 recalls the suppression and humiliation the
Bengalis suffered at the hands of the British imperialist rulers
following the Indian Mutiny of 1857: “However, even after in-
dependence the West Pakistanis sought to perpetuate this myth;
(that Bengalis were non-martial and inferior) first by trying to
impose Urdu as the only state language of Pakistan and sub-
sequently by trying to Urduizc the Bengali language and culture,”
wrote “Observer”. “This was more evident when the Pakistan
army deliberately pursued a policy of not taking Bengalis in
its ranks. . . . This policy was maintained even though in the sole
war fought by Pakistan, the 1965 engagement with India, the
only soldiers to distinguish themselves were Bengalis, men of
the 1st Bengal Regiment.
“The hatred towards the Bengali was total : his culture was
’• A contribution published in the Bulletin issued by the Bangla Dcsh
U ission in New Delhi.
34
A CULTURAL REVOLUTION
35
belittled, his efficiency suspected and even his eating habits and
his way of life were held in the greatest contempt As a result of
all these factors, there developed, over the painful years, a seething
hatred towards the West Pakistani ”
“Observer" concluded “The revolution in Bangla Desh
therefore is not merely against exploitation by West Pakistan —
it is to preserve our race, our language, our culture that we are
fighting For once and for all, we wish to break the myth created
by the British, and prolonged by the West Pakistanis, that
Bengalis, in some inexplicable way, are ‘inferior’, and prove to
all, that the awakened Bengali is a viable force to contend with."
The Pakistan Government’s foolhardy attempt to impose Urdu
on the Bengalis as the national language verily sparked off a
cultural revolution in East Bengal A language, which in the
pre-Independence days many a Bengali Muslim* did not hesi-
tate to dub as Hindu and Sanskrit in culture, and therefore
un-Islamic, now became a powerful symbol of Bengali culture
and nationalism
Rabindranath Tagore became their deity more than even before.
It has to be remembered however that as far back as 1937 Dacca
University had established a department for Bengali and offered
honours and master’s degrees in Bengali language — it was only
six years later that Calcutta University followed suit
In the process, the East Bengali Muslims rediscovered their
cultural heritage and began to notice the racial and ethnic gulf
between them and the West Pakistanis. Indeed, while the West
Pakistanis turn to West Asia for cultural kinship, East Bengal
Muslims belong to the South-East Asian group of Muslims, with
much more in common with the Malaysians and Indonesians —
the West Asian Arabic Muslims have always considered (heir
South-east Asian compatriots inferior.
Indeed, like all political grievances, the language movement in
East Bengal throve on repression.
On March 21, 1948, the Qaid-e-Azam declared at a public
meeting in Dacca in his customary vehement style: “Let me
warn you in the clearest terms of the dangers that still face
Pakistan and your province in particular, as I have done already.
Having failed to prevent the establishment of Pakistan, thwarted
5 A. K. Majumdar, Advent of Independence
36
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
and frustrated by their failure, the enemies of Pakistan have now
turned their attention to disrupt the State by creating a split
amongst the Muslims of Pakistan. These attempts have taken the
shape principally of encouraging provincialism. As long as you
do not throw off this poison in our body politic, you will never
be able to weld yourself, mould yourself, galvanise yourself into
a real true nation.”
Three days later delivering the convocation address at the
Dacca University Jinnali returned to the theme with greater
emphasis. He declared :
“Let me restate my views on the question of the state language
for Pakistan. For the official use in this province, the people of
the province can choose any language they wish. This question
will be decided solely in accordance with the wishes of the people
of this province alone, as freely expressed through their accredited
representatives, at the appropriate time, and after full and dis-
passionate consideration. There can however be only one lingua
jranca, that is, the language for intercommunication between
the various provinces of the State, and that language should be
Urdu and cannot be any other.”
What followed was an explosion. The students demonstrated
against the Qaid-e-Azam’s statement and demanded the re-
cognition of Bengali as a national language.
On February 21, 1952, to protest against Government’s langu-
age policy as adumbrated in the Basic Principles Committee’s
Interim report, the students organised a mammoth demonstra-
tion, which soon enveloped almost the entire city of Dacca. The
police repeatedly opened fire on the crowds who had turned viol-
ent, and killed 20 and injured hundreds.
Responding to pressure of public opinion, Nurul Amin’s
Government initiated a resolution in the Provincial Assembly
demanding Bengali to be made a national language of Pakistan,
which was promptly passed. Soon after, the Central Government
yielded and proclaimed Bengali a state language side by side
with Urdu.
Thereafter, the students of East Bengal have observed every
year February 21 as Shahced Day (martyrs’ day) to commemorate
the supreme sacrifice made by Bengali youths for their language.
A CULTURAL REVOLUTION 37
The Central Government’s prejudice against Bengali as a
language of Hindu culture came to be expressed in various ways.
Attempts were made to “Islamise” the language without much
success Under the Ayub regime the Government even appointed
a committee to “reform” the Bengali language and “Arabise” its
script But Bengali Muslims killed the attempt with ridicule
To denigrate a subject people’s culture and seek to establish
the superiority of that of the metropolitan country is an old.
tried tactic of colonialism The West Pakistani rulers were there-
fore following a tradition practised by colonial powers from times
immemorial
Communist China has resorted to these methods systematically
in its peripheral regions like Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia and Tibet
The Han culture, and through it national integration, has been
sought to be imposed on the people of those regions in four
ways.
(1) “Language reform” and indoctrinated literature,
(2) transplantation of Chinese people in large numbers as
settlers in those lands,
(3) reducing the indigenous population through the liquidation
of the resisters of “recultunsation” campaigns launched by their
alien rulers, through banishment to labour camps or transfer en
masse to another region;
(4) bringing batches of hand-picked young men and women
from those regions to Peking for a prolonged period of education
and indoctrination, to be ultimately sent back home as catalysts
and messengers of the great Han culture among their own people
Yahya Khan would appear to be taking a leaf out of the red
book of his friend and patron Mao on at least the first three of
his tenets
Bengali resisters have been liquidated on a mass scale or chas-
ed across the border into India, and attempts are being made to
settle non-Bengalis in their place Indeed, Islamabad seems to
have embarked upon a fantastic operation m East Bengal with
a view to changing the demographic contours of that province
From all indication, the ambitious plan appears to be to
transplant on a large scale the Muslim immigrants from India,
who remain unassimilated in large parts of West Pakistan, to
East Bengal to provide them a new home and help to raise a
new breed of loyal inhabitants in that province.
38
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
According to Anthony Mascarenhas' article in the Sunday
Times of London, plans for “re-educating" and “Islamising" the
people of East Bengal — that is, those still left behind — are
already on hand. Over 3.000 policemen and hundreds of officials
have been moved from West Pakistan to East Bengal, and more
are on their way.
Like the Jews of medieval Europe or Nazi Germany, the help-
less Hindu minority in East Bengal comes in handy as a con-
venient target to divert people’s passions from their genuine
grievances. Hence Yahya’s murder gangs have turned their
attention on the Hindu community. The Pakistani authorities
have for long been wanting to get rid of the considerable Hindu
minority, and here was a good excuse to accomplish the fell
objective. Hence the large-scale pogroms embarked upon by the
Pak Army against the Hindus in the towns and villages of East
Bengal.
“Justification for the annihilation of the Hindus was para-
phrased by Lt.-Gen. Tikka Khan, the military governor of East
Bengal, in a broadcast.” writes Anthony Mascarenhas in his
Sunday Times article. Tikka Khan said: “The Muslims of East
Pakistan who had played a leading part in the creation of
Pakistan, arc determined to keep it alive. However, the voice
of the vast majority had been suppressed through coercion, threats
to life and property by a vocal, violent and aggressive minority,
which forced the Awamy League to adopt the destructive course.”
Major Bashir, SSO of 9th Division at Comilla explained to
Mascarenhas : “This is a war between the pure and the impure.
The people here may have Muslim names and call themselves
Muslims. But they are Hindus at heart. You won’t believe that
the maulvi of the Cantonment mosque here issued a fatwa during
Friday prayers that the people would attain janat (paradise) if
they killed West Pakistanis. We sorted the bastards out and
we are sorting out the others. Those who arc left will be real
Muslims. We will even teach them Urdu.”
Dividing the ranks of the nationalist forces through separate
communal electorates is another tried trick of colonialism which
the British imperialists practised in pre-Independence India so
successfully. The West Pakistani rulers have been wanting to
introduce separate electorates in East Bengal for many many
years, but in the face of the united opposition of Bengali Muslims,
38
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
According to Anthony Mascarenhas’ article in the Sunday
Times of London, plans for “re-educating" and “Islamising” the
people of East Bengal — that is. those still left behind — are
already on hand. Over 3,000 policemen and hundreds of officials
have been moved from West Pakistan to East Bengal, and more
are on their way.
Like the Jews of medieval Europe or Nazi Germany, the help-
less Hindu minority in East Bengal comes in handy as a con-
venient target to divert people’s passions from their genuine
grievances. Hence Yahya’s murder gangs have turned their
attention on the Hindu community. The Pakistani authorities
have for long been wanting to get rid of the considerable Hindu
minority, and here was a good excuse to accomplish the fell
objective. Hence the large-scale pogroms embarked upon by the
Pak Army against the Hindus in the towns and villages of East
Bengal.
Justification for the annihilation of the Hindus was para-
phrased by Lt.-Gen. Tikka Khan, the military governor of East
Bengal, in a broadcast.” writes Anthony Mascarenhas in his
Sunday Times article. Tikka Khan said: “The Muslims of East
Pakistan who had played a leading part in the creation of
Pakistan, arc determined to keep it alive. However, the voice
of the vast majority had been suppressed through coercion, threats
to life and property by a vocal, violent and aggressive minority,
which forced the Awamy League to adopt the destructive course.”
Major Bashir, SSO of 9th Division at Comilla explained to
ascarenhas : This is a war between the pure and the impure,
he people here may have Muslim names and call themselves
uslims. But they are Hindus at heart. You won’t believe that
t re maulvi of the Cantonment mosque here issued a fatwa during
, n .? ra ^ ers l * lat ^e People would attain janat (paradise) if
ey i e West Pakistanis. We sorted the bastards out and
we are s °r tir >g out the others. Those who are left will be real
Muslims. We will even teach them Urdu.”
Dividing the ranks of the nationalist forces through separate
munal electorates is another tried trick of colonialism which
successfully 'tIi^'w 313 £ rac . tised m Pre-Independence India so
introduce q' i St P:dastani rulers have been wanting to
years but in ^ ra C eIe ?° rates . in East Bengal for many many
e face of the united opposition of Bengali Muslims,
A CULTURAL REVOLUTION
39
they (ailed in their plot. Now that they have crushed or driven
out the Awami League Muslims from East Bengal, it is reported
that Islamabad has decided to introduce the communal poison
in East Bengal’s body politic through the separate electorates
Indeed, in an article, Z. A Suleri, senior editor of the Pakistan
Times, considered close to the military junta, has advocated:
“The constitution (to be framed) should deprive the Hindu
minority of the vote, foist Arabic script on the Bengalis, divide
Bengal into two or four provinces, negate the Bengalis’ over-
riding representation in the Assembly and leave the Punjab as
the dominant province of the country ”
According to a DPI news item from Islamabad, the Pak
education authorities have already ordered that all textbooks for
Pakistan's schools and universities be “screened” to conform to
"the ideology of Pakistan" as a Muslim nation. The Central
Bureau of Curricula and Textbooks was authorised to remove
any material which might be “offensive to the founding concepts
and ideology of Pakistan” and to include such material as would
reflect “our cherished goals.”
The decision to screen textbooks at all levels was taken at a
meeting held in Islamabad of the Vice-chancellors of all Pakistan
universities under the chairmanship of the Secretary of the
Ministry of Education and Scientific Research, Dr Z A Hashim
The formidable block in the way of the East Bengalis realising
their legitimate political aspirations is the powerful opposition
of the mililary-bureaucratic-industrial complex now firmly
ensconced in the seats of power in Pakistan. The advent of
democracy spells death to their interests
The Army’s prejudice against democracy, and the bureau-
cracy’s distrust of it, plus the industrialists’ vested interest in the
status quo — all three exclusively West Pakistani — bring together
three most powerful elements in the life of Pakistan to forge a
united front ranged against the consummation of East Bengalis*
democratic demand.
For, the moment those aspirations are fulfilled, democracy
would be ushered in And democracy in Pakistan means the
shifting of political power to East Bengal, which will, at one
stroke, convert the West Pakistani from the status of the ruler
to that of the ruled — in other words, the roles reversed: a
humiliating prospect!
40
PAK COLONIALISM IN HAST BENGAL
That, besides, also means cutting the Army to size, pulling
the bureaucracy in its place and diverting the West Pakistani
industrialists of their privileged position. In a word, that would
mean an end to the colonial exploitation of East Bengal by West
Pakistan that has been going on without let or hindrance for
the last 24 years.
Such a denouement the powerful military-bureaucralic-industrial
clique will never allow to occur. The clique has the strength to
prevent it. And since it is for them a fight for survival, they
will pay scant regard for cither the consequences for the country
or the gross injustice or the degree of violence involved in their
desperate bid.
The logic of the situation has therefore convinced both parties
that either East Bengal is forcibly kept part of Pakistan as the
latter’s colonial appendage, or it breaks away as an independent
state: there could be no half-way house about it.
Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, a shrewd civil servant, who was the
first secretary-general of Pakistan Government and later its Prime
Minister, as far back as 1950. is reported to have laid down two
guidelines for Pakistan: (1) That East Bengal would sooner or
later walk out of Pakistan and therefore Government must not
pay much attention to East Bengal’s economic needs; and (2)
that the Government must find ways and means to squeeze out
the Hindus from East Bengal. Both the guidelines have been
faithfully implemented over the years by Islamabad.
Such then being the stakes, it is idle to expect the West
Pakistani rulers voluntarily to abdicate in favour of democracy;
they arc bound to fight to the last ditch to retain the status quo.
In its early first phase, in the eighteenth and nineteenth century,
European colonialism was crude, blatant and unnecessarily brutal.
But as it matured, in the middle phase, colonialism became some-
what enlightened and sophisticated in its methods. In its final
phase, in the twentieth century, as it mellowed, it even developed
a kind of social conscience and adopted a greater finesse in its
techniques. Some of those colonialists at any rate knew when
to get out with grace — that is, when they realised that the cost
of clinging to their colonial possessions in the face of resistance
from a politically-awakened indigenous population, was loo high.
And using brutal force to preserve their colonial empire was not
practicable in the post-Sccond World War era.
A CULTURAL REVOLUTION
41
The West Pakistani colonialism m East Bengal is obviously
going through the first phase of crude, blatant and brutal
methods, (hough coming to birth two centuries too late
Offensive superior airs put on by the West Pakistanis in their
altitude towards the East Bengalis, reminiscent of the old British
‘koi liais*. is one symptom of that rudimentary phase But it has
added insult to injury and intensified the flashpoint of Bengali
nationalism, when tact and political wisdom would have averted
tragedy and disintegration of Pakistan and retained the Bengali
Muslims’ loyalty to it
It IS distortion of the truth for (he Pakistani rulers to charge
Bengalis with the motive of wanting to break away and set up
an independent State As Mujibur Ualitnan has repeatedly pointed
out. the Bengalis were in a majority in Pakistan and therefore
there could be no question of their seceding, they were only
demanding economic justice and their due share of political
power as the majority community in the country But for the
West Pakistani rulers, acquiescence in such a legitimate,
democratic demand amounted to giving up their economic and
political dominance over Pakistan and loss of easy benefits
accruing to them from the colonial exploitation of East Bengal
Come what may. they were not prepared to relinquish that pri-
vileged position.
Indicting the Ayub regime- that brought the Bengali dis-
content to a boil - for treating East Bengal as a colony of West
Pakistan, Dr. John E Owen, at one time UN sociology adviser
at the University of Dacca, in an article published in The Hindu
of Madras, observed that many Bengali Muslims told him that
East Bengal was poorer now than it was m 1947. while many
West Pakistanis said to him that they would have been "glad to
ditch East Pakistan if it were not for the jute”'
Ayub's own attitude towards the Bengalis --a mixture of a
colonialist arrogance and patronising condescension, reminis-
cent of the British imperialist stance towards Indians a century
ago — illustrates the point In his autobiography friends, not
Masters, Ayub Khan writes:
"They (Bengalis) have been in turn ruled either by the caste
Hindus, Moghuls. Pathans or the British. In addition, they have
been and still arc under considerable Hindu cultural and
linguistic influence. As such they have all the inhibitions of the
42
PAIC COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
down-trodden races and have not yet found it possible to adjust
psychologically to the requirements of the new-born freedom.
Their popular complex, exclusiveness, suspicion and a sort of
defensive aggressiveness probably emerge from this historical
background.”
In another passage very condescendingly Ayub confesses to a
liking for Bengali songs though he had “no real ear for music”
and tells a Bengali friend to his face: “You have such sweet
music. I wish to God you were half as sweet yourself” — a typical
example of lack of subtlety. Then the Field Marshal patronisingly
adds, “I found that once you got to know an East Pakistani he
really accepted you without reservation.”
Ayub Khan however admits that the West Pakistani officials
serving in East Bengal were “no angels or missionaries” and
“many used to be irritated by what they regarded as a general
inefficiency of the East Pakistani." Then he goes on lo comment
on “the lack of manpower with qualities of leadership” among
the Bengalis and how he advised the army selection board lo
take the local boys “anyway because nobody would accept that
the board had been fair and objective and that the rules and
specifications had been rigidly applied.”
Of a piece with Ayub’s attitude is the Punjabi Army officer’s
reference to Bengalis as recorded by a Guardian correspondent:
“The trouble with these people is that they have never seen a
war before. They run like rabbits. Maybe when they had their
villages burnt down three times, they’ll get used to it.” The
Guardian commented: “There in three sentences is the true
Pakistani army attitude. Callous, careless of life, indiscriminate
of slaughter; and at heart, sickeningly supercilious. The Bengalis,
who have endured for centuries in the swampland of the East are
unworthy of full human status. They run like rabbits because
they are rabbits. They can be mowed down like rabbits. . .”
The London Economist once described the Bengalis (of East
Pakistan) as the “most articulate, most politically conscious, and
most permanently disgruntled group in the subcontinent.” The
sensitive elite of the new, fast-growing middle class among the
East Bengali Muslims have for long smarted under the rebuffs,
indignities and injustices inflicted on them by the West Pakistani
overlords. Traditionally, the Bengali, whether he is Hindu or
Muslim, is politically more articulate as compared with the feudal
A CULTURAL REVOLUTION
43
and less intellectual Punjabi The thought that the Bengalis who
were politically more advanced and formed the majority in
Pakistan should be denied their share of political power in the
country’s governance and that the comparatively politically back-
ward Punjabis, who arc in a minority, should rule over them
was humiliating indeed
The lid forced down by a prolonged military dictatorship on
this simmering discontent, composed of an amalgam of indigna-
tion, humiliation, frustration and disillusionment, blew off when
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's Awami League were denied the
democratic right, legitimately earned ui a general election. to
frame a constitution and form a government of their choice —
an opportunity they had so ardently prayed for so long This
is the implication of the convulsions East Bengal, nay Pakistan
as a whole, is now going through since March 1971
Were those at the helm in Pakistan truly patriotic men,
interested in preserving the integrity and unity of that Stale, they
would have immediately realised that decentralisation and a
large measure of provincial autonomy is the only answer to the
problems posed by a State with that monstrous structure.
To insist on ruling from a thousand miles away, in Islamabad,
a turbulent majority with scores of grievances chalked against the
Central Government, is to invite trouble Only llic single-track,
authoritarian mind of a colonialist would persevere in the folly.
Much of the administrative mclficicncy and lack of imagination
and political bungling by Islamabad in the handling of the affairs
of East Bengal must be traced to this mentality.
”ll is neither feasible nor practicable for llic Central Govern-
ment at Karachi (now Islamabad) to attend lo the increasing
needs of this vast humanity.” pleaded Prof Muza (far Ahmad of
Dacca University in a newspaper article. "The geography renders
it impossible. Ou the other hand, the provincial government,
either for lack of authority or of resources or for (he lack of
both, is unable to satisfy many of the legitimate demands and
needs of the people."
Muhammad Abdul Kfuicquc, a Bengali member, on March 4,
1955. declared from the floor of the Pakistan National Assembly:
“Placed as we arc, our provinces (West Pakistan and East Bengal)
are far flung These two provinces have all the appearances of
two countries . . . people must sec that the writing on the wall is
44
I*AK COLONIALISM IN HAST DliNGAL
there. If the demand for secession comes from the youths of that
country (East Bengal) a hundred Awami League organisations
will not be in a position to prevent that demand.”
In his historic speech at the Rawalpindi Round Table Con-
ference in March 1969, Mujibtir Rahman made a powerful plea
for "bold solutions”. He said. “The unique geography of the
country, resulting in lack of labour mobility, as well as the
dilTerent levels of development in the different regions, require
that economic management should not be centralised."
Encyclopaedia Britannica defines a colony as "any territory in
which conditions of life — social, economic, political — are
defined in considerable measure for the whole population by a
minority different from the local majority in culture, history,
beliefs and often race.” The passage adds that currently, as
considered by Asians, Africans and Latin Americans, a colony is
"any territory that is under the overwhelming economic or political
influence of another country.” Both these definitions seem to fit
like a glove to the Pakistani rule in East Bengal.
The East Pakistan League’s appeal addressed to the United
States Government and members of the Senate and House Com-
mittees on Foreign Relations underlines the Bengalis’ depth of
feeling against West Pakistani colonial rule in their country. The
appeal pleaded:
“The situation in East Pakistan is not much different from
what was in the USA when you were embarked on your glorious
struggle. Like the British colonies in America. East Pakistan was
being b;ied white in the interests of alien rulers a thousand miles
away, llike you, v/e have to pay taxes to a distant government
indifferejiu to our welfare without any right of representation. Like
you, we|have decided to exercise our right of self determination.
Like ycAi, we will prevail, no matter what the cost.”
Muc/i political wisdom and a lot of improvisation and original
thinking are called for to devise a constitution that could meet
the peculiar and unique requirements of a bifurcated Stale like
Pakistan, with a thousand miles of foreign territory separating
the two parts. Alas, it has been clear that the rulers of Pakistan
lack that statesmanship.
Instead of imbibing the right lessons from the actual experience
of administering the State in the last 24 years and forging a
constitution seeking to rectify the shortcomings discovered in the
A CULTURAL REVOLUTION
45
process, they are clinging to an ideology that had been long ago
exploded in West Asia and elsewhere in the world and has
proved equally fallacious and unworkable in Pakistan Indeed,
they seem to be prepared fanatically to defend that ideolog} to
the point of disrupting Pakistan in the name of preserving its
integrity l
Gulf of Distrust
The history of Hast Bengal’s feud with “Upper India Muslims,”
as they called them, goes far back to the first years of this
century. Over the years the Bengali Muslims’ mistrust of the
latter developed into a complex and a vendetta. In the pre-
partition days. East Bengal Muslims have at least thrice charged
their compatriots from northern India with failing to stand by
them on political issues of grave concern to them.
In the eve-of-partition euphoria, Bengal Muslims chose to over-
look their unhappy experience of the past in the rosy expectation
that Pakistan would bring them a new heaven and a new earth in
which they would rule the roost!
Indeed, Muslim Bengal, before Partition, was the pioneer and
cradle of Muslim separation. Muslim League was born in Dacca
in 1906, at the initiative of Sir Salimullah, the Nawab of Dacca.
It was this mustard seed sowed in Bengal, the largest Muslim
province of undivided India, that grew into the mighlly tree of
Pakistan. Among the Muslim-majority provinces of undivided
India, the Muslim League was most active in Bengal, and Bengal
was also among the first to have a Muslim League Ministry.
It was a Bengali Muslim, A. K. Fazlul Huq who moved the
historic Pakistan resolution at the Lahore session of the Muslim
League in 1940. Thereafter, following the spectacular victory of
the Muslim League in the provincial general elections in 1946,
it was again a Bengali, Shahced Suhrawardy, who moved the
46
GULr OF DISTRUST 47
Pakistan resolution at the triumphant Muslim League Legislators’
Convention held in Delhi that year
It was Suhrawardy, as Chief Minister of Bengal, who by staging
the “Great Calcutta Killings”, convinced the Hindus that they
could never co-exist peacefully with Muslims, and thus persuaded
them to acquiesce in the partition of the country The unprece-
dented riots were designed to forge sanctions for the Muslim
League demand for partition of the country For after that, the
Hindus of Bengal — ull then resolutely opposed to partition —
immediately opted for a bifurcation of their province
In the 194(3 provincial elections, Muslim League in Bengal
scored 116 out of 119 seals allotted to the community The Mus-
lim League’s performance in the other provinces was nearly as
spectacular as that in Bengal In the Central Assembly they cap-
tured all the 30 scats, in Bihar 43 of 50, HP 54 of 66, Punjab 79
of 86, Sind all 34, Bombay all Muslim scats Indeed, everywhere,
the League won thumping majorities except in the North-West
Frontier Province where it could annex only 17 out of 38
Thus at the Muslim League Legislators' Convention held at the
Anglo-Arabic college in Delhi in 1946, the Bengal contingent —
by far the largest in the assembly — was the cynosure of the vast
zindabad-shouting gathering Shaheed Suhrawardy was the
proudest man that day in that hall
A special train decorated with League flags and bunting and
the words “Muslim League Zindabad” chalked out on the side
of the engine, brought the Bengali contingent to Delhi. The train
was somewhat late, so that when the contingent arrived at the
Anglo-Arabic college, the hall was already filled and packed with
eager, slogan-shouting crowds, who gave the Bengalis a terrific
ovation, as they filed in, with a beaming Suhrawardy at their
head
Very rightly, as the leader of the largest Muslim League party
among the provinces, Suhrawardy was given the honour of
moving the Pakistan resolution at the Convention. The resolution
reiterated the demand for Pakistan and for the setting up of two
constituent assemblies for the two countries that were to come
into being.
Before concluding, the Convention got the assembled League
members of the Central and provincial assemblies to take an
oath pledging to “undergo any danger, trials or sacrifice which
48 1’AK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
may be demanded for the attainment of Pakistan."
Amid the tumult and shouting of zindabads. the Bengali Muslim
leaders assembled failed to notice the significance of a seemingly
innocuous change in the wording of the Pakistan resolution moved
by Suhrawardy. Nor did they care. For they had not the least
doubt that in the Pakistan soon to be born, the Bengalis would
be the rulers under any counting-of-heads democracy by virtue
of their numerical majority in the new Slate.
The draftsman of the Pakistan resolution. C'haudhuri Khali-
quzzaman had changed the word “states" in the original Lahore
resolution into “stale” in the resolution moved by Suhrawardy -
according to the Chaudhurisaheb, a change he deliberately made,
to which no one in the drafting committee raised any objection.
The drafting committee was chaired by Nawab Ismail Khan
and comprised of, besides Khaliquz/.aman, Hasan Ispahani. Abdul
Matin Choudhri and Ismail Chundrigar (no Bengali among them).
The resolution, moved by Suhrawardy. seconded by Khali-
quzzaman and supported by Feroze Khan Noon, Chundrigar.
Ghulam Hussein Hidayatullah and others, read inter alia:
“This convention of Muslim League legislators of India,
Central and Provincial, after careful consideration, hereby declare
that the Muslim nation will never submit to any constitution for
a United India and will never participate in any single constitu-
tion-making machinery set up for the purpose, and that any
formula devised by the British Government for transferring power
from Britain to the peoples of India, which does not conform
to the following just and equitable principles, calculated to
maintain internal peace and tranquillity in the country, will not
contribute to the solution of the Indian problem :
“(1) that zones comprising Bengal and Assam in the north-
east and Punjab, North-West Frontier province. Sind and
Baluchistan in the north-west of India, namely Pakistan zones,
where the Muslims are in a dominant majority, to^bc constituted
into a sovereign independent state and that an unequivocal
undertaking be given to implement the establishment of Pakistan
without delay.
“(2) that two separate constitution-making bodies be set up
by the peoples of Pakistan and Hindustan for the purpose of
framing their respective constitutions;
‘(3) that the minorities in Pakistan and Hindustan be provided
GULF OF DISTRUST
49
with safeguards on the hoes of the All-India Muslim League’s
resolution passed on March 23. 1948. at Lahore,
“(4) that the acceptance of the Muslim League demand for
Pakistan and its implementation without delay are the sine qua
non for the Muslim League cooperation and participation in the
formation of an interim government at the Centre
“This Convention further emphatically declares that any
attempt to impose a constitution on an United India basis or to
force any interim arrangement at the Centre, contrary to the
Muslim League demand, will leave the Muslims no alternative
but to resist such imposition by all possible means for their
survival and national existence ”
Later, when East Bengal Muslims rued over the fate they
met in Pakistan. Abdul Hashim, Secretary of Bengal Muslim
League, recalled how he had questioned at the 1946 Muslim
League Legislators’ Convention the change made in the text
of the Lahore resolution and demanded the constitution of East
Bengal as a separate independent State. He alleged that Jinnah,
presiding over the 1946 Convention, browbeat him by declaring
that the plural used in the original Lahore resolution was a
printer’s devil!
Subsequently, some time after Partition, Hashim raised the
issue with Khahquzzaman 1 and asserted that he did raise the
question m the subjects committee of the Convention. Khali-
quzzaman checked up on the point with Nawab Ismail Khan,
The Nawab wrote back:
“I am afraid I have no recollection of the objection raised by
Hashim . . . what has really astounded me in your letter is
that Mr. Jinnah ruled that the world ‘'states" was a misprint
How can a chairman disregard the phraseology of the written
constitution and base his ruling on unrecorded memory of
his own? If the word had been a misprint, as is contended,
how was it that it was not rectified when this resolution was
converted into the creed of the Muslim League? Surely,
particular care should have been taken at the time that the
language employed was not dubious and vague. In the sub-
sequent editions of the constitution, which were many in
number and were published under the direct supervision of
1 Khali q uziAma o's memoirs, Pathway to Pakistan
50
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
Nawabzada Liaqat Ali Khan, the same words were repeated.
I have by me the last edition of the constitution published
before Partition. The word "states” occurs. For your reference,
I reproduce the relevant phrases from it. They arc: The
establishment of completely independent stales . . . the Mus-
sulmans are numerically in majority as in the north-western
and north-eastern zones shall be grouped together to constitute
independent states as a free national homeland’.
“The whole context vitiates the ruling of the President. Had
the objection been pressed vigorously I feel sure the substitu-
tion could not have been effected. Any how, the whole
controversy, after accepting the proposals of the British
Government, appears to me to be meaningless and uncalled
for. It is perfectly true that the word ‘state’ was substituted
for the word ‘states’. Whether it was done validly and legally
has only an academic interest.”
In the mean lime, the Cabinet Mission Scheme, which had
been accepted by the Muslim League, had proved unacceptable
to the Congress, and had been withdrawn by the British Govern-
ment. This was construed by the Muslim League as a rebuff to
it. In protest and retaliation, the Muslim League decided to hold
a “Direct Action Day”, in the observance of which Muslim
Bengal took the lead. The outcome was the “Great Calcutta
Killings”.
But the gulf of distrust between the Bengali Muslims and
“Upper India Muslims”, which has widened and deepened since
Partition, can be traced to 1906 when the North Indian Muslims
failed to back Bengali Muslims’ opposition to the annulment of
the partition of Bengal by the British Government under pressure
from the Hindus and the Congress.
Later, once again, Bengal Muslims accused their brethren
from Upper India of letting them down when the latter accepted
the Lucknow Pact between the Congress and the Muslim League
under which the Muslims were given weightages in Hindu-
majority provinces and in Bengal, where the Muslims were 52.6
per cent of the population, were given 40 per cent of the total
number of seats in the legislature, while the Punjabi Muslims
with. 54.6 per cent of that province’s population, were allotted
50 per cent of the seats in the provincial legislature. Indeed,
GULF OF DISTRUST 51
following the signing of the Lucknow Pact by the League, many
Bengali Muslims resigned from the League
Nevertheless, as the largest Muslim province of the country,
Bengali Muslims were, later, in the vanguard of the Pakistan
movement. They did so not only because they were the largest
Muslim group belonging to Ihe largest Muslim-majority province,
but also because they looked forward to be on top in a new
Muslim state and to shaking off the economic and cultural tute-
lage of the Hindus
When after partition, they discovered that their lot was no
better, if not worse, w the new dispensation, their embitterment
turned into volcanic fury. Alas, their numerical superiority was
of no avail to them Indeed, the West Pakistanis were reducing
their province into a colony for exploitation by the West
Later when they were discriminated against by the West
Pakistan rulers, they began to recall and emphasise that it was
the Bengali Muslims who had fought for and won Pakistan.
They pointed out, “We have seen in Bengal, in particular during
the 1946 election. 99 per cent of the Muslim population voted
for Muslim League and for Pakistan, when Muslims of other
provinces were indifferent to the cause.” 1
Things began to happen immediately after Partition. When the
Constituent Assembly met at Karachi, no sooner the oath-taking
ceremony was concluded than a member from Bengal got up
and moved a resolution suggesting that the Constituent Assembly
should meet alternately in Karachi and Dacca
A discussion followed, writes Begum IkramuIIah, a Bengali
Muslim Leaguer and member of the Constituent Assembly, m
her book From Purdah to Parliament. “And I, forgetting my
nervousness, joined in I supported the idea wholeheartedly,
poinung out the great benefit that would come of it. Prime
Minister Liaqat All got up to reply and. looking at me, said in a
mock horror. ‘Women never understand practical difficulty,’ to
which I retorted, ‘If we did, we would not have got Pakistan
today’.”
The demand which was considered impracticable by Liaqat
Ali Khan was later conceded, and Pakistan’s National Assembly
has been meeting in Dacca too.
1 Mahbudul Huq, National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, April 16,
1963.
52
i'AK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
A Bengali member for the first time, in 1948, spoke in the
Constituent Assembly of a feeling “growing among East Pakistanis
that East Pakistan is being neglected and treated merely as a
colony of West Pakistan.”
The focus of the Bengalis’ agitation turned on the explosive
issue of language. The Qaid-e-azam himself flung the lighted
match into the tinder in March 1948 by his two vehement speeches
asserting that Urdu alone would be the national language.
When famine hit East Bengal in 1948, the Central Government’s
failure to show concern about the distress caused and to take
quick measures of relief forfeited whatever confidence the Bengalis
had in the rulers from West Pakistan and distrust began to grow
between the two wings.
Shamshuddin Ahmad, a Muslim League member, exclaimed
in the East Bengal Assembly: “It was a disgrace that our
provincial Ministers could not impress upon the Central Govern-
ment the needs and demands of our province. They could not put
through their demands to the Centre and they could not make
their grievances felt even by the Governor-General."
Sensing the popular mood, the Muslim League Chief Minister
Nurul Amin responded appropriately. “The province must be
allowed to enjoy full autonomous position,” he declared. His
Finance Minister flamidul Haq Choudhury (now turned collabo-
rationist) demanded a larger central allocation of funds for East
Bengal. His paper Pakistan Observer backed the demand with a
vigorous editorial.
The Central Government’s response was to apply PRODA
against Hamidul Haq Choudhury and debar him from being
member of the Assembly for five years.
In September 1950 the Interim Report of the Basic Principles
Committee was presented to the Constituent Assembly. That
report sought to deny the Bengalis the advantage of their
numerical majority in the country. East Bengal reacted by raising,
for the first time, the cry of autonomy and harked back to the
Lahore resolution of 1940.
On November 21, Nur Ahmed said in the Constituent
Assembly: “In East Bengal there is a growing belief that there
are principles in the report which if adopted will reduce the
majority of East Bengal into minority and it will turn East
^Bengal into a colony of Pakistan.”
GULF OF DISTRUST
53
At a national convention held at Dacca, the grand old man of
Bengal politics, Fazlul Huq called for the grant of full autonomy
for the two wings of Pakistan The Basic Principles Committee
interim report was shelved
In 1951. the mild Khwa/a Nazimuddm, a Bengali, succeeded
Liaqat All as Prime Minister of Pakistan, and ironically enough,
by sponsoring the Central Government’s policy that installed
Urdu as the sole national language of the country, provoked a
virulent language agitation m East Bengal
The Bengalis did not expect that from a Bengali Prime
Minister. In violent demonstrations on February 21. 1952. some
20 perrons were killed and hundreds wounded in police firings
The enure province was up in arms
The Basic Principles Committee's final report was published in
December 1952, which ensured Bengali domination at the Centre,
by providing for parity between East Bengal and a West Pakistan
divided into four or more provinces It was now the turn of the
Punjabis to demonstrate They protested against the basic prin-
ciples enunciated in the report, which they attacked as un-Islamic.
The outcome was a riot in Lahore in which orthodox Muslims
went on rampage against the Ahmediyas.’ and the army had to be
called out to quell the riots
The anti-Ahmediya riots were seized upon by the Punjabi ruling
clique to dismiss the Nazimuddm Cabinet at the Centre This
added fuel to the fire of discontent in East Bengal where, by
now. the charge of Punjabi conspiracy to dominate Pakistan at
the expense of the Bengalis was publicly bruited
In 1953, with the first provincial general elections round the
comer m East Bengal, the three main indigenous parties —
Shaheed Suhrawardy’s Awami Muslim League. Fazlul Huq’s
KnshaL Sramik Party and the Nizam-i-Islam — joined together
to forge a united front against the unpopular Muslim League. It
amounted to the raising of the banner of revolt against West
Pakistani rule.
Its 21-point charter demanded: recognition of Bengali as the
official language side by side with Urdu, complete autonomy
for East Pakistan in aff mailers except defence, foreign policy
* The Ahmedija sect, which believes that its founder Ilazrat Mtrza
Ahmed is a Prophet of God, is considered heretical and un Islamic by
orthodox Muslims
54
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
and currency; dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and
rejection of the draft constitution; complete freedom from the
Centre with regard to export of jute; consultation between Centre
and East Bengal on the allocation of foreign exchange; abolition
of Indo-Pakistan passport and visa system and all the existing
restrictions between East and West Bengal; and devaluation of
the Pakistani iupee.
The last two demands in particular constituted East Bengalis
bread-and butter. The travel and trade restrictions between the
two Bengals and the non-devaluation of the Pakistani rupee had
brought economic ruin to East Bengal in general and to its main
exchange-earning trade, jute.
In the September of that year, the Awami Muslim League
dropped the “Muslim" from its name and turned a secular, non-
communal parly — an act of tremendous courage in the Pakistan
of the time, hardly six years after partition. Two months later,
the Awami League came out with a manifesto that demanded the
abolition of zamindari without compensation and nationalisation
of the jute and tea industry in the province.
In the ensuing elections, the United Front won hands down
and routed the Muslim League — nearly as spectacular a victory
as that the Awami League won in 1970. The United Front
captured 223 of the 310 seats in the Provincial Assembly. Nural
Amin, the leader of the Muslim League, lost to an 18-year old
student.
So deep was the prejudice nursed by Punjabis against the
Bengalis that the C & M Gazette of Lahore explained away the
United Front victory by attributing it to “the swarms of com-
munist cells" in East Bengal. “The University of Dacca in
particular is affected with the germs,” the paper wrote. “About
80 members of the newly elected legislature are believed to be
communists or fellow-travellers.”
When Fazlul Huq formed in April 1954 an United Front
Ministry in East Bengal, much alarm and concern were betrayed
by Karachi. In the then Capital of Pakistan, anti-Bengali
demonstrations were staged, and the Muslim League in East
Bengal incited riots between Bengali and non-Bengali workers
in the Adamji Jute Mills in Narayanganj.
On May 30, Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad seized
upon an emotional speech delivered by Fazlul Huq in Calcutta
GULF OP DISTRUST 55
to dub him a traitor wanting to strike for East Bengal’s
independence, and sacked his Ministry Huq’s spirited denial of
the charge and reiteration of loyalty to Pakistan were ignored
by the Central Government Fazlul Huq was placed under house
arrest This however did not prevent the Central Government
from appointing Huq as Governor of East Bengal a year later!
Governor’s Rule was proclaimed in the province and “strong
man” Iskandar Mirza was sent down as Governor to Dacca
Opposing the one-unit Bill in the Constituent Assembly in
September 1955, Ataur Rahman, a Bengali leader echoed a
common Bengali sentiment when he observed. “Sir, the attitude
of the Muslim League coterie here was one of contempt towards
East Bengal, towards its culture, its language, its literature and
everything concerning East Bengal In fact, sir, I tell you that
far from considering East Bengal as an equal partner, the leaders
of the Muslim League thought wc were a subject race and they
belonged to a race of conquerors”
On another occasion, a few months later, Ataur Rahman
ruminated- he “did not feel as much when I went to Zunch,
Geneva or London as I feel here in my own country in Karachi
that I am in a foreign land.”
In January 1956, Maulana Bhashani at a public meeting in
Dacca warned that the people of East Bengal would be forced to
prepare for secession if the Central Government did not fulfil its
economic demands
Ayub Khan took some vigorous measures to discourage pro-
vincialism in the country and to integrate the various provinces
into the Pakistani nation. He realised efforts to impose national
integration from the top had proved a failure He now therefore
attempted the task from the bottom. In 1959 he established a
Bureau of National Reconstruction which was armed with
copious funds to carry out the task of national integration Its
goal was “to coalesce all divergent linguistic, sectarian and social
groups into a single cohesive nation.” The Bureau carried out
publicity through pamphlets, leaflets and posters propagating
emotional integration of the country
Although the Islamic ideology was not excluded, the Bureau
now laid emphasis on secular national unity It encouraged the
development of local culture as part of the nation-building
process.
56
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
The Bureau’s activities were however largely confined to urban
areas. It failed to stem the tide of regionalism rising all round
in the country. This was underlined when Basic Democrats from
the four corners of Pakistan, east and west, met in Dacca in
February 1962 for a three-day convention. “During the three days,
the delegates from West Pakistan participated in discussions, in
the committee deliberations, in the convention recommendations
and the variety of social and cultural programmes,” writes Karl
Von Vorys. 1 “In the proceedings, vigorous references were made
to united commitment to Pakistan, including a rather dramatic
statement by Ayub Khan. Still it was clear there were firm and
definite regional groupings. East Pakistanis seemed to perceive
a patronising attitude in the West Pakistani delegates. The latter
in turn thought they detected suspicion on the part of Bengalis.
A delegate from Mardan complained: ‘They treat us like
foreigners. I tell them they are our brothers, but they still treat
us like foreigners.’ ‘Now I know why I never liked the Punjabi,’
confided another from Sylhet."
For various reasons, the bureau’s activities soon withered away.
The bureau was wound up in 1961. “As massive internal efforts
towards national integration proceeded and full dimensions of
the task unfolded," adds Vorys, “a rising inclination to seek
support for cohesion from international stimuli became perceptible
— external enemy — the chief threat India, but also Afghanistan.”
Nor did the West Pakistani’s stereotype image of the Bengali
help to bridge the gulf of prejudice between the two wings. For
example, Ayub Khan, as head of state and dictator of Pakistan,
himself nursed a strange contempt for the Bengali, though, as
was his wont, he appeared very patronising towards the latter.
His comments also underline the gulf of distrust and mis-
understanding separating the Bengalis from the West Pakistanis.
“I could not quite understand whether the agitational pressure
in East Pakistan was the result of a combination of little things,
such as personal complaints and grievances or the manifestation
of some deeper malady,” writes Ayub in his autobiography
Friends, not Masters. “I often heard criticism of the conduct
of civil servants serving in East Pakistan. They were accused of
being exclusive and aggressive and their attitude was regarded as
patronising. I saw many of these officers at work in the province,
* Political Development of Pakistan.
CULP OF DISTRUST
57
and I thought they worked very hard and were deeply interested
in the welfare of the province No doubt their manners and pattern
of life were different, an average East Pakistani was inclined to
misjudge and misunderstand them It is quite common for a
West Pakistani to answer a simple question with a grunt and not
realise that he is being impolite ’’
Trying to pinpoint the root cause of the distrust. Ayub writes -
“The trouble in the early days of independence was that there
was very little social contact between the East Pakistanis and
West Pakistanis The average West Pakistani found himself
isolated and tended to form a group of his own I would tell a
West Pakistani 'Why don’t you meet them'’ Ask them over and
entertain them even if it is over a simple cup of tea You will
get to know each other at the human level and, from that,
friendship and warmth and understanding will develop’ ”
Ayub made no bones about lus conviction that the Bengalis
were an inferior race as compared with the West Pakistanis
lie bruited that view freely and openly, which only further
angered and humiliated the Bengalis
“Go and fight it out with the Central Government to get your
rights. Do so by all means, but also insist that jour young men
and women should be properly educated so that they can dis-
charge their responsibilities as equal citizens as well as any one
else," Ayub exhorted the Bengalis. But has cautioned them, "And
do not lake the argument too far After all, human beings arc
human beings, and if jour brethren in West Pakistan start feeling
frustrated and unhappy at being constantly subjected to criticism
and pressure, you will be doing a very great disservice to the
unity of the country. For God’s sake keep jour differences and
jour argument within the bounds of reason ‘
Chaudhun Muhammad All in his memoirs dwells on the same
theme. He writes: “It is impossible to redress the neglect of a
century in a few years. All this was well recognised. Yet, voices
of discontent soon began to be raised against the preponderance
of the West Pakistanis in the Central Government and the entire
blame for the existing imbalance was laid at the door of the
Central Government, This unjust accusation was repeated
endlessly until it became an article of faith with many in East
Pakistan.”
Friends.
Masters
58
PAtC COLONIALISM IN HAST BENGAL
“Since East Pakistani officers were not available, others had
to be sent there to take care of the province’s administration and
services under the control of the Central Government, such as
the railways and the customs," adds Muhammad Ali. “Many of
them had never been to East Pakistan before and were not
familiar with the language, manners and susceptibilities of the
people. To the normal failings of the bureaucratic behaviour was
added in some cases at least an attitude of supercilious superiority
...Soon grievances multiplied and some people went so far as to
suggest that the behaviour of West Pakistani officers was the
main cause of estrangement between East and West Pakistan.
Though this is an exaggerated view, it has an element of truth
in it.”
Muhammad Ali put the finger on the root cause of the distrust
when he explained: “Geographical separation of East and West
Pakistan produced not only administrative but social, economic
and political problems as well. Distance made communication
fitful and expensive- Misunderstandings arose easily and were
difficult to dispel. Since the capital was in West Pakistan, East
Pakistan felt neglected. The differences in language and back-
ground put obstacles in the way of national integration.”
Abdul Mansur Ahmad, a Bengali member, in a speech in the
Pakistani National Assembly, pointed out that Pakistani states-
men were called upon to create one nation but of “two peoples"
for they were entrusted with the unique job of governing a
state consisting of two countries. The two peoples, barring
minorities, had a common religion and were linked by a common
struggle for the achievement of Pakistan. Mansur Ahmad said:
“With the exception of these two things, all other factors, viz.,
the language, the tradition, the culture, the costume, the customs,
the dietary, the calendar, the standard time, practically everything
is different. There is in fact nothing common in the two wings,
particularly in respect of those factors which arc the sine qua non
to form a nation.”
The Bengalis nursed the grievance that the Punjabi-dominated
Central Government in West Pakistan was denying them their
political due and turning their province into a colony. The
Punjabis, on the other hand, betrayed a fear that the Bengalis
by virtue of their numerical superiority might impose Bengali
rule over the country, to the detriment of the Punjabis. The
GULF OF DISTRUST
59
Punjabi leaders were therefore found at this juncture furiously
hatching schemes that could avert the "calamity” The outcome
was the notorious one-unit scheme — Mumtaz Daultana and
Chaudhuri Mohammad All are reported to be the co-authors of
the scheme
The despotic rule and arbitrary actions of Ghulam Mohammad
and Iskandar Mirza had demoralised the country’s politics and
rubbed the East Bengalis the wrong way Provincialism was now
running rampant in the entire country “The short history of
Pakistan is replete with examples of politicians, even very
prominent politicians, who sacrificed previous commitments, the
interest of their party and the stability of the political system in
order to obtain personal advantage," wntes Karl Von Vorys in
his book*
Constant rebuffs and impcrviousness to then economic grievan-
ces and political demands fanned to white heat the discontent in
East Bengal.
The Bengalis’ struggle for idenuty now moved on to the phase
of agitating against regional disparities in the allocation of central
funds, in public and private investment, in per capita income,
in the growth rate, the gross provincial product and in the Central
civil and military services
Ataur Rahman speaking m the National Assembly on March
19, 1956, bitterly exclaimed: "You have pushed East Pakistan
to the verge of frustration and starvation and economic ruination
Now the bond that existed has been broken You have broken the
tie. it is for you to restore the tie and confidence and faith of
East Pakistan.”
Then he warned “You write it out and take note of this, lest
you forget that a small man from East Bengal administered this
warning and, God forbid, if what I fear does happen one day.
it is you (the central ruling coterie), and nobody else, who would
be blamed because of the behaviour towards the people of East
Bengal.”
As the massive efforts of the Bureau of National Reconstrucuon
failed to check the fissiparous trends in the country, and as the
Ayu’o regime's popreiVaroy go\ on the -want, \Vie ccM -wat wiVi
India and to a lesser degree with Afghanistan, came to be
* Political Development in Pakistan
60
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
intensified. The number of anti-Indian news items in the Pakistani
Press suddenly increased.
"After a temporary suspension of coid war, following dis-
illusionment over the Ayub-Nehru agreement,” wrote Karl Von
Vorys. 7 "the newspaper headlines again focussed on Indian
threat and aggression. The average days per month when Dawn
carried such reports on its front page rose to 15. Government-
censored editorials veered toward the use of force. The President
called upon his countrymen ‘to unite and prepare ... to defend
their homeland’."
Vorys continues: "When a group of Dacca University students
were involved in a fight with Indians during their journey home
from Calcutta, Government encouraged a mass demonstration.
The inexcusable publication of the holy Prophet’s picture in a
West Bengal textbook led to riots in Calcutta and communal
violence around Malda. There was a perceptible tendency on
the part of Government to magnify such occurrences by keeping
them alive through public statements. The riot in Malda was
reported over and over again. Later these reports included the
Murshidabad district. It was an act of considerable integrity for
a Dacca paper to send its correspondent to the area and then
report that ‘there has been no communal clash or even a minor
incident in Murshidabad preceding, during or after the Malda
disturbances.’ Meanwhile, the Government decided to bring
Kashmir before the UN Security Council, a move which was well
publicised. The President of Azad Kashmir toured the country
and inflamed passions with his oratory.”
Vorys noted that during 1963 a record of 307 daily issues of
Dawn each carried at least one front-page item connoting India’s
aggressive designs. “This monthly average of 26 is more than
twice the level of the early days of martial law and far exceeds
the high point reached in the months preceding martial law,”
comments the American writer.
Many a foreign observer avers that Ayub Khan started the
1965 war against India with a view to diverting the rising tide
of his unpopularity among the people to Pakistan’s favourite
external stimuli. Indeed, this whipping-boy was such an
indispensable favourite that even in the 1964 Presidential election
in Pakistan, Ayub’s rival candidate. Fatima Jinnah, was dubbed
' Political Development in Pakistan.
GULF OF DISTRUST 61
by the “kept” press as a favourite of India and other “enemies”
of Pakistan
Jean Wetz of Le Monde who visited Pakistan at the end of
1964. was surprised to find a campaign in the Press that India
wanted Ayub Khan to be defeated in the election' “Wetz, who
was a Delhi-based journalist, told the President that his im-
pression was exactly the opposite and that if anything, Indian
opinion was favourably disposed towards Ayub Khan The
President’s reaction to the observation was significant He was
reported to have remarked that he was not going to let Wetz
say that until after the election was over!”
• G. S. Bhargava, Pakistan ut Crisis.
6
Might Versus Right
To the UN and the international community, the life-and-death
struggle the East Bengalis are waging against Yahya’s Army may
be no more than the “internal affair” of Pakistan to be shrugged
off from one’s mind.
To the super-Powers, the desperate struggle might be only a
threat to the status quo and power balance in the South Asian
region, to be sternly discouraged.
To world public opinion, the tragic events in East Bengal are
possibly something more — a poignant human story unprecedented
in its dimensions — calling for urgent concerted measures of relief
to be rushed to the victims.
To the “still small voice” of human conscience in this world
of cynical international politics, however the agonising happenings
in East Bengal arc nothing short of re-enactment of the classic
battle between Might and Right, between the colonialist oppressor
and the oppressed, between dictatorship and democracy.
Pakistan’s politics are caught up in an intractable deadlock
which tends perpetually to deny democracy to its people. For this
battle stems from the twenty-year old feud between the two major,
rival elements in the country’s polity.
It is the fierce rivalry between the Punjabis, who have might on
their side, dominating as they do the armed forces and the
bureaucracy, on the one hand, and, on the other, the Bengalis, who
are in majority in the state and have right on their side, having
62
MIGHT VERSUS RIGHT 63
just scored an overwhelming victory in a fair election and are
entitled to form the government
Thus, those in possession are not prepared voluntarily to relin-
quish power. Those who have earned the right to power through
the democratic process, do not command the military sanctions
to enforce their demand
In other words, the West Pakistanis, (the Punjabis dominate
the West Wing) are fighting for all they are worth for the reten-
tion of the status quo, in which they have a vested interest, and
against the return of democracy, lest the Bengalis come into
power, with all the dire consequences flowing from it to those
who have ruled the roost all these 24 years
It is thus that we come upon in the 24-year history of Pakistan
repeated instances of the rulers trumping up pretexts to postpone
or sabotage democracy in the land A restoration of democracy
would at once divest the Punjabis of the political and economic
grip on the country they have enjoyed all these years, and put
the Bengalis into power !
Pakistan’s political history since its mception is largely the
story of the struggle of the Bengalis to restore parliamentary de-
mocracy m the country and the Punjabi executive’s manoeuvres
to sabotage the former’s efforts In the early three years, while the
first glow of achievement endured and so long as Muhammad All
Jinnah and Liaqat All Khan were at the helm in Pakistan, every-
thing seemed to go on swimmingly m the new State
The Qaid-e-azam and his trusted lieutenant, Liaqat All Khan,
the two top-most leaders and co-founders of Pakistan, were both
immigrant Muslims, with unparallelled prestige, whose detach-
ment and bona fides were lmphcity accepted m both the Wmgs
and whose non-partisan approach to the grievances and problems
of East Bengal was above suspicion Even then the Bengalis did
not hesitate to demonstrate their protest when Jinnah declared at
Dacca that Urdu alone would be Pakistan’s lingua franca.
But Jinnah died within thirteen months of the birth of Pakis-
tan, while Liaqat All Khan, on whom fell the mantle of the
supreme leadership of the infant state following the Qaid-e-Azam’s
death, was assassinated at Rawalpindi in October. 1951 — strangely
enough no serious effort has yet been made to get to the bottom
of the murder, though in some quarters it is traced to a chauvin-
istic Punjabi clique in the bureaucracy.
64
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST IiENGAL
Punjabi intrigue to snatch power had already begun in
Liaqat Ali’s life time. Predominating the defence forces and top
administration, the Punjabi elite soon developed a sense of posses-
sivencss over the infant state, and a gulf of political distrust
sprang between the “sons of the soil” and the refugee Muslims
who in the beginning wielded considerable influence in the govern-
ment. Indeed, in his latter days, even Liaqat Ali was increasingly
falling back upon the immigrant Muslims for advice and
confidence.
“He was a lonely man.” writes Ayub Khan about Liaqat Ali
in his book Friends, Not Masters. “Towards the end. Liaqat
was being challenged from several quarters. Politics became re-
gionalised, with the result that the Prime Minister was forced to
depend more and more on the refugee group.” Groupism had
already raised its ugly head in Pakistani politics.
After the death of Jinnah. with the colourless ineffective
Kliwaja Nazimuddin succeeding him as Governor-General, the
levers of power had temporarily reverted to the Prime Minister.
On Liaqat’s death, the country witnessed an unseemly scramble
for power, in which Ghulam Mohammad displaced Kliwaja
Nazimuddin as Governor-General, and the veteran Bengali leader
look over as Prime Minister. And once again, following the tradi-
tion laid down by Qaid-e-Azam, the head of State became the
repository of all powers. Ghulam Muhammad was both a civil
servant and a Punjabi, and therefore for the Punjabi permanent
executives, he was very much their man.
Pakistanis now began to hear the first rumblings of the tussle
between the Punjabis and Bengalis. Ghulam Muhammad himself
proved a past-master at intrigue and clever political operator.
The goings-on at Government House now resembled those in the
proverbial thieves’ kitchen. In the process, the immigrant group
of Muslims, who till then were at the helm, found themselves
pushed into the background.
Inevitably, the tussle between the Punjabis and the Bengalis
took the shape of a battle between authoritarianism and demo-
cracy. The Bengalis, as the majority community, discovered that
their political salvation lay in the maintenance of the democratic
system— but what was meat to the Bengalis proved poison to
the Punjabis, who in a democratic set-up would have to give up
their monopoly of governmental power.
MIGHT VERSUS RIGHT
65
Hereafter, therefore, whereas the tactics adopted by one side
were to devise ways and means to sabotage every attempt to bolster
up the democratic set-up. a return to parliamentary democracy
became the sine qua non of their political existence for the other
side.
For a while in 1952, with Nazimuddm as Prime Minister and
Nurul Amin as Chief Minister in East Bengal, the Bengalis seemed
to have got the upper hand in the Muslim League, then still the
hub of politics m Pakistan
On October 12, 1952, the Muslim League Council was convened
at Dacca and the League Constitution was amended giving parity
to the two wings whereby East Bengal’s domination within the
Muslim League was assured This was followed by the release of
the Basic Principles Committee’s report which sought to give
parity to the two wings in the federal legislature and thereby
reinforced Bengali domination in the governance of the country
Punjab, the dominant province in the West wing, was furious and
raised a storm of opposition against the BPC recommendations
until the report was shelved The Punjabis now came to the firm
conclusion that a Bengali grip on the government and the League
was inimical to their interests and should be prevented at any cost.
About this time, the anti-Ahmadiya riots broke out in Lahore,
which were allegedly inspired by Mian Mumtaz Daultana. Pre-
sident of the Punjab Muslim League Many Ahmediyas were
butchered and many more rendered homeless in the fierce
disturbances. That was turned into an excuse to get rid of the
Nazimuddm Government. In April 1953 Governor-General
Ghulam Muhammad sacked Nazimuddm peremptorily, even
though his Government enjoyed a majority in the National
Assembly and had just got its budget passed by it. The Governor-
General now called upon Mohamad Ah of Bogra. till then
Pakistani Ambassador in Washington, to form a government at
the Centre.
That was the first naked act of authoritarianism by the head
of state, that applied the axe to the democrauc processes and
constitutional procedures in Pakistan, and set a dangerous pre-
cedent. which his successors were quick to expfoit in order Co
banish democracy and estabbsh a dictatorship in the country.
The March 1954 provincial elections in East Bengal proved
re\oIuuonary in their impact on the country's politics. The election
66
PAK. COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
results revealed the growing strength of the Bengalis’ agitation
for political identity as well as the unpopularity and death of the
Muslim League in East Bengal.
It also dramatically underscored the fact that the members of
the National Assembly elected seven years ago on a limited
franchise had now ceased to be representative of the people. That
gave a fillip to the demand for fresh elections in the country,
which now spread to West Pakistan.
Hitherto the Puujabi-Bengali tussle for power was carried on
within the forum of the Muslim League. The 1954 provincial
election rendered any such manoeuvres meaningless and futile.
Henceforth, the battle between the two rivals was fought on the
larger national stage.
As related in the preceding chapter. Governor-General Ghulam
Muhammad grabbed at the first available excuse to sack the
Fazlul Huq Ministry in East Bengal, which symbolised the
Bengalis’ challenge to Central despotism and had to be crushed
out.
Any pretext was good enough to stamp on the Bengali struggle
for identity. To distort the province’s movement for autonomy
and dub it secessionist and treason is an old tactic on the part of
the rulers of Pakistan — a tactic which we were to see resorted
to again and again by Ghulam Muhammad’s successors to
sabotage democracy and deny economic and political justice to
the Bengalis. For the real sin of Huq’s United Front was that
it was defiant of the Centre and demanded full autonomy except
in foreign affairs, defence and currency.
Meanwhile the Nazimuddin group now sought to have its
revenge on Ghulam Muhammad in particular and the Punjabis
in general. When the Punjab unit in the Muslim League tried to
get its pet one-unit scheme adopted, the Bengal group saw to
it that the scheme was rejected by both the Muslim League
Parliamentary Party and the Constituent Assembly.
On the contrary, the Bengal group got the Constituent Assembly
to accept the alternative plan that divided West Pakistan into six
provinces, whereas the Punjabis’ one-unit scheme sought to weld
the existing four provinces of West Pakistan into one unit on the
basis of parity between the East and West wings.
Next, the Bengal group moved against the Governor-General
who had so summarily sacked the Nazimuddin Government.
MIGHT VERSUS RIGHT
67
When Ghulam Muhammad was away on a holiday, the group
got legislation rushed through the National Assembly that divested
the Governor-General of his powers to sack the Prune Minister
and repealed the PRODA, and then got the Basic Principles
Committee Report adopted by a house in which only 40 out of
80 members were present The Bengali Speaker, Maulvi Tami-
zuddin Khan looked the other way while these unseemly proceed-
ings were going on m the House The Assembly met at 9 am.,
an hour earlier than usual and ran through the special business
brought before it in ten minutes
How this farce was staged is vividly described by Ayub Khan
in his biography. “A resolution was printed in the middle of the
night and placed in the pigeon-holes of Members of the National
Assembly In the mommg the Assembly met as a constitution-
making body, an hour before its scheduled time, and revoked
sections 9. 10, 10-A, 10-B and 17 of the Government of India Act.
thus stripping the Governor-General of the powers in exercise of
which he had dismissed the Nazimuddin Cabinet "
Ghulam Muhammad flew back to Karachi and swiftly retaliated.
On October 24. 1954. he dissolved the National Assembly, pre-
liminary to framing a new constitution A new Constituent
Assembly was convened in August 1955, and Mohamad Ali of
Bogra was once again named as Prime Munsiet and Shabeed
Suhrawardy as Law Minister and General Ayub Khan was brought
in as Defence Minister — the first time a military man was inducted
into the Government.
Mohamad All of Bogra announced on November 22, 1954, the
Government’s decision to carry through the integration of West
Pakistan into 'One Unit’. The Governor-General issued an order
on March 27, 1955, establishing the new province of West
Pakistan. The Governor-General now decided to frame a consti-
tution on his own on the basis of his own ideas of “controlled
democracy" and assumed, under the Emergency Powers Ordinance,
full powers for constitution-making
The Speaker of the Constituent Assembly. Maulvi Tamizuddin
Khan (of East Bengal) challenged the Governor-General's action
in the High Court and the latter ruled that the Governor-General
had to convene a new Constituent Assembly for framing a
constitution
Thus in May 1955, the Governor-General called off the state
68
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
of emergency and announced the setting up of a new Constituent
Assembly consisting of 80 deputies, equally divided between East
and West Pakistan.
Gliulam Muhammad died in September and was replaced by
Iskandar Mirza as Governor-General, and the latter appointed
Chaudhri Muhammad Ali as Prime Minister, who brought the
legislation for one-unit before the new Constituent Assembly.
The measure evoked strong opposition not only from East Bengal
but also from the minority provinces of West Pakistan.
In the course of a powerful speech, Sardar Abdul Rashid
Khan, 1 the ousted Chief Minister of North-West Frontier Province,
created a sensation in the Constituent Assembly by extensively
quoting from a secret document entitled “Clearing the Decks”
which vividly brought out the ambitions and motivations of the
Punjabis in mooting the one-unit plan.
The authorship of the one-unit scheme has been traced to
Mian Mumtaz Daultana and Chaudhri Muhammad Ali. From the
extracts quoted by Sardar Rashid Khan, it was clear that the
twin objective of the scheme was to checkmate Bengali domina-
tion in Pakistan’s affairs by virtue of their numerical majority
and of snatching the leadership of entire West Pakislan for Punjab
by welding the four Western provinces into one unit. The scheme
gave parity to the two units in the federal legislature, thereby
depriving the Bengalis of the predominance they hitherto enjoyed
in that body on the basis of population.
The document emphasised: “That West Pakistan in its con-
frontation with East Bengal should speak as one entity, because
the politicians of East Bengal had often resorted to the ‘small
brother’s big brother role’ of West disruption”, and emphasised
the imperative need for West Pakistan to become one-unit to
counter East Bengal. It exonerated the use of violence in pursuit
of its aims. 2
“A final word about the role of Punjab,” stated the document
as quoted by Sardar Khan. “At present we do not require too
much noise in the Punjab. It will only put other people’s back
up and cause suspicion. Punjab must be kept quiet. The folly of
our friends must be checked At a later stage, Punjab will have
to take the lead. At that time, I hope an effective Punjab leader-
1 Constituent Assembly oj Pakistan debates 1055, Vol. I, No. 17.
2 J. K. Ray, Democracy and Nationalism on Trial.
MIGHT VERSUS RIGHT 69
ship will have been put in place both at the Centre and at
Lahore.”
The Frontier leader revealed that the authors of the one-unit
scheme had planned to launch their political campaign m favour
of the scheme towards the end of 1954, and the first thing to be
done was “to silence and render inoperative ail opposition of
which we are morally convinced that it is motivated by evil We
must take the benefit of full and firm exercise of authority to
create an opportunity for our voice to be heard "
The document revealed how the acquisitive instinct had been
roused in the hearts of the Punjabi ruling class. That was also
the beginning of their claim to a prescriptive right to possess and
rule Pakistan
They were conscious of the fact that their domination of the
armed forces and bureaucracy backed their proprietory claim
over Pakistan That proprietory claim could be menaced only by
a democratic set-up and by the Bengalis who enjoyed a majority
status in the country Hence forward therefore the twin political
objectives of the ruling Punjabi military-bureaucratic clique were
to prevent a reintroducuon of parliamentary democracy in Pakis-
tan and deny the Bengalis their democratic rights
The Establishment of West Pakistan Bill was passed m the
Constituent Assembly on October 5. 1955. and on October 14.
the new province of West Pakistan came into being, with Lahore
as capital.
The Constituent Assembly adopted the new constitution on
February 29, 1956 and the “Islamic Republic of Pakistan" came
into being on March 2, 1956 The Constitution also changed the
name of East Bengal into East Pakistan On East Bengal's insist-
ence. however. — the condition on which Suhrawardy lent his
support to the one-unit scheme — joint electorates were enshrined
in the constitution, even though West Pakistanis were generally
opposed to them.
The new constitution provoked a wave of protest m East
Bengal. The Bengalis neither liked the parity introduced between
the East and West wing, which denied them the advantage of
their numerical majority in the country, nor the change of the
name of their province from East Bengal to East Pakistan. Fur-
ther, the new constitution failed to concede their most important
demand— autonomy for their province.
70
PAK COLONIALISM IN LAST BKNGAL
On April 2, 1957, the Provincial Assembly adopted a motion
demanding full autonomy for East Bengal without delay, with
only defence, foreign affairs and currency reserved to the Centre.
Iskandar Mirza himself disliked the new constitution for dif-
ferent reasons. The new constitution made the Prime Minister
and his Cabinet the principal executive authority and reduced
the president to a titular head, whereas Mirza wanted to continue
his authoritarian role at the head of the state as well as the
government. So, from the day he was elected provisional pre-
sident of Pakistan, the two paramount objectives for which he
worked were: (1) to wreck the constitution, and (2) to become
the permanent President of Pakistan, with full powers as its
executive head.
He thus immediately set for himself the task of discrediting
the constitution and proving that it was unworkable. The game
of musical chairs in the Central Cabinet was now played with
a faster tempo and reckless abandon.
Chaudhuri Muhammad Ali’s sole achievement as Prime Minis-
ter was to get for his home-province the one-unit scheme. After
six month’s tenure, he was replaced by Shaheed Suhrawardy as
Prime Minister. The latter had warmed the Prime Minister’s chair
for hardly a year when he was displaced by Ismail Chundrigar.
Chundrigar lasted only 59 days, when Firoz Khan Noon took
over from him.
Thus Mirza showed less respect for constitutional niceties and
democratic norms. He treated the country as if it was his private
zamindari. By pushing around politicians like marionettes on a
string and reducing the legislatures to a mockery, he brought both
into contempt and ridicule in the eyes of the people and thus
hastened the advent of naked dictatorship in Pakistan.
Mirza made up with Fazlul Huq and overlooking the fact that
he had, a little while ago. proclaimed the latter a traitor, appointed
him as Governor of East Bengal. And then a fantastic, quick-
paced farce was enacted at the provincial level.
On March 31, 1958, a crisis reared in that province when
Governor Huq sacked Ataur Rahman Khan’s cabinet. Later that
night, Governor-General Mirza dismissed Huq himself. Ataur
Rahman was succeeded by Abu Hassan Sarkar as Chief Minister,
who was in turn sacked after 12 hours in office, and Ataur
Rahman came back in saddle !
MIGHT VERSUS RIGHT
71
The political confusion was seized upon by the President to
institute Governor's Rule in the province After two months,
Ataur Rahman was reinstalled as Chief Minister, and the Pro*
vincial Assembly met and pronounced the Speaker of "unsound
mind.” and in the brawl that followed in the House on September
21, the Deputy Speaker was hit and later died of the injury.
Between Ghulam Muhammad and Iskandar Mirza they took
every step possible to murder and bury democracy in Pakistan.
They actively conspired with the bureaucracy and the army to
discredit politicians and demoralise political life in the country.
It was in Mirza's regime as the head of State that the Army
was inducted into the country's political affairs by the appoint-
ment of its commander-in-chief. General Ayub Khan, as Defence
Minister in the Central Cabinet Mirza thus prepared the ground
and public opinion m favour of a military dictatorship m the
country.
If Ayub Khan is to be believed, people of Pakistan were so
fed up with the politicians and their government that "not infre-
quently they (army officers) would be told, ‘You armywalas, you
should be true to your salt While the country is going to the
dogs, you are enjoying yourselves.'"*
The Field Marshal claims. “Not only was I blamed : everybody
in uniform was being blamed Perfectly respectable people would
come to me and say. ‘You can save the situation, but you arc not
prepared to take any risk.' Some of my friends put it to me even
more bluntly, and I said to them. ‘What can I do? After all I
am not responsible for all this You can only criticize me for the
things that I am responsible.”
“The sense of demoralisation had seeped down to the masses
and they started saying openly. 'Let somebody save this coun-
try,'" observed Ayub Khan, who obviously needed no such
prodding. He concluded from such statements from the public:
“The implication was obvious: It was the army alone that could
step into the breach.”
The role that the Pakistani Army had now arrogated to itself
and its determination to intervene to save the country from the
politicians are reflected in A>ub Khan's significant observation
in his diary dated May 22, 1958* (five months before he took
over): “The elections of course are drawing near. The pohti-
* FrienJt, not Mailers * I but
72
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
dans ... are trying to get back into power by hook or by crook.
And having got there they know that they will have nothing to
show for themselves except working for the disruption of the
country further. In that case they will come face to face with the
army and me."
Ayub’s decision to take over the reins of government of the
country is implicit in his observations in the same passage further
on: “But they (politicians) have ail been tried and found wanting.
I am now certain that if the country is left to them we should
expect nothing but ruin."
On October 5. reported Ayub, he met President IVlirza sitting
on his lawn “brooding, bitter and desperate.”
“I asked him. ‘Have you made up your mind, sir?’ ‘Yes.’ he
replied. ‘Do you think it is absolutely necessary?’ 'It is absolutely
necessary.’ he said firmly.”
What was President Mirza “brooding, bitter and desperate
about?” Was it that the politics of the country were in a state of
shambles? Or could it be that he was worried about the man-
made economic crisis, through Governmental mismanagement and
recklessness, mounting up?
Both could be tackled by a purposeful and honest administra-
tion. In any case, if politics were in a bad state, he and his
predecessor were primarily responsible for it. They did everything
to deflate and debase politics.
Could it then be that Mirza was thinking of the nemesis likely
to befall him with the advent of the new order?
The scheduled elections following the inauguration of the new
constitution were drawing near. That would bring back a repre-
sentative government to a country threatened with political chaos
and politicians back in power who had been abused and maltreat-
ed all these years by an authoritarian government.
Much as he would like to, he dare not risk a major explosion
and postpone the elections for which the people were waiting
impatiently all these years. And yet elections might bring re-
tribution on one who had so misused and abused his powers as
though Pakistan was a sultanate of the Middle Ages.
On October 7. Mirza abrogated the Constitution and proclaim-
ed martial law throughout the land, dismissed the Central and
Provincial Assemblies and appointed General Ayub Khan Chief
Martial Law Administrator.
MIGHT VERSUS RIGHT
73
Twenty days later, Mirra abdicated and flew into exile in
London.
All these eleven years. Pakistan was supposed to have parlia-
mentary democracy Yet the federal parliament played a very
minor role in the governance of the country During those eleven
years, the legislature was in session for 338 days or for an annual
average of 30 days For the rest of the time, the executive ruled
uninhibited and unhampered by legislative vigilance Indeed, the
legislature was no more than the tool of the executive that used
it to legitimise the latter’s actions
During those eleven years, the National Assembly passed 160
laws, while the Governor-General issued 376 major ordinances’
Karl Von Vorys in his book Political Development in Pakistan
estimates that ninety per cent of the time since Independence,
public meetings and processions have been banned m one part or
the other of Pakistan
During this period, the Central Government also freely took
recourse to the notorious Section 92-A to supercede a provincial
administration and promulgate Governor's Rule m the province
Thus Punjab was under Governor’s Rule from January 1949 to
April 1953; Smd from December 1951 to May 1954, and East
Bengal from May 1954 to June 1955 In the first seven years of
independence, the Ceniral Government intervened in a provincial
administration ten times to sack provincial Ministries.
Munir Ahmad. Legislature of Paiutcn.
7
A Sergeant-Major’s Regime
It was a bloodless coup. General Ayub Khan called it a revo-
lution. Never had a dictator begun under more favourable
auspices. Ayub Khan, if his autobiography is to be believed, had
been grooming himself for this day. Indeed, he had twice before
declined the crown! And when finally the day came, power was
handed to him on a platter, amid all round acclamation, by the
President himself — though it looks as though, without realising
what he was doing! Ayub Khan sacked the President twenty
days later without much ado.
Ayub Khan was hailed as a saviour by a people fed up with
corrupt politicians and their dirty politics, from whom they looked
up to be delivered by him. A pompous and conceited personality,
with the manner and style of a sergeant-major who tended to
treat an entire nation like the barracks, Ayub Khan was more
than convinced of his own abilities to rule the country. No sooner
he took over as President than he abolished the office of Prime
Minister and concentrated all executive power in his own hands.
He had not the least doubt about what was wrong with his
country, and also that he alone — and none else— could put things
right.
The Ayub era opened with the promulgation of martial law
and a series of ordinances that snuffed out all civil liberties and
struck terror in the hearts of people. His first target was of course
his pet aversion— the politicians. The Elective Bodies (Disquali-
74
a sergeant-major’s regime 75
fication) Ordinance authorised special tribunals to try former
political leaders for “misconduct”.
The accused were however given the option of offering them-
selves to be disqualified from “being a member or a candidate for
the membership of any elective body" in order to avoid prosecu-
tion Majority of the politicians, with some skeleton or other in
their cupboards, chose to exercise the option and voluntarily
went into exile These numbered approximately 7000 in all Pakis-
tan. and 3976 in East Bengal alone
The Public Conduct Scrutiny Ordinance and the Scrutiny Ordi-
nance and the Public Offices Order were other draconian measures
enforced These ordinances authorised extraordinary screening
procedures, defined the scope of "misconduct” and “inefficiency”
and specified punishments Special military courts were set up
which could pass any sentence "except death, transportation, or
imprisonment exceeding one year or whipping exceeding 15
stripes.” Censorship was clamped down on the Press. By July
1959 some 19,662 officials had been punished. 813 of them by
dismissal.
Nor did the fading out of the martial law after 1962 relax the
rigours of the repressive measures — indeed, they were intensified.
Meanwhile the “sergeant-major” went round whipping people into
line, scolding citizens and threatening politicians, as he prepared
the ground for his "basic democracy"— which ultimately, from
all accounts, turned into a farce.
And yet Ayub Khan m his autobiography seriously claims: "To
my knowledge there has never been so much freedom in this
country as there is today (under the Ayub regime).”
At the outset however Ayub Khan made a spectacular impact
with Ins massive clcan-up campaigns m the capital and the
country as a whole. His anti-corruption, anti-ad liberation and
price control measures and his firm handling of the refugee pro-
blem brought him much popularity The people were happy to
see. at last, profiteers and adultrators meted out condign punish-
ment. When the refugees cluttering up the streets and open spaces
of Karachi were forcibly transplanted to a special colony laid
out for them away from the city, every one applauded.
It was all a novel, welcome change. But soon the novelty of it
all wore off, and the harshness of the martial law regime became
the day-to-day reality. And the people realised to their clognn
76
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
that they had exchanged King Log for King Stork and tossed
from one kind of corruption and misrule to another.
The much-trumpeted land reform when introduced hardly
touched the fringe of the problem. The policy of exploiting “the
social utility of greed” accelerated the country’s economic growth
while accentuating imbalance and widening the gulf between the
rich and the poor, enabling the rich to get richer faster. The Indus
Water Treaty signed with Jawaharlal Nehru on September 19,
1960, on the sharing of the waters of that river system between
India and Pakistan, was a feather in Ayub Khan's cap, particu-
larly as it roused hopes of a settlement of the Kashmir question.
For East Bengal, however, the Ayub era meant bleaker days
ahead. Hitherto some semblance of participation in the political
processes in Pakistan had been vouchsafed to Bengalis, so long
as the facade of the parliamentary system was kept up. Now
with the advent of martial law and overt dictatorship, the Ben-
galis’ political involvement in the governance of the country was
snuffed out and the safety-valve plugged. Ban on political activi-
ties and politicians intensified frustration.
With an almost exclusively West Pakistani personnel manning
the top military and civilian administration in the province, the
Bengalis’ major grievance that their country was treated as West
Pakistan’s colony attained substance. Ayub Khan’s own hauteur
and unconcealed contempt for the non-martial, small-stalured
Bengalis made him a hated man among the people. Nor did the
military regime’s brusque ways endear it to the Bengalis.
From the outset however Ayub Khan showed awareness of
the Bengalis’ long-standing grievances against the Central
Government and West Pakistan. He made some spectacular
gestures calculated to mollify them. He announced that Dacca
would be the principal seat of the National Assembly, and Isla-
mabad the principal seat of Government, and that both Urdu
and Bengali would be State languages.
He decreed that the provincial governors and ministers must
belong to the respective provinces. He publicly pledged parity
between the two wings in the services and allocation of develop-
ment funds and foreign aid. He established an exclusive Industrial
Development Corporation for East Bengal with its headquarters in
Dacca as also a separate railway board for the East Wing.
But the poison had gone too deep, which only drastic measures
A SERGEANT*MAJOR*S regime 77
could have expelled. Ayub was neither willing nor in a position
to go to that length. At this late stage, what he attempted to do
proved too little and too late. In any case, in most instances, the
promises proved paper gestures which were seldom translated into
practice or were distorted m implementation
For example, the projects launched by the East Pakistan Indus-
trial Development Corporation were mostly handed over to non-
Bengali entrepreneurs The promised quota of recruitment of
Bengali personnel in the EPIDC and the railway board was never
filled
The Bengalis were also quick to point out that though parity
might have been ensured m the allocation of development funds
between the two wings, the substantial additional funds earmark-
ed for projects under the head “Central” were all exjxmded in
West Pakistan, and therefore exclusively benefited the West Wing,
The charge was also made that Bengalis were kept out of the
decision-making processes
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was cjnical about the “grandiose plans
and projects for the development" of East Bengal He commented,
“If even 25 per cent of these paper schemes were to be transform-
ed into reality, East Pakistan would now be safely on its way to
an economic El Dorado and our standard of living would be
higher than that of Sweden or America ” The iron had already
entered the Bengali soul.
The Awamt League's cry for autonomy and economic parity had
already changed the political atmosphere in Dacca, when General
Ayub Khan took over on October 27. J958 For the moment the
jackboot of martial law hushed the rebellious mood of the people
By the winter of I960, however the agitation flared up again. On
January 28. 25.000 students took out a torch-light procession
shouting slogans of complete independence.
On January 24, 1961 students attacked the offices of the two
pro-Govcmment newspapers, the Morning Nens and Damik
Pakistan and set fire to them In the police firing that followed
four demonstrators were killed. The Students Action Committee
called a general strike in Dacca to protest against Government
repression.
On March i, 1962. Field Marsha/ Ayub Khan promulgated hjs
much-bruited new constitution based upon “basic democracies”,
as he described them. Under this constitution, the union councils.
78
I 1 A 1C COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
thana, tehsil, district and federal councils formed the basic demo-
cracies. A union council comprised 15 members of which two-
third members were elected, one-third nominated by Government.
The National and Provincial Assemblies were elected by the
members of the union council. This meant that not more than
80,000 electors out of a total population of 10 crores could vote
for elections to these councils. The basic democrats were them-
selves elected by universal adult franchise, and the basic demo-
crats, numbering 80,000 formed the electoral college to elect the
President.
As a pre-emptive measure, in anticipation of hostile agitation,
the President imprisoned Shahced Suhrawardy a month before
the promulgation of the new constitution. But Ayub Khan’s bit-
terest pill was that despite all the precautions he took to keep the
politicians out of mischief, the elections held in April 1962 to the
National Assembly under the system of “basic democracies”,
resulted in the return of politicians of the same old afliliations,
instead of non-party men that he hoped would be thrown up by
his system. The new National Assembly proved as deliant of
the Establishment as its predecessors.
When the presidential election was staged, the opposition par-
ties with their centre of gravity in East Bengal, bestirred them-
selves and set up a powerful rival candidate in Fatima Jinnah,
the sister of Qaid-c-Azam Jinnah. against Ayub Khan. Ayub
Khan of course won, but the volume of votes polled by Miss
Jinnah in urban areas was quite disturbing as it was an index to
the President’s waning popularity.
East Bengal had never accepted the constitution and agitated
for a full-fledged parliamentary democracy. To that end student
demonstrations were revived. Nine East Bengali politicians issued
a statement seeking permission to form political parties. When the
Government brought forward the Political Parties Bill which
imposed restrictions in regard to formation of political parties.
East Bengal MNAs vehemently oposed it and walked out of the
House in protest against it.
AH parties of East Bengal now joined together to form a
National Democratic Front, whose goal was democratisation of
the political processes in the country. On October 28, 1962. East
Bengal Leaguers held a Muslim League convention in Dacca to
demonstrate their opposition to the formation of a “King’s party”
A sergeant-major’s regime
79
by the President, called Muslim League Convention (after the
presidential election, Ayub Khan realised that he should have a
party of his own in the National Assembly to support his policies
and programme and mooted the idea).
Among further measures Ayub Khan now took to head off
agitation against his constitution in East Bengal were the declara-
tion of Dacca as the subsidiary capital and the appointment of a
Parity Committee whose task was to remove imbalances m the
Civil services. Apart from some young Bengalis getting accelerated
promotions and the appointment of a Bengali as Chief Secretary
to the Provincial Government, not much concrete evidence was
available of the Panty Committee's work.
But with the rise of the politically-conscious new middle class,
East Bengal’s struggle for idenUty had meanwhile moved from the
politics of distress to the politics of disparity, and was soon to
switch on to the politics of despair and rebellion, as it failed to
evoke sympathetic response from the authorities. The conviction
was deepening among them that the only true remedy for the
situation was a widest possible measure of provincial autonomy
including economic self-determination
Hope, however slender, still lingered that their aspirations
could be achieved peacefully and constitutionally. To that end,
they started agitating for adult franchise and direct election. On
March 15, 1964, province-wide demonstrations were staged to
focus attention on those demands.
In Febfljary^ 1366 j while West Pakistanis were agitated over
the Tashkent Agreement following the Twentytwo-day War be-
tween India and Pakistan, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman unleashed
the histone Six-Pomt programme on the country, which sought a
federal constitution that confined the Central Government’s con-
trol to foreign affairs and defence and empowered the two fede-
rating states to raise their own “temtonals” for their respective
defence and make their own agreements on foreign trade.
The six points were:
(1) The constitution of Pakistan must b e .federal, * ith a parlia -
m entary form of covemmeni td i! a legislature directly
elected on the basis of adult_ franchis e.
(2) Federal subjects to be limited to defence and foreign
affairs.
80
pak: colonialism in east hengal
(3) There should be (i) separate currenci es for the two Wings,
freely convertible into each other; (ii) in the alternative,
^one currency subject to statutory saf eguards, against flight
of capital from the East to the West Wing.
(4) Power of taxation and revenue collections to be vested in
the federating units; the Centre to be financed by alloca-
tion of a share in the State’s taxes.
(5) Separate foreign exchange accounts to be kept for East and
West Pakistan, the requirement of the federal government
to be met by the two Wings in proportion or on any other
fixed basis as may be agreed upon.
(6) Self-sufficiency of East Pakistan in defence matters — an
''ordinance factory and a military academy to be set up in
the Eastern Wing, the federal naval headquarters to be
located in East Pakistan.
In a pamphlet embodying these six points, Mujibur Rahman
referred to the “mischievous propaganda and motivated campaign
carried on by the vested interests" against East Bengal’s demands,
which revealed the depth of the bitterness felt by the Bengalis
against the West Pakistani rulers and the tactics resorted to by
them to browbeat the Bengalis and suppress their just agitation.
The Bengalis would “surely not forget that whenever in the
past any demand was made, however small, simple and reason-
able it might be,” said the pamphlet, “these beneficiaries and
agents of vested interests kicked up the self-same dust by raising
the well-known cries of ‘Islam in danger’, ‘disruption of Pakis-
tan’, ‘Sovereign Bengal’, etc. It was the same set of people who
discovered the ‘hidden hand of India’ in our simplest demand
for the inclusion of Bengali as a State Language along with
Urdu . . . Nothing is too mean for them to achieve their selfish
objective which is perpetuation of their exploitation of the people
of East Pakistan."
It was a well-reasoned document, which sought to disarm the
fears and suspicions of the people of West Pakistan and argued
cogently East Bengal’s case for a weak federal centre and larger
quantum of provincial autonomy. The pamphlet cited examples
from the USSR and the USA in support of its case for a federal
centre without the power of taxation. It recalled the Indian
Cabinet Mission Plan of a federal government without the power
of taxation.
A SERGEANT-MAJOR’S REGIME 81
Finally, demanding self-sufficiency m defence for East Bengal,
Mujib pleaded “East Pakistan is the home of the majority of
Pakistanis To defend it is the political obligation as well as
moral duty of the Government of Pakistan . How and with
what conscience do they say that defence of Pakistan lies in West
Pakistan . How will the arms, ammunition and wealth in West
Pakistan help East Pakistan when transport between the Wings
can be snapped in a matter of seconds?”
Ayub Khan in a speech at Rajshahi on March 16 charged that
the Six-Pouit programme was aimed at achievmg the dream of
“greater sovereign Bengal” and pronounced: "The fulfilment of
this horrid dream would spell disaster for the country and turn
the people of East Pakistan into slaves."
Later that month, the President addressing the Dacca session
of the Mushm League Council, warned: “They should be pre-
pared lo face even civil war. if forced upon them, to protect the
sovereignty and integrity of the country."
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, now elected President of the Awami
League, in reply, called upon the people to prepare for a “relent-
less, peaceful, democratic movement ” He then asked : "Why was
it that East Pakistan could not be helped during the national
crisis in September last (the 1965 war with India)? How was it
that the Foreign Minister (Bhutto) came out with the statement
that East Pakistan was saved because of China?" From that
episode, Mujibur Rahman drew ihe conclusion that the defence
of East Bengal could never be trusted to West Pakistan or any
foreign power. Both the East and the West Wings must be self-
sufficient in their defence, he insisted.
Now that the corrupt and opportunistic political leaders of the
pre-Independence vintage were no more, and a man of the cali-
bre of Mujibur Rahman, selfless, fearless, incorruptible and cap-
able of infinite sacrifice for the cause, had taken the mantle of
leadership of East Bengal’s struggle for “emancipation’’, the
movement assumed a tougher phase. Ayub for the first time be-
gan to take the Bengali agitators seriously.
On March 20 Mujibur Rahman was arrested. In June a gene-
ral strike was called to demonstrate the people’s support for the
Six-Pomt programme, that embraced Dacca, CbittagoDg, and
Narayanganj'.
Towards the end of July the Awami League and Maulana
PAJC COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
82
Bhashani’s National Awami Party jointly decided to launch a
movement to demand autonomy for East Bengal. This was fol-
lowed by a meeting of six opposition parties which discussed
plans for a campaign in favour of a direct election of the Presi-
dent and restoration of Parliamentary Government in Pakistan.
It was now clear that the Field Marshal was really worried.
His visits to East Bengal multiplied. In a speech on August 6 to
the MNAs and MPAs at Dacca, he declared: "Those who talk
of secession are not friends of the country nor friends of East
Pakistan. Let me warn you there is growing frustration in West
Pakistan that in spite of their sacrifices East Pakistanis are not
pleased. This is a dangerous feeling.” This is the kind of attitude
and tone which was bound to irritate and anger the sensitive
Bengalis.
With the Twentytwo-day War and the Tashkent Agreement,
Ayub Khan’s charisma broke and prestige got on the wane. That
war instead of bringing an easy victory and glory, risked loss of
Lahore and brought frustration. The Tashkent Agreement con-
firmed their fears.
In 1967 things began to happen. On New Year’s day that year
the Ebdonians (those politicians who had been debarred from
public life under the Elective Bodies Disqualification Order of
1959) were freed to return to active politics. There was much
hectic activity among the Ebdonians of the two Wings to come
together in a united front to prepare the ground to fight the
regime at the elections scheduled for 1969.
Now suddenly, the President came to be criticised freely on
the public platform and in the press, particularly in West Pakis-
tan. And when finally West Pakistanis joined hands with Ben-
galis in demonstrating against Ayub Khan, that was the begin-
ning of the end for him. The people of Pakistan publicly de-
manded full parliamentary democracy. Public discontent snow-
balled and all the suppressed fury of a decade burst out against
the President.
Sensitive to the signs of the times, Ayub Khan got ready to
fight back. On March 31, in a speech at Jcssore, in East Bengal
the President charged the opposition with disruptionist activities
and causing confusion. In another speech a few days later, at
Dacca, he described the demand for autonomy as “camouflage
for separation.”
A SERGEANT-MAJOR’S REGIME 83
The Field Marshal's threats and imprecations failed to scare
the people, and for the first time in a decade, the Press freely
reported public demonstrations critical of the regime And then
that month Ayub Khan suffered a severe heart attack, which in-
capacitated him for three months.
On May 2. the opposition took another big step forward when
the opposition parties from both the West and the East Wing got
together in a conference at Dacca and formed a Pakistan Demo-
cratic Movement The constituent parties were Awami League,
Muslim League (Council), the Jamait-e-Islam. Nizam-e-Islam
and the National Democratic Front.
It is significant that Mumtaz Daultana, the Punjab leader of
the Muslim League (Council), the sponsor and champion of the
anti-Bengali One-Unit scheme of a decade ago, a Iso joined the
Bengalis in the united front against the Ayub regime Daultana
now even supported East Bengalis’ autonomy demand
This was the politicians’ bid for a come-back and rally toge-
ther to revive political life and the democratic system. Only
Maulana Bhashani’s National Awami Party kept out of the
Movement, as its pro-Peking leader flirted with Ayub Khan
The PDM formulated an 8-point programme to agitate for the
return of the parliamentary form of Government, with a federal
structure and a Centre entrusted with only defence, foreign affairs,
currency, federal finance. mter-wuig communications and trade.
While Mujibur Rahman’s Awami League kept up the fire at
the Government. Ayub Khan’s erstwhile Foreign Minister Zulfi-
kar Ah Bhutto also joined the yelpmg pack and in his charac-
ter^ style unloosed vicious attacks on the President. The
latter’s student followers in West Pakistan took the issue to the
streets
In the North-West Frontier Province, Wali Khan, Abdul
Ghaffar Khan’s son. led the agitation against President Ayub.
Government arrested both Bhutto and Wall Khan. That sparked
off more demonstrations all over West Pakistan. In Nowshera
troops were called out. there was firing m Sukkur and Jhang.
In Karachi student demonstrators tore up Ayub Khan’s pictures.
In Peshawar students raided the USIS Library Troops were also
called out in Dacca. Two hundred arrests were reported in West
Pakistan alone.
Now Ayub Khan put the stick aside and tried the carrot with
84 PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
the students, whose non-political demands were conceded at
once. In a broadcast on December 8. 1968, he offered to withdraw
the unpopular University Ordinance which sought to penalise
students for their politics. The curfew was lifted and schools
and colleges were reopened in Quetta. In Lahore and Rawalpindi
the ban on processions and public meetings was withdrawn.
The President in his first-of-the-month broadcast expressed his
preparedness to treat with the Opposition and discuss political
changes with them. The same day, PMD met in Lahore and
decided to boycott the ensuing elections and continue a relent-
less struggle against the Ayub regime and for regaining sove-
reignty for the people. The PDM charged the Ayub regime with
“bringing ruin and degradation to the country in all aspects of
national life." An All-Pakistan Direct Action Committee was
formed to carry on the agitation for democracy.
The Democratic Action Committee produced an eight-point
programme for the President’s acceptance. That programme de-
manded abrogation of the “basic democratic” system and direct
elections and adult franchise, parliamentary democracy and justici-
able fundamental rights, and an immediate ending of the stale
of emergency. In addition, the DAC laid down three precondi-
tions for their participation in any talks: (1) the army to be
withdrawn to the barracks; (2) curfew to be lifted; (3) the Gov-
ernments at the Centre and the provinces to resign.
When the National Assembly met on January 31, 1969, at the
end of a four-hour discussion on the political situation in the
country, the Leader of the House, Khan A. Sabur announced that
the President was prepared to consider “any reasonable proposal”
made by the Opposition for “meaningful talks".
The next day, in his monthly broadcast, the President elabor-
ated on the subject. He said he would “shortly invite representa-
tives of responsible political parties for talks,” and added, “the
Constitution is no word of God. It can be changed. It is not
something immutable or static.”
The DAC agreed to participate in this round table confer-
ence. but demanded the presence of Mujibur Rahman at it. The
President offered to release Mujibur Rahman on parole for the
purpose, but Mujibur Rahman would not look at the proposal
on the basis of parole.
On February 21, Ayub Khan further climbed down and an-
A sergeant-major's regime 85
nounccd the withdrawal of the Agartala Case and release of all
the 30 odd accused Simultaneously, to everybody’s surprise, he
also announced, as though taking a leaf from President Johnson,
his own withdrawal from the Presidential contest, on the plea of
removing the “difficulties” in the way of the talks that were be-
tng delayed
He declared that his decision not to contest the election was
“final and irrevocable” and desired that “all doubts, suspicions
and misgivings” should end with his announcement This double
announcement considerably eased the tension in the atmosphere
The Awaml League now accepted the invitation to the Round
Table Conference and decided to send Mujibur Rahman as their
sole representative to it On his release from jail, the Sheikh was
given a hero’s welcome by his people. The route of hi s drive
home was decorated with arches, and rallies and receptions were
held in his honour.
The round table conference was held at Rawalpindi in
March 1969. Addressing the conference, the President promised
a reintroduction of parliamentary form of government and adult
franchise, but he had little concrete to say about East Bengal’s
demand for provincial autonomy and Six-Point programme The
President said that the unresolved issues should be taken up by
the National Assembly.
Mujibur Rahman, Nurul Amin and S M Khurshed, all three
Bengalis, disappointed and furious, walked out of the confer-
ence in protest. The Awami League leader denounced the PDM.
and accused it of letting down East Bengal, by fading to hack
their demand for autonomy as jointly agreed In Dacca a mam-
moth rally was held endorsing their leaders' protest at the round
table conference and demanding immediate resolution of the
“unresolved issues”.
So far as the Establishment was concerned, the conference had
achieved the desired result* the President’s announcement had
proved an "Apple of Discord". It at once undermined and split
the dangerous united front of the Opposition parties of the two
wings and once again isolated East Bengal.
The round table conference proved abortive and failed to lead
to any solution of the political crisis developing in the country
Both the wings were now swept by an upheaval In two weeks
of March, 39 people were killed and there was widespread loot-
86
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
ing and arson in East Bengal, according to Pakistan Radio. The
talk of reimposition of Martial Law was very much in the air.
Ayub Khan found the situation getting beyond his control.
Internal pressures from the generals demanded firm action and
they seemed, if necessary, prepared to sacrifice Ayub in favour
of a stronger man. Ayub Khan threw in the towel. He handed
over the reins to his Commandcr-in-Chief and trusted man, Gene-
ral Yahya Khan.
8
Yakya’s Samson Act
When a decade earlier Ayub Khan sacked Iskandar Mirza and
sent democracy packing home, the people of Pakistan welcom-
ed the bluff soldier-dictator with open arms. After their sicken-
ing experience of corrupt politicians and their dirty politics, the
people hailed him as a saviour. Ayub thus found himself on an
easy wickeL The people wanted a sultan to rule over them. And
there he was, a custom-built, spruce, efficient, vigorous and
modem sultan — their own version of Kamal Ataturk. For a
while they were even proud of him and did not mind being push-
ed around by him.
But when Ayub Khan handed over to Yahya Khan in October
1969. billions of cusecs of water had already flowed down the
Indus as well as the Padma. By then the people had had more
than their fill of authoritarianism, and did not find much fun in
being pushed around. And they discovered that corruption, whe-
ther in a democracy or a dictatorship, smelt equally foul. And
so the Pakistanis were once again yearning for parliamentary
democracy and the politicians' rule, which Ayub had just promis-
ed them. And now another General had come along and re-impos-
ed the hated martial law.
Eleven years of Ajubism bad also wrought certain major
dioofft* »v? the c&ttairy's pebtiesi fosdsczpc. Persecuted by the
new regime and kept away from the corridors of power, the race
of politicians as a whole de\ eloped new values and a rare objf^
87
88
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
tivily. Besides, their very instinct for survival drove them to hang
together lest they hanged separately.
Confronted by a powerful common enemy, the well-enlrench-
ed military-bureaucratic-industrial complex that now ruled Pakis-
tan, the Pakistani politicians discovered the need for a realign-
ment in order to face the new threat. That ruling clique had not
only kept the politicians at a distance but insulted them, maligned
and libelled them and treated them with disdain. Thus fighting
and unseating this powerful clique in power became their
supreme common objective.
In the new equation thus born we find such Punjabi chauvin-
ists like Mumtaz Daultana, the author of the notorious docu-
ment “Clearing the Decks” that plotted to impose Punjabi
suzerainty over the Bengalis and other Pakistanis thirteen years
ago, now extending all out support to Mujibur Rahman’s Six-
Points and demand for full provincial autonomy. So did the Mus-
lim League veteran and champion of Pakistan’s integrity, Abdul
Qayum Khan, who expressed the view that East Bengalis should
be conceded their demand (though he did a complete volte face
after Mujib’s arrest on March 25, 1971).
Even Bhutto, while the ruling clique exploited his opposition
to the Awami League’s Six-Point to stage a showdown with
Mujib, swore by a full-fledged federal constitution and parlia-
mentary democracy for Pakistan.
The new equation of course docs not blur the fact that the
military-bureaucratic-industrial clique continues to be dominat-
ed by the Punjabi military and civilian top brass, and would be,
in the very nature of things, averse to a genuinely democratic
structure that would dispossess them of the power they have
wielded all these twenty-four years. And this ruling minority is
in a position to enforce its will on the country, thanks to the
sanction of the armed forces backing it.
The colonial grip on East Bengal was vital to the industrial
element in the ruling clique as it supplied a market as well as
primary products for the enrichment of West Pakistan. So any
constitutional proposal that loosened that colonial grip on East
Bengal would be unacceptable to the ruling clique. Thus, the
Central Government has consistently and deliberately interpreted
the Awami League’s demand for autonomy as seccssionism so
as to find a pretext to deny self-government to the East Bengalis.
YAHYA’5 SAMSON ACT
89
With the exit of Ayub, the politicians, backed by the people,
were getting restive as they looked forward to the restoration of
normal public life and parliamentary democracy in the country
Considering therefore the turbulent conditions in which he sue*
ceeded to the gaddi, Yahya Khan appeared to have started well
He at once earned much popular goodwill by the apparent since-
rity of his gestures and acuoos
Sensing the atmosphere, he took the first opportunity to re-
assure the people that his was only an interim government and
that he was determined to keep his predecessor’s promise to the
country of an early return to parliamentary democracy and adult
franchise Indeed, he immediately embarked on a pacification
campaign all round.
In order to win over the opposition in the minority regions of
West Pakistan, he announced the dismemberment of the One-Unit
West Pakistan, so that Sind. Baluchistan and North-West Frontier
province reverted to their individual separate existence, released
from the hated apron-strings of Punjab Thereby, at one stroke,
he de-fused the tensions in those minority provinces where dis-
content was simmering to a boiling point
To East Bengal, he readily conceded that in the past the East-
ern Province had been discriminated against and pledged himself
to redress their grievances. He then accepted the principle of one-
man-one-vote for which East Bengal had been agitating for long
and which Ayub Khan’s round table conference of March 1969
bad failed to concede. With that fundamental concession, Yahya
Khan had jettisoned the hated mter-wing parity and restored to
the Bengalis the advantage of their majority position in the
future Central legislature.
Nor did he let the grass to grow under his feet. He held
a senes of individual meetings with political leaders and ascer-
tained their views on the country’s political future and problems.
From January 1, 1970 freedom of political activity was restored
in the country.
On March 20, 1970, President Yahya Khan issued a Legal
Framework Order which set the dates of elections to the nation-
al and provincial assemblies as October 5 and 22, 1970, respec-
tively, which were subsequently postponed to December 7 and
17, 1970, following the floods in July-August 1970 in East
Pakistan.
90
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
The LFO laid down five fundamental principles of the con-
stitution to be framed. These were:
(1) Preservation of Islamic ideology.
(2) Ensuring the independence, territorial integrity and nation-
al solidarity of Pakistan (for the attainment of which aim, a
federal structure is prescribed).
(3) The constitution shall be democratic, in which “such basic
ingredients of democracy as free and periodical elections on the
basis of population and direct adult franchise are included” (also
providing for the independence of the judiciary and the fund-
amental rights of the citizens).
(4) The constitution must be a "true federal one in which
powers, including legislative, administrative and financial, shall
be so distributed between the Federal Government and the pro-
vinces that the latter shall have maximum autonomy, that is to
say, maximum legislative, administrative and financial powers,
and the Federal Government shall have adequate powers, includ-
ing legislative, administrative and financial powers, to discharge
its responsibilities in relation to external and internal affairs and
to preserve the independence and territorial integrity of the
country.
(5) It must provide “full opportunity to the people of all re-
gions of Pakistan for participation in national affairs so that they
can live together as equal and honourable partners and be mould-
ed into a strong nation as visualised by the Father of the
Nation.”
To that end the LFO further laid down that “opportunities
must be made available to the people of various regions of Pakis-
tan for enabling them to participate in all the branches of nation-
al activity, and to achieve this objective there must be statutory
provision to remove all disparities, in particular, economic dis-
parity, among the various provinces of Pakistan within a fixed
period.”
The broadcast of Yahya Khan promulgating the LFO how-
ever concluded with an unmistakable warning to Mujibur
Rahman and East Bengal. He ominously declared: “If anyone
thinks that he can let down the country and the people or enter-
tain any ideas destroying the basic unity of our people, he is very
much mistaken. The people will not stand for this . . . Every one
has a right to offer a solution to the constitutional, political, eco-
YAIIYA’S SAMSON ACT
91
nomic and administrative problems of the country, but no one
has a right to oiler a solution which would adversely aflect the
solidarity of the people of Pakistan. This no one would tolerate.
We will refuse to be silent spectators to any attacks against
Pakistan’s entity as a nation."
Equally unmistakable was Islamabad's hostile altitude towards
Mujibur Rahman's Six Points, which seemed to define the
Awami League's demand as a "solution adversely affecting the
solidarity of the people of Pakistan”. Mujibur Rahman has, of
course, challenged that definition and has again and again re-
affirmed his position that he wanted East Bengal to be very much
part of Pakistan, but as an honourable, effective partner in the
enterprise.
The sting in the tail apart, the Yahya broadcast promulgating
the Legal Framework Order was received by the people at large
with much enthusiasm It dissipated the apprehensions roused in
the minds of many when Yahya Khan reimposed martial law
that the promised democracy might once again be postponed to
(he Greek kalends.
The LFO also laid down that the National Assembly should
complete its task of framing the constitution within 120 days
from the opening day of the Assembly.
Much popular dissatisfaction was however expressed over the
provisions in the Legal Framework Order that the constitution
had to be authenticated by the President before enforcement and
that the President was the sole interpreter of the provisions of
the LFO and his decision was to be final and not liable to be
questioned in any court. The President, and not the National
Assembly, had the power to make any amendment to the Legal
Framework Order.
These provisions were considered stumbling blocks by the
Awami League leaders in the way of adoption of their Six-Point
programme in the National Assembly.
In November 1970 an unprecedented cyclone devastated large
areas of East Bengal, and Islamabad’s failure to react prompily
to the tragedy and rush relief to the stricken region further em-
bittered feeling in East Bengal against the West Pakistani rulers.
When finally the general elections were held in Pakistan, in
the East Wing. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's Awami League swept
the polls. Indeed, it was 3n electoral victory unprecedented in
92
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
the history of democracy in the world. The Awami League cap-
tured 160 out of 162 seats given to East Pakistan in the Nation-
al Assembly, polling 72.6 per cent of the votes cast in East Ben-
gal. That gave Awami League an absolute majority in the
National Assembly, winning 160 out of a total of 313 seats and
thus obtaining 53.3 per cent of the seats in the Central Legisla-
ture. Later, the Awami League also captured all the seven re-
served seats for women from East Bengal. The Awami League’s
triumph in the election to the Provincial Assembly was equally
overwhelming — 284 out of 300 seats.
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party scored the sec-
ond largest number of seats in the National Assembly, having
won 82 out of the 138 seats allotted to the West Wing, amount-
ing to 60 per cent of the West Pakistani seats.
These electoral results had the impact of a nuclear bomb on
Pakistan’s political landscape. They upset the anticipations and
calculations in Islamabad and placed the ruling military-
bureaucratic-industrial clique on the horns of an excruciating
dilemma.
Yahya Khan’s intelligence reports had assured him that the
Awami League, at the most, might prove the largest single party
in the National Assembly, with no more than 125 seals, and
would therefore be compelled to go into coalition with West
Pakistani parties, and thus dilute its Six-Point programme, or,
in the alternative, go into opposition. But an absolute majority
in the National Assembly for the Awami League was something
that possibly even the leadership of that parly never dreamt of.
At the same time. President Yahya Khan’s public commit-
ment to parliamentary democracy compelled him to go through
the motions of democratic procedure, while trying to mitigate
what he considered the dangerous consequences of the situation
thrown up by the roulette wheel of general elections. Now Islam-
abad’s hopes rested on the possibility of being able to tame
Mujibur Rahman. No more in the irresponsible role of opposi-
tion, the rulers hoped, Mujib, as the head of the Government,
would be in a frame of mind to water down his demands.
They expected, as it happened in the case of his distinguished
predecessors like Fazlul Huq and Shaheed Suhrawardy, the lure
of power would sober down Mujibur Rahman, once he assum-
ed office, and then everything would be once again fine in the
YAHYA’s SAMSON ACT
93
garden' But Mujib was made of sterner stuff He had always
spumed power He had spent over ten years in jail for hts prin-
ciples and for the cause of emancipation of his country.
The entire country, including the leaders and people of West
Pakistan were greatly enthused by the spectacular results of the
first democratic general elections held in the land The Press as
well as leaders even in West Pakistan took it for granted that
Mujibur Rahman was going to form the government at the Centre
and treated his statements with the respect due to those of the
Prime Munster-designate.
On January 1, an “Azad” Kashmir deputation flew to Dacca to
meet the future Prime Minuter to get his assurances on the policy
lus Government was likely to follow on Pak-hcld Kashmir in
view of the Awami League leader's past pronouncements on the
subject. They returned to West Pakistan claiming to be satisfied
with their talks with Mujib They told the Press that the Prime
Minister-designate assured them his fullest co-operation in a
“meaningful” settlement of the Kashmir dispute.
As many as seventy newly-elected members of the National
Assembly from West Pakistan in public statements lent their
support to Mujibur Rahman’s demand that the constitution
should be framed on the basis of the Awami League’s Six-Point
programme.
Mujib's almost first reacuon to his spectacular victory was to
declare at a public meeting at Dacca. “Now no force, however
powerful, would be able to harm any more Bengali culture and
language.”
On January 3. addressing a victory rally attended by 20 lakhs
of people at Che Ramcu Race Course maidan. Mujib declared
that his party, being in majority, had the right to frame the
country’s future constitution. He underlined the fact that his
party was the majority party not merely of Bengal but of the
whole country.
Mujib however cautioned the people against complacency.
Electoral victory alone could not restore the nghts of the people,
he said. If necessary, they might hase to go in for an “extreme
struggle” and give more blood for realising their demands.
Then, by way of re-assurmg the people of West Pakistan,
Mujib stated that he wanted the full settlement of the Kashmir
and Faraqqa Barrage disputes wuh India in a peaceful manner.
94
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
He assured the minorities that they would have equal rights.
Mujib also stated that his Government would nationalise the
jute mills, banks and insurance. On foreign policy, the Awami
League leader said that he wanted friendly relations with all
neighbours including India and China.
He dismissed as malicious propaganda the allegation that
Awami League was anti-Islamic and Hindu-oriented. He signi-
ficantly warned the people that conspiracy was still going on even
after the elections to annul the process of democracy. He charg-
ed a section of Government officials with conspiring to foil the
results of the election and alleged that some of them had come
recently to Dacca and held secret meetings to that end. He how-
ever congratulated President Yahya Khan for fulfilling his pledge
of elections and urged him to stop such conspiracies forthwith.
The rally was. significantly, attended by diplomats and their
wives. Mujib’s speech lasted 45 minutes, and it was the only
speech of the evening- Dawn and other newspapers, including
the Government’s mouthpiece, Pakistan Times, splashed the
speech on their front-pages, as befitting the pronouncement of a
Prime Minister-designate.
Bending to the popular wind of change. President Yahya Khan
immediately made overtures to Mujib. On January 14 he flew
to Dacca and held parleys with the Awami League leader for
three days, and then told press reporters that he was satisfied
with his talks with Mujib.
When pressed for details, the President expressed his inability
to say anything more than what had already been given out to
them by the Awami League leader.
“If he cannot say more, I cannot,” Yahya Khan said, and
added, “the Sheikh is going to be the future Prime Minister of
the country. I cannot enter his domain.”
“Sir, you are the President.” said a reporter.
The President: “When he takes over, I won’t be there. It is
(government) going to be his."
Mujib also expressed satisfaction with his talks with the Pre-
sident. His impression was that the President had not found
“anything seriously objectionable in the Six-Points.” Nor did the
President however give any inkling of his own ideas on a new
constitution, apart from, strangely enough, stressing the need for
an agreement with Bhutto.
YAHYA’S SAMSON ACT
95
The President was not slow in encouraging Dhutto to challenge
Mujib, and resorting to the ancient colonialist technique of
divide and rule.
Immediately on his return to West Pakistan, Yafi>a Khan
proceeded to Mohonjodaro. near Larkana. in Suid, for talks with
Bhutto Speaking to newsmen on the eve of the parleys, the Pre-
sident stated “The people have given their decision in favour
of the majority parties (italics mine)".
The plural was mischievously used with a view to staging a
political combat between Bhutto and Mujib. For if Pakistan is
one nation, as is claimed by the President, the talk of two majo-
rity parties in its legislature does not make sense.
After his meeting with Bhutto, the President told the Press
that he had fruitful talks with the PPP leader and announced that
Bhutto would soon meet Mujib in Dacca,
Bhutto met Mujib m Dacca on January 30 and then told the
Press that he wanted a genuine federation and that he was
against the idea of a subfederation for West Pakistan. Of the
Awami League's Six-Points, he accepted points one and six
(federation and regional militia).
On his return flight on February 2. Bhutto did not miss the
opportunity to incite anti-India passions by exploiting the Wow-
ing up of the Indian Airlines plane at Lahore airport by hijackers.
He patted the hijackers on the back on their heroic deed.
Meanwhile. Ataur Rahman Khan, President of the Pakistan
National League, declared m a statement: “Nothing short of
the Lahore (Pakistan) Resolution of 1940' will now satisfy East
Pakistan. The time is past for provincial autonomy.”
At the 7lh annual Law Conference held in Karachi on Feb-
ruary 5, its chairman Hassaa All Abdur Rahman ( a West Pakis-
tani himself) stated “West Pakistan has ruled Pakistan for 23
>eais. Now East Pakistan must do so. being the majority party.”
He said. “It is wrong to think that the Six Points will weaken
the Centre.”
In a speech on February 9, Mujib complained at the delay in
announcing the date of opening of the National Assembly and
declared that only the representatives of the people have the
» Two separate independent state* ot Pakistan in north-west and east
tespeetnely.
96
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
right to frame the constitution, and again referred to a con-
spiracy “still going on,” and stated, “Pakistan’s politics is the
politics of conspiracy and intrigue. Conspiracy has not yet stop-
ped. But since Bengalis have learnt to shed blood, none can stop
them any more. The Avvami League were true to their promise
and they don’t go back on their promise. If necessary we will go
to jail again, but we won’t deviate from the principle.”
Mujib then asked his people to remain prepared: “If the time
comes, I will give you the call. Power has to come to us, and
none can stop it. When power comes to us, we will go all out to
solve the problems of our people.”
Meanwhile, in a statement in Rawalpindi on February 13,
Sardar Shaukat Hyat Khan, President of the Punjab Council
Muslim League expressed support for the Awami League’s Six-
Points. He declared, “When I say the Six-Points suit Punjab, I
literally mean it. For, in my opinion, Punjab is perhaps the only
province which has a viable economy. It is self-sufficient in food,
cloth, sugar and other daily needs ... If Punjab is taxed on the
basis of its population, it could easily turn into a welfare state.”
The President at last announced March 3 as the date for the
opening of the National Assembly. And on February 14, the
Awami League Working Committee met and welcomed the Pre-
sident’s announcement of a date for the National Assembly to
meet, and reiterated the Six-Point programme. But made no
comment on the hijack incident and India’s strong reaction to
the blowing up of the IA plane at the Lahore airport.
Addressing a joint meeting of MNAs and MLAs in Dacca on
February 16, Mujib reiterated that the constitution would cer-
tainly be framed on the basis of the Awami League’s and the
Students’ Eleven Points, 2 and “No power on earth can stop us.”
3 The Eleven-point programme formulated by the East Bengal Students’
All-party Committee of Action:
(1) (a) Restoration of the original status of the provincialised colleges;
(b) Increase in the number of schools and colleges; (c) Night shift ar-
rangement in provincial colleges; (d) Tuition fees to be reduced by
half; (e) Hostel charges to be subsidised by 50 per cent; (f) Bengali
as medium of instruction as well as of work in all offices; (g) Increase
in the salaries of teachers; (h) Free and compulsory education up to
class VIII, a medical university to be set up and the medical council
ordinance to be withdrawn; (j) The facilities of a condensed course for
polytechnic students; (k) Train and bus fare concessions for students;
YAIIYA’S SAMSON ACT 97
He advised the West Pakistani leaders to accept the Six-Point
programme in toto — “Then we can live together”
He said the constitution was being drafted by his party and
declared categorically: “The Awami League as the majority
party in the National Assembly, had the democratic right to give
the pountry a constitution Only the Awami League was com-
petent to form the Government, and nobody else Awami League
members were strong enough to meet machine-guns."
The next day, Bhutto announced in Peshawar his party’s deci-
sion to boycott the National Assembly unless it was made clear
that “there would be some amount of reciprocity from the majo-
rity party either publicly or privately.” Bhutto said that the PPP
had accepted all the 11 points of the students and the first and
sixth of the Awami League’s Six-Points In an intemperate
speech, he held out threats of physical violence against West
Pakistani MNAs who dared attend the National Assembly. He
declared his party would take “action befitting a revolutionary
and progressive party.”
Bhutto's incendiary speech and decision to boycott the Nation-
al Assembly were almost unanimously denounced by the Pakis-
tani Press as well as by most Pakistani political leaders.
In an editorial, Dawn commented. “People in the West Wing
have to acquire a fuller understanding of the reasons for the
alienation of a large segment of East Pakistani opinion. A will-
(1) Job opportunity guarantees, (m) Repeal of the university ordinance
and full autonomy for the universities, and (n) Repeal of the national
education commission and Hamoodur Rahman report
(2) Parliamentary democracy on the basis of universal adult franchise
(3) (a) Federal form of government aDd sovereign legislature, and (b)
federal government's powers to be confined to defence policy and cur-
rency
(4) A subfederation of Baluchistan, NWFP and Sind, with regional auto-
nomy for each unit
(5) Nationalisation of banks, insurance companies and all big industries.
(6) Reducuon in the rates of taxes and revenues on peasants
(7) Fair wages and bonus for workers.
(8) Flood control measures for East Bengal.
(9) Withdrawal of all emergency laws, security acts and other prohibitive
orders
(10) Quit the SEATO, CENTO and Palc-US military pacts
(11) Release of all detenus and political prisoners including those of the
Agarlala Conspiracy Case.
98
PAK. COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
ingncss to do this will inescapably point to the need for posi-
tive and vigorous measures to remove misgivings, restore harm-
ony and strengthen the forces of national cohesion.” Dawn
took Bhutto severely to task for his destructive Peshawar speech.
On February 18, President Yahya Khan urgently summoned
Bhutto to Islamabad to discuss “important national issues.” No
clear idea was available to the Press as to what transpired at the
meeting.
Bhutto however persisted in his perverse stand, and on his
return to Karachi, told his party workers that there were only
three forces in the country: “Awami League. PPP and the arm-
ed forces — we don’t recognise any fourth power.”
At a press conference in Dacca on February 24, Mujib denied
that the Awami League wanted to impose the Six-Point pro-
gramme on West Pakistan. If the other federating units did not
want the same degree of autonomy, they were free to cede more
powers to the Centre. He then warned that certain objections raised
against the Six Points seemed “nothing but calculated measures
to perpetuate the colonial status of Bangla Desh. The colonial ex-
ploitation of 70 million people of Bangla Desh and transfer of
its resources for the benefit of the vested interests of the West
Wing had been carried out principally through the control of
foreign trade, foreign aid and foreign exchange by the Centre.”
Mujib declared: “Conspirators and vested interests and their
lackeys were embarking on a last, desperate bid to frustrate the
adoption of a constitution by the elected representatives of the
people and a transfer of power to them. Their desperation has
reached a point where they were even willing to gamble with
the existence of Pakistan while pretending to be concerned with
national integrity. It is they who arc about to inflict a mortal blow
on the integrity of Pakistan by frustrating the last opportunity
the people of Pakistan have of evolving for themselves, through
a democratic and constitutional process, a basis for living toge-
ther. For this is what a constitution adopted by the National
Assembly of Pakistan would be.”
About Bhutto, Mujib said: “The PPP had suddenly started
striking postures and issuing pronouncements which revealed a
tendency to subvert the constitutional process by obstructing the
normal functioning of the National Assembly. In this way trans-
fer of power to the people is sought to be sabotaged. It would
YAIiYA’S SAMSON ACT
99
be the sacred duty of Bangla Dcsh. Punjab, Sind, the North-West
Frontier Province and Baluchistan to resist them I urge upon
the awakened masses of Bangla Desh to prepare to resist anti-
people forces by every means possible so that they can be rooted
out from our soil We renew our pledge today to lay down our
lives if necessary, so that our future generations do not have to
live in a colony, but can Jive in freedom and wuh dignity as free
citizens of a free country.”
Meanwhile, the Awami League’s constitution drafting com-
mittee was ready wuh its draft constitution, which was placed
before the parliamentary party of the Awami League With 188
articles and ten schedules, the constitution provided for.
(a) Autonomy — with alternative provision made for West
Pakistani provinces to allay the charge that East Bengal was
seeking to impose the Six-Points on West Pakistan;
(b) A federal co-ordinating body to maintain liaison between
the federating units;
(c) A unicameral federal parliament;
(d) Federal levy — Bangla Desh will pay at the rate of 27 per
cent, Punjab a little over 40 per cent, etc . — the arrangement to
be reviewed every five years by a Federal Finance Commission;
(e) Foreign aid and foreign trade to be provincial subjects,
wuh the proviso that the Centre can contract foreign aid and
foreign loans as federal subjects — the proviso to operate with-
in the framework of foreign policy.
(f) the Capital alternately to be Dacca and Islamabad.
In an article in D<mn of February 28, AHM Kamaruzzaman,
Secretary-General, All-Pakistan Awami League, explained- “The
Six-Point programme is a national strategy whose object is to
remove from the federal sphere the main sources of discord."
Now Bhutto demanded a prior agreement on the broad out-
lines of the future constitution and a postponement of the
National Assembly so as to enable him to continue dialogue with
Mujib He also demanded the waiving of the 120-day deadline
clause. He threatened a “movement'' if the National Assembly
met m the absence of the PPP — “a hartal from Khyber to
Karachi”.
Bhutto’s tactics infuriated the entire country, including West
100
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
Pakistatnis. Almost all parlies condemned Bhutto’s threat to
wreck the National Assembly and promised the President to co-
operate with the constitution-making body if it was convened
according to schedule.
Bhutto’s obstructionism however came in handy to Yahya
Khan, who had already felt disturbed and intimidated by the
Awami League’s overwhelming electoral victory and the rising
stridency in its leader’s demands and pronouncements.
The President decided to make use of Bhutto to block Mujib
and as an alibi for putting off the convening of the National As-
sembly and avoiding the likely awkward outcome of its proceed-
ings. So he bowed to Bhutto’s threat and announced an indefinite
postponement of the National Assembly.
The announcement, made on March 1, three days before the
scheduled date of the opening of the National Assembly, sent a
wave of indignation around the entire country. In East Bengal
the President’s action amounted to throwing a lighted match into
a powder-keg. There was a spontaneous countrywide flare-up.
The Bengalis interpreted the announcement as another device to
cheat them out of their democratic due.
9
Ruling Clique’s Perversity
A country looking forward to the restoration of parliamentary
democracy, at last, after over a decade, was outraged by the
unexpected postponement of the National Assembly The an-
nouncement did not even offer an alternative date for its meet-
ing The people, including the West Pakistanis, blamed the turn
of events upon Bhutto
In Karachi and Lahore demonstrations were held to support
Mujib and denounce Bhutto. Leaders publicly expressed their
disapproval of the President’s action m truckling to Bhutto’s
threat to boycott the National Assembly and postponing the con-
vening of that constitution-making body
In Lahore, Malik Ghulam Jilam, convenor of the Pun;ab
Pakistan Front, called an immediate meeting of the Front to ex-
press dissociation of the people of Pakistan from Bhutto’s “mad
game of brazen-faced power politics which is bringing (he coun-
try to the verge of immediate disaster”
The Punjab Council Muslim League leader Mian Muxntaz
Daultana asked for a firm date for the National Assembly.
Maulana Gulam Ghaus Hazarvi, general secretary of the Jamiat-
ul-Ulcma-i-Islam (West Pakistan), criticised Bhutto for talking
the language of ultimatums and extended his own support to
Mujibur Rahman. Air Marshal Ashgar Khan demanded imme-
diate transfer of power to the Aw ami League as required by
democratic processes.
tot
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST 1JENGAL
On Marcli 5, a joint meeting held in Karachi of five parties —
Awami League. National Awami Party (Wali Group). Council
Muslim League, Pakistan Democratic Party, Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-
Islam — called for an immediate transfer of power to the majo-
rity party in the National Assembly and demanded an early
summoning of the National Assembly. The meeting denounced
Bhutto’s activities.
Indeed, the plain implication of this universal chorus of pro-
tests to the President and support to Mujibur Rahman was that
the people of Pakistan had firmly chosen democracy, and that the
logic of that choice demanded that they should bow to the verdict
of the ballot box, however unpalatable it might be to the Presi-
dent or certain other elements in the country.
Hence the near unanimous demand that power should be
transferred to the Awami League, whatever the consequences —
a demand with which even the veteran Muslim Leaguer of North-
West Frontier Province. Abdul Qayum Khan associated in a
~ -t latcr , ,ssucd to thc Pr« S >'n Dacca during the historic
i ahya-Mujib parleys.
rip? 51 . BCn i fia ' c , onvulscd with indignation. On March 2. Mujib
eclared a hartal and a one-day general strike in protest against
he^poidponemem of the National Assembly, and "demanded an
immediate withdrawal of martial law in the land. He now pre-
“ iT pIc f ° r ba f ' Verted them against agents pro-
ncTrnatter ***' East Bengal,
was for them a^P C °[. 18malcd frora or thc language he spoke,
were their sacre I , 83 *’ and the,r pcrson ’ P ro Perty and honour
The Z St> and UlCSU musl b ‘ protected."
“ ThC “™ -it-
rights of the renrecen, r d r Clf emancipation. Denial of the
behest of In and ! T ° ^ maj ° rUy of [bc People at the
the people ” UndCm ° Crat,c was an intolerable insult to
a C m h r) 10 6 and
spheres, government offices' secre.a'rTat Tt?” 3 '' “ COV ' r,:d
courts, semi-government and ’ hlfih C0Urt and other
International Airlines offices the n °, m0US cor P or ations. Pakistan
tion services, transport m ils and 0ther ^munica-
blishments and markets' ’ *” Ustnal ancl commercial esta-
RULING CLIQUE’S PERVERSITY 103
It soon escalated into a cent per cent non-co-operation move-
ment that brought to a standstill the administration and almost
the entire life in East Bengal for well nigh 24 days.
As the wave of protests swept through the province, the Gov-
ernment unloosed military repression In a clash, on March 2,
near the airport in Dacca, one person was killed and seven in-
jured in firing The next day martial law was reimposed and
press censorship clamped down
Addressing a mammoth rally at Paltan maidan in Dacca, Mujib
warned the rulers of Pakistan that "Bengal was on fire and if
the conflagration continued, the West Pakistanis would not be
able to escape the flames"
The Awami League leader now instructed the people to re-
fuse to pay taxes until transfer of power. He said his speech
that evening might be his last speech, and then appealed for
communal peace, and said Bihans and non-Muslims were their
sacred trust
He further added that on March 7. at the race course maidan.
he would announce the future course of action If he failed to
turn up at the meeting for any unforeseen reason, there would
be others to announce the future line of action.
Mujtb disclosed that the Awami League, as the majority party,
had intimated their desire to the President that the National
Assembly should be convened on February 15. but it was Bhutto
who wanted it to be deferred to the first week of March, and
March 3 was the date fixed at Bhutto’s behest Now again, at
Bhutto’s instance, the President had postponed the National As-
sembly. Mujib declared *if you don’t want to frame the constitu-
tion, allow us to frame our own constitution and jou frame your
own. Then let us see if wc can live together as brothers."
Taken aback by the unanimity and strength of feeling display-
ed in East Bengal, and in the rest of Pakistan too. against his
action in postponing indefinitely the National Assembly, the Pre-
sident. on March 3. came forward with the offer of a round
table conference of twelve MNAs at Dacca on March 10 to re-
solve the ensis.
Mujib rejected the offer with scorn. “We are called upon to sit
with certain elements whose devious machinations are responsi-
ble for the death of innocent, unarmed peasants, workers and
students,”
104
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
Mujtb congratulated the people for their stirring response to
his call and now instructed banks to work from 2.30 to 4.30 p.m.
to disburse salaries and transact other business within Bangla
Desh.
In four days of demonstrations, a large number of people died.
Six hundred were admitted in hospital in Chittagong, and 300
were injured in Dacca. A Government press note stated that dur-
ing the week 172 persons were killed and 358 injured in East
Bengal during the disturbances. On the other hand, Awami
League workers reported a thousand casualties in military firings
on demonstrators in the province on March 2 and 3.
In Karachi, special fateha were held at Friday prayers for the
souls of those who died in the four days of upheaval in East
Bengal. At the Memon Mosque in Sadar, Maulana Shah Ahmad
Noorani, MNA-elect and leader of the Jamial-ul-Ulema-i-Pakis-
tan, who led the prayers, deplored the tension “wilfully created”
and said there was no justification to deploy troops in the towns
in East Bengal. He demanded the lifting of martial law, with-
drawal of troops and immediate summoning of the National As-
sembly. He declared that the people of West Pakistan fully
sympathised with East Pakistan, and demanded payment of com-
pensation to the bereaved families.
Maulana Noorani also announced his refusal to attend the
round table conference called by the President. Nurul Amin, the
only non-Awami MNA from East Bengal, also declined the in-
vitation to the RTC.
In the mosques of Lahore, prayers were held for the pre-
servation of the integrity of Pakistan.
Meanwhile, Yahya Khan conferred with Bhutto for five and a
half hours, and the next day, March 6, announced that the
National Assembly would meet on March 25.
It was however a hard-hitting broadcast, in which the Presi-
dent warned Mujib that he would use the Pakistan Army to pre-
vent the disintegration of the country. He said a constitution
would have to be framed according to the Legal Framework
Order, under which he will have the right to ratify or reject the
constitution.
“I want to make it absolutely clear that no matter what hap-
pens, as long as I am in command of the Pakistani armed forces
and head of the state. I will ensure complete and absolute inte-
RULING CLIQUE’S PERVERSITY
105
grity of Pakistan, Let there be no doubt or mistake on this point,”
declared Yahya Khan “I have a duty towards millions of people
of East Pakistan and West Pakistan to preserve this country.
They expect this from me and I shall not fail them I will not
allow a handful of people to destroy the homeland of millions
of innocent Pakistanis. It is the duty of Pakistani armed forces
to ensure the integrity, solidarity and security of Pakistan — a
duty in which they have never failed "
The President said that instead of accepting his decision of
postponing the National Assembly “in a spirit in which it was
taken, our East Pakistani leadership reacted in a manner which
resulted in the destructive elements coming out in the streets and
destroying life and property."
Explaining the reasons for his earlier postponement, the Presi-
dent said that the environment was not conducive to constitu-
tion-making, in that a very large number of West Pakistani re-
presentatives had refused to attend the Assembly session on
March 3. “I came to the conclusion that havmg the inaugural
session of the National Assembly on that date would be a futile
exercise and was likely to result m the dissolution of the As-
sembly. I therefore tried to save the situation by postponing the
date of the session."
The same day, as if to back his threat, the President also an-
nounced the appointment of the “hard-liner” Lieutenant-Gene-
ral Tikka Khan as governor of East Bengal — the “Butcher of
Baluchistan," as he came to be knoiwi after his performance m
Baluchistan in repressing political agitation
Agreeing to attend the National Assembly on the basis of four
pre-conditions, Mujib replied back: “It is only too clear to the
people of the country and indeed the world that it is a minority
group of West Pakistan which has obstructed and is continuing
to obstruct the transfer of power.”
The four pre-conditions were:
(1) Withdrawal of martial law; (2) troops back to the barracks;
(3) inquiry into the army killings, and (4) transfer of power to
the elected representatives of the people.
Apropos the President’s claim that his earlier postponement
had been misunderstood, the Aw ami League leader asked whether
or not this was “effected solely in response to the machinations of
a single party — constituting a minority of the total members.
106
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
against the declared wishes of the majority party and also those
of the numerous West Pakistan members.”
Mujib declared: “Neither the democratic way of life could
be established nor could power be transferred to the people if a
minority group conspired with the vested interests to frustrate the
democratic process.” The Awami League leader warned, almost
prophetically, that if democracy was the ultimate casualty or the
proposed transfer of power aborted, the responsibility would lie
with the minority group and those who colluded with it.
Mujib further suggested a seven-point formula for immediate
adoption :
(1) Immediate withdrawal of martial law; (2) transfer of power
to the elected representatives of the people; (3) immediate with-
drawal of all military personnel to the barracks; (4) immediate
cessation of the military build-up and of the heavy inflow of
military personnel from the West Wing; (5) immediate cessation
ot tiring upon civilians so that not a single bullet is fired, with
immediate effect; (6) non-interference by the military authorities
m the different branches of the Government functioning in Bangla
esh and direction to desist from victimisation of government
officers and employees; and (7) maintenance of law and order
to be left exclusively to the police and Bengali EPR, assisted,
n^iMT ncccssary ’ by Awami League volunteers.
order sim.? 9 - U rCp0rlcd from Dacca that the law and
inc Muiih’ 10n m ! c province had appreciably improved follow-
S 17a f ace - Tl,c A ™y had withdrawn ,o .he
Slreels and h . T' LcaS “ C voluntc " s were patrolling .he
street a „d heh>,„g lire police lo maintain law and order.
of March Ts ap C |“‘?l ial paS ' ankh in " ,c Pakhu " 7 '™“
“hrew hi -o„ f qUl Ihe correspond™,.
People" as well a HasTsLafsT 0 lhS Shdkh " kMs Ws
March 6 broadcast which £ P r<!aai0n '° 1,10 Prcsi ‘ tal ' s
.o sof.cn .he —
■A.iam wrote :
so cohesive and Svisible 0 Righd^o ^ Whlg been
to have stood up as one man p, V Wr ° ngly ’ they now seem
hour is Sheikh Mujibur Rahman ” * CaUSe> ^ thC man ' of - the '
Mam then pointed out: “Many people, particularly in the
RULING CLIQUE’S PERVERSITY
10?
West Wing, seem to be under the misconception that the move-
ment which is now more than ten days old, was set off by Sheikh
Mujib and his companions. The fact however is that the students
and the people rose in a spontaneous outburst of indignation
when the postponement of the NA session was announced, and
as the undisputed leader of East Pakistan, the Sheikh had per-
force to assume the role he was destined to in the gathering
crisis . . . had he not responded to the call of the hour in the
manner he did, imploring the angry masses to direct themselves
to a disciplined movement of non-violence and non-co-operation,
the situation would have been much worse than it is. The com-
pliance was total No incident was heard of thereafter from any
part of the province.”
It is to be noted that until the fateful March 25, the West
Pakistani Press, including The Pakistan Times, was strictly ob-
jective in presenting the political news from East Bengal.
Alam’s article courageously added:
“I learn from a top Awami League source that had the Pre-
sident’s announcement been ‘impartial,’ the Awami League
would have joined the National Assembly without any pre-con-
dition. But if the party had agreed to attend the session after the
way the broadcast was worded, the source said, it would have
been accused by its opponents of being 'frightened’
“The Awami League’s attitude has been: (a) national integrity
is nobody's monopoly, (b) it is up to the majority party and a
majority of the people to determine the pattern of national inte-
grity, and (4) that the terms of national integrity acceptable to
East Pakistan cannot be dictated by West Pakistan, much less
Mr. Bhutto,
“Why must the sincerity of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman be al-
ways doubted, it is asked. It was an outstanding feat for a leader
to withstand the pressure he was subjected to from within his
party as well as from revolutionary student groups who were
demanding a unilateral declaration of independence.”
Mian Mumtaz Daultana. the Punjab Muslim League Chief,
issued an impassioned appeal. “Since the integrity of Pakistan
must be preserved at all costs, it is necessary, above all other
things, to tackle and solve the present constitutional crisis with-
out anger and recrimination.” He blamed Bhutto for the prevail-
ing tension and pointed out that Mujib had said, “there is still
108
EAK COLONIALISM IN EAST IiENGAL
time for us to live as brothers if things arc settled peacefully...
we went to the extent of affirming that if any member presents
before the National Assembly anything just and reasonable, we
would accept it.”
Daultana added: “A suspicion has been created in the mind of
the majority party in the National Assembly that their point of
view has been consistently disregarded and brushed aside, and
they are threatened with suppression by force.” He therefore
appealed to the President to fly to Dacca and meet Mujib and
remove all doubts of a one-sided approach as well as assure him
of the speed and irreversibility of the process “When the
nation stands on the brink both of hope and disaster, nothing
should stand in the way of large-hearted statesmanship which is
the stuff of greatness.”
In Lahore, on March 10, a meeting of leaders of public opinion
in West Pakistan (political figures of front rank, retired top brass,
a retired judge of the Supreme Court, renowned Ulema of various
denominations, veteran journalists) convened at the invitation of
Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, former Chief of the Pakistan Demo-
cratic Movement, endorsed in principle Mujib’s four pre-condi-
tions.
A joint statement issued at the conclusion of ihe meeting re-
futed the suggestion that the people of West Pakistan, and parti-
cularly of Punjab, were not willing to permit peaceful transfer
of power.
On his return from a trip to Dacca, Air Marshal Asghar Khan
in a press interview warned that if power was not transferred
within five or six days to the Awami League, the province would
declare independence. He said Rahman was “the only link in a
a rapidly loosening chain of East-West unity.” The Sheikh was
under great pressure, he said, to declare independence, but so far
had been able to control his more extremist supporters and had
acted with great moderation.
The Air Marshal said that the eastern province was already
“mentally” separated from West Pakistan, with Rahman in the
role of de facto ruler, giving orders to senior civil servants and
other officials.
In Dacca Mujib reiterated the pledge of the people of Bangla
Desh to fight to the last and to make every sacrifice in order to
fulfil the goal of emancipation.
RULING clique’s perversity 109
Mujib added that U Thant should not end merely with the
evacuation of UN personnel. “For, the threat that is now held is
that of genocide and the denial of fundamental human rights
guaranteed under the UN Charter.”
A significant development at this juncture was the visit of
Mr. N. Khurshid, President of the Punjab Awami League, to
Dacca for a talk with Mujib, following his meeting with President
Yahya Khan. Mujib also received a telegram from Bhutto expres-
sing his readiness to come to Dacca for talks— a measure of (he
grave view taken by West Pakistan of the turn of events in East
Bengal. The Awami League however ignored Bhutto’s telegram
with contempt.
Abdul Qayum Khan, the NWFP Muslim League leader, in u
statement from Pindt pleaded for a conference of all party leaders
to discuss the developing crisis and induce Mujib to agree to
some formula which could “keep Pakistan one and enable our
East Pakistani brethren to enjoy almost all the provincial auto-
nomy on which they have set their hearts.”
Now public opinion in West Pakistan was snowballing in favour
of the Awami League’s demands. In Lahore, at a meeting of
minority parties in the National Assembly, Mian Mumtaz Daultana
declared: “Mujibur Rahman’s demands arc quite reasonable and
should be accepted and the political crisis ended ” All minority
parties’ leaders except Abdul Qayum Khan attended the meeting,
which decided to send a delegation to President Yahya Khun
to discuss the mechanics of transfer of power and also to meet
Mujib
A statement issued by the minorities’ meeting slated: “There
can be no Pakistan nor can the concept of Pakistan have ideolo-
gical validity or practical credibility without tho unity of the
people of East and West Pakistan. The only basis, source and
assurance of this unity is the free will to live together, based on
a sense of identity, comradeship, mutual justice and brotherhood."
Meanwhile, on March 14, in Karachi, Uliuito threw another
bombshell, lie demanded that the PPP should be handed over
power in West Pakistan and Awami Lcaguo in East Pakistan.
Strenuously opposing Mujib’s demand that the provinces should
be vested with powers to have trade relations with foreign coun-
tries, Bhutto commented, “The PPP would have to forego its
confronlalion-with-India policy on the Kashmir issue, if such
110
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
powers were vested in the provinces.” He emphasised, “The only
debatable point in the Awami League’s Six-Points is foreign trade
and foreign aid.”
When a storm of protests and criticism greeted him for his
statement in favour of transfer of power separately in the two
Wings, Bhutto resiled from his stand and declared that what he
meant was that power should be transferred jointly at a common
national Centre.
The prevailing mood in both West Pakistan and East Bengal
was reflected in the editorial columns of the Press which was
receptive to Mu jib's demands on behalf of East Bengal and
urged President Yahya Khan to bow to the voice of reason and
to the supremacy of the ballot box.
On March 14, coaxed by public opinion. President Yahya
Khan announced that he proposed to fly the next day to Dacca
for talks with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Mujib responded warmly
and declared that the President would be “our guest” during his
visit and assured him that there would be no demonstrations on
his arrival.
On the eve of the Yahya-Mujib parleys, the Dacca newspapers,
on March 14, ran a common editorial titled “Time is Running
Out”. The editorial fervently urged Yahya Khan to lift martial
law and reach a settlement immediately with Mujibur Rahman,
leader of the majority party, so that power was transferred to the
representatives of the people.
The article declared: “We the newspapers of Dacca firmly
believe that this is the time for decision and it is our bounden
duty to speak with a common voice at this hour."
The joint editorial emphasised : “The people are sovereign and
their representatives have the right now to decide what will be
the structural pattern of the country and the system of govern-
ment. One must recognise, if one is a believer in democracy, this
right of the people’s representatives to make the laws and govern
the country. This is a fundamental political question . , . The
armed forces are for defending the borders of the country against
external aggression. It is not their function to interfere in political
controversy.”
The editorial concluded: “We believe that the time has come
for President Yahya Khan to recognise these political facts of
life.”
RULING CLIQUB'S PERVERSITY HI
From Rawalpindi, the Pakistan Times, reputedly the mouth-
piece of the Yahya regime, under the caption “Break New
Ground,” welcomed the President’s announcement to reopen dia-
logue with Mujibur Rahman and described the latter’s declara-
tion, “albeit conditional, in favour of attending the assembly
session,” as significant, and concluded from that declaration that
the Awami League leader wanted to keep Pakistan one
The Pakistan Times wrote -
“While Sheikh Mujibur Rahman stands for one Pakistan, it
must be clearly understood that he does not any longer do so
in terms of traditional thinking. Some new ground will have
to be broken and a new formula found to accord with the
present revolutionary ethos. The urgency of the moment de-
mands that the coacept of Pakistan’s unity should be cast in a
new mould. The new constitutional prescription should take
into account the basic bi-zonal character of the State Perhaps
our failure so far has been due to the fact that we have con-
sistently denied and defied this compulsive geographical
reality ... A mechanism which internally ensures maximum
autonomy in all matters but externally binds them together in
order to face the world jointly is to be preferred either to a
strong central pattern which may have to be backed by force,
or the pretence of a theoretical national focus which is incom-
petent to function ”
From Karachi, Dawn commented: “It is no longer possible
to begin a search for a new basis for sustaining the political
union of the two geographical zones without simultaneouly em-
barking on democratisation.”
The paper squarely blamed Bhutto for the current crisis and for
provoking a political confrontation between the East and the
West. Bhutto’s declaration that the National Assembly would not
be competent to frame a constitution in the absence of the PPP
MNAs led to serious misgivings ui the East Wing, said the paper.
“Mujib’s assessment of the resulting situation was that a ‘cons-
piracy’ was being hatched against the people of East Pakistan.
The suspicion that moves were afoot to rob the people of the
fruits of their electoral victory led to buter resentment and loud
protest.”
112
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
Dawn described the development in East Bengal as “something
very akin to a full-dress rehearsal of a revolution, which will be
under nobody’s control once it gets under way. The country
cannot simply afford to dally away the present opportunity.”
The Pakistan Times came back to the subject four days later
with a significant editorial which accepted the Mujib regime in
East Bengal and pleaded for a dialogue to hammer out a new
formula for the co-existence of the two wings as one State. The
editorial incidentally udcrlined the measure of success and impact
achieved by the non-cooperation civil disobedience movement in
East Bengal.
Betraying some exasperation, the article commented :
“While others are making demands for the transfer of power
academically. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman has assumed full authority
in East Pakistan factually, and not merely governmentally but
also constitutionally. The latest directives for running the admini-
stration of Bangla Desh, including the abolition of some of the
Central taxes and diversion of some of them to the provincial
exchequer, are clear and incontestable indications that the Six
Points are being fast and earnestly realised in the eastern domain
without so much as ‘by your leave’ from the National
Assembly ... If the constitutional dispensation for East Pakistan
is already decreed and settled, ail that remains to decide is the
pattern of governance in West Pakistan and the form of relation-
ship between the two zones.”
The editorial then explored the possibilities of a new formula
for a relationship between the two zones and conceded: “It is
extremely doubtful if Sheikh Mujibur Rahman can now abrogate
the aims and objectives for which he fought the elections . . . There
is however a very good chance of coming to terms if, in a
business-like atmosphere, purged of the emotions generated by
the struggle for power, the leaders of the East and West sit
together to face the hard realities of a common national existence.
They may demarcate a line of thought and action which may
provide more binding and reliable links between the two zones.”
Tugging in the opposite direction, was Bhutto’s PPP in Karachi
which warned against a “sell-out” of West Pakistan. But as of
that moment, Bhutto’s was almost the only discordant voice, and
judging from the comment^' in the Press and by politicians, he
was in a minority in West Pakistan on this issue.
ruling clique's rtRVCRSirr 113
At a press conference, (lie secretary-general of tlic PPP. A
Rahim declared. "We are watching developments with full pre-
paredness and with a hawk’s eyes Our plans of action arc ready
and can be implemented readily."
Indeed the atmosphere in entire Pakistan was charged with an
agonising sense of urgency The Press, including the Pakistani
Times, supposed to be close to the regime, the majority of the
political parties and the intellectuals in the country were sympa-
thetic, if not resigned to the logic of the ballot box They con-
ceded not only the right of Mujib to form the government at the
Centre but atso the reasonableness of the Awami League’s
demands. The condemnation of Bhutto's perversity was unanim-
ous. The exhortation to President Yahya Khan to accommodate
Mujib and usher in democracy in the country was equally un-
animous, it Bhutto’s party is excepted
It was this overwhelming weight of national pressure that
propelled Yahya Khan to Dacca and to parleys with Mujib
Filibuster Talks
On March 15 Yahya Khan arrived in Dacca for the momentous
talks with Mujib. The same day Mujib took over the governance
of his province and issued 35 directives to the administration.
These directives included (1) orders to East Bengalis to continue
their strike of the federal government’s secretariat, provincial and
semi-government offices and courts; (2) orders to district commis-
sioners and subdivisional officers to handle what work they could
without reopening their offices; (3) the police, assisted, if neces-
sary, by Awami League volunteers, to maintain law and order;
(4) non-official authorities to function in all respects relating to
incoming and outgoing ships except that “no cooperation shall
be extended for mobilisation of forces or materials which may
be utilised for repression against the people"; (4) the Post and
Telegraph department to continue their activities within Bangla
Desh; (5) teleprinter channels with West Pakistan to be main-
tained only for the purpose of exchanging messages between
banks; (6) import, distribution, storage and movement of food-
grains to be continued on top priority; (7) all provincial and local
taxes to be collected and credited to the account of the Govern-
ment of Bangla Desh; and (8) no income tax was to be collected
until further orders.
Mujib’s announcement however did not cover the cantonments
of Dacca, Comilla and Jessore where the armed forces were
deployed.
114
FILIBUSTER TALKS
115
From all accounts, these directives were faithfully and loyally
carried out by officials as well as non-officials, underscoring the
de facto establishment of the Sheikh’s authority over the province
As though in retaliation. General Tikka Khan issued 16 orders
on the people, including one demanding surrender of arms and
another an ultimatum that government employees and other
workers Should get back to work These orders went totally
unheeded.
In the first round of talks between the President and Mujib,
on March 16, the two leaders were together for two and a half
hours On the second day, they met only for an hour At the end
of the second round, in answer to a reporter’s question Mujib
said he had “no reason to be depressed because 70 million people
of Bangla Desh are behind me and my party and they are united
like a rock” There was no meeting the next day
Meanwhile. Yah>a Khan summoned Bhutto to Dacca But the
latter refused to join the talks, demanded clarification and
threatened that his party would launch a civil disobedience
movement if West Pakistan’s interests were compromised at
Dacca.
The third and fourth rounds took place on March 19 and 20.
The atmosphere seemed to exude optimism The talks on March
19 lasted 90 minutes, at the end of which, it was reported, that
the two sides had arrived at an agreement to hold an advisers’
meeting This was interpreted as a hopeful sign of an "intensive
search for a solution ” The previous day the President had sent
for his legal adviser, A R. Cornelius, which suggested, it was
claimed, that the talks had reached matters of substance.
Peter Hazelhurst reported to the London Times that at their
90-mmute talk, both sides had softened their attitudes Yah>a
Khan was believed to have made three proposals 1 2 3
(1) Power be restored to the provincial governments of both
Wings, while the Army continued to administer the coun-
try's central affairs until a constitution was framed.
(2) Alternatively, leaders of both Wings to form an interim
government at the Centre under the auspices of the martial law
administration, until a constitution was framed by the National
Assembly.
(3) The two leaders, Mujib and Bhutto, to form an interim
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
116
government and if they did so, the President would restore
power to the provinces immediately.
The Sheikh was reported to have insisted on the fulfilment of
the preconditions laid down by him as also that any interim
government he might form should coalesce with like-minded
West Pakistani minority parties, with Bhutto remaining in
opposition.
After the fourth round, covering two and a half hours, Mujib
conceded to the Press that the talks were progressing -- he des-
cribed it as "some progress.”
It was reported that the advisers of the two sides, at their
meeting, discussed the power transfer plan — a three-subject
centre and provincial ministries. The Dawn Special Representative
cabled that a broad agreement on the interim arrangement was
reached and it had also been decided to lilt martial law and
hand over power to the majority party, and that the experts were
working on the formula.
Maulana Bashani and Alaur Rahman Khan, two rival Bengali
leaders, one president of the National Awami Party and the other
president of the Pakistan National League, offered to Mujibur
Rahman full cooperation in the struggle he had launched for
East Bengal’s emancipation. Bashani instructed his followers to
obey Mujib’s orders unreservedly. Ataur Rahman Khan asked
for an all-party action committee, and declared that there could
be no compromise on Bangla Desh.
Meanwhile, Dacca radio, along with TV. had gone over to
Mujibur Rahman. In a broadcast on March 17 the radio reported
that the situation in the eastern capital was surcharged with
tension and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had already drawn up a
programme of action for continuing the agitation, to be directed
by a select band of trusted lieutenants, in case Mujib was mur-
dered. (Fears had earlier been expressed in Awami League circles
that an attempt might be made on their leader’s life.)
One score for Mujib was the military administration’s announce-
ment, as demanded by him, of an appointment of an enquiry
commission to go into the army killings. The personnel of the
commission was so chosen as to be acceptable to Mujib.
Reports were now multiplying of the personnel of the East
Pakistan Rifles and the Police refusing to carry out the orders
FILIBUSTER TALKS
117
of the military administration to fire on their Bengali brethren.
Dacca radio, renamed Dacca Betar Kendra, in a commen-
tary warned the Government in Islamabad not to undertake any
“foolish military adventure” to impose its “colonialism” on East
Bengal. The radio said the people of Bangla Desh were experienc-
ing “a new dawn of democracy and freedom ” They had become
masters of their own destiny and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had
been successfully and lawfully exercising supreme authority. His
residence had, in fact, become the headquarters of the govern-
ment for 16 days.
While the talks were still on. the martial law administration let
loose a reign of terror On March 19, at Joydevpur, troops opened
fire on civilian demonstrators and killed 30 and injured a large
number. Faced by incidents of mob violence, the Army authori-
ties lost their heads and went all out to suppress and punish
defiance of orders by the people
Assessing the unpopularity of his stand, Bhutto, at last, on
March 20, announced that he was flying to Dacca, being now
satisfied with the clarifications he had received Other West
Pakistani leaders had already arrived in the eastern capital.
On March 21, President Yahya Khan met Mujib and Bhutto
separately. On his return from the talks, addressing the crowd
assembled outside his house, the Awami Leader sounded far
from optimistic. He told the people: “There can be no relaxa-
tion until our demands are fulfilled. The awakened nation can-
not be kept under subjugation We will not allow them to keep
Bangla Desh as a colony and market any more.”
Bhutto told reporters that Mujib’s demands for “foreign trade
and aid went beyond genuine autonomy, bordering on sovereignty.”
The next day, the President announced another postponement
of the National Assembly — which, be said, was done in consul-
tation with the leaders. Yahya Khan now had a joint meeting
with Mujib and Bhutto, lasting seventy minutes. After Mujib left.
Bhutto stayed on with the President for an hour. Later in the
evening, Bhutto met the President again. The President also met
that night five other West Pakistani leaders of the minority
parties
Yahya Khan's announcement stated that the National Assembly
had been postponed "with a view to facilitating the process of
enlarging the area of agreement among the political parties.”
PAK COLONIALISM IN HAST I1HNGAL
118
That afternoon. when a reporler asked Mujib whether there
was any progress at the talks, Mujib replied: "It there is no pro-
gress, why am I continuing my discussions.” Mujib’s advisers
continued their parleys with the President’s aides.
On March 22, Dawn’s special correspondent in Dacca reported :
“It was decided in principle to withdraw martial law and restore
civil administration. A document has been prepared. The Awami
League chief’s advisers, who have already had a series of talks
with the President’s aides, are now examining it. They might
meet again tomorrow to finalise it jointly.”
Bhutto told the Press that his party was examining the terms
“of the broad agreement and understanding reached between
the President and Mujib.”
He said the President had briefly apprised him of the broad
agreement. If everything goes well, and there is no last-minute
hitch, an announcement of withdrawal of martial law and return
to civil administration wilt be made on March 24. There would
be no interim government — formation of the Central government
may wait for the time being or till framing of the constitution.
After the withdrawal of martial law, ministries in the provinces
would be formed. How the central government would be run in
the meantime was not known, but constitutional experts were
of the view that the President could run the administration, if
necessary, with the help of advisers.
On Pakistan Day, March 23, President Yahya Khan’s message
referred to the grave crisis that the country was going through
at the moment. “In the agonies of trying to return to democracy,
there have been unhappy developments, but nothing is lost if we
do not lose faith in our destiny,” he said.
The message also stated: “In pursuance of this objective
(adherence to democratic principles), the present regime has
ceaselessly to ensure peaceful transfer of power lo the representa-
tives of the people elected through free and fair elections.”
East Bengal celebrated Pakistan Day as the anniversary of the
Lahore Resolution on Pakistan. In observance of the anniversary
the Bengalis tore down the Pakistani flag and in its place hoisted
the Bangla Desh banner— a golden map of East Bengal inscribed
in a velvet green circle.
Mujib’s message for the occasion stated that the struggle for
“emancipation” would continue. “Ours is the right course and
FILIBUSTER TALKS
119
hence victory is ours . . . Our people can no longer be silenced
by bullets, guns and bayonets. Every house in Bangla Deslt
should be turned into a strong fortress *’
But addressing hundreds of his supporters outside his house,
Mujib declared that he would continue his search for a compro-
mise formula with the President “Leave everything to me.” he
told them He said his non-cooperation movement (now twenty-
two days old) had broken the back of the “vested interests”. He
exhorted the people to continue the struggle, but pleaded for non-
violence.
Paul Martin in his dispatch from Dacca dated March 24 to the
London Times referred to the “independence of sorts" established
by Mujib in East Bengal— "even Yah} a felt it necessary to secure
the Sheikh's guarantee that law and order would prevail during
his stay,” he wrote “There is no doubt that events of the past
weeks have set the province firmly and irreversibly on the path
of independence.”
A Bengali politician however told Martin. “The Six-Point
programme was a formula for getting our due while remaining
united withm the context of Pakistan However, the past eight
weeks have faced both the East and the West Wings with the
problem of how best to get out of each other's hair once and
for all "
Abdul Qayum Khan, the veteran Muslim League leader from
the North-West Frontier Province, in a press statement, demanded
(hat constitutional guarantees should be provided to East Bengal
to protect its interests He conceded. “East Pakistan should have
the right to use its revenue and foreign exchange earnings and
should have foreign aid allocations on the basis of its population.”
“The people of East Pakistan by their vote have showed that
they want maximum autonomy Speaking as an individual.’’ he
said, “it was now for the people of East Pakistan to tell us how
much autonomy they want to have and how far they want to
maintain links with us."
On March 24 Mujib's and Yahya’s advisers met once again for
what was believed to be to finalise the accord arrived at earlier
between the President and the Awami League leader.
At this meeting, the President's economic adviser, M. M.
Ahmed, presented his amendments. A call was awaited from
General Pcerrada, the President’s Chief of Staff, for a final session
120
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
to be held the next day at which the draft accord was to be
finalised.
The fact that West Pakistan leaders representing the smaller
parties left for Karachi that day suggested at any rate that the
parleys were coming to an end — and most people believed that
they were ending satisfactorily.
Daultana told the Press he was going back satisfied. Qayum
however seemed less optimistic, and stated: ‘‘Can’t say satisfied
or not. But I can say this much: negotiations are going on."
Bhutto however stayed on in Dacca and held a night-long
session with his party men examining the terms of what was
supposed to be a broad agreement arrived at.
That day, evidently sensing difficulties in the way. in ominous
tones Mujib warned against imposing a decision on his people.
Addressing a large gathering outside his house, the Sheikh said:
“Bengalis will no more tolerate injustice. Either we shall live
like men or we shall go out of existence, fighting for our
cause ... In case I cannot give you orders, carry on the struggle
with greater determination to save 70 million Bengalis from
being slaves.”
In the meantime. East Bengal had entered the 23rd day of its
non-cooperation movement — it was so successful — that everyone
from the dock labourer to the judiciary joined in it, and the
entire administration of the province remained at a standstill for
20 days. Only those public utility services as were specified by
Mujib functioned in the land. It was a unique and remarkable
demonstration of a people’s determination and sense of discipline.
Unprecedented in the history of national liberation struggles in
the world, the non-cooperation movement was a total success.
No judge of the high court could be found to administer the oath
of office to the new governor, Lieutenant-General Tikka Khan.
The entire civil administration, including the police and the civil
service of Pakistan, refused to attend office. The people stopped
supply of food to the army. The v/orkers stopped work. Even
civilian employees of defence establishments joined the boycott.
The non-cooperation did not stop at abstention from work. The
civilian administration and the police pledged their support to
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and put themselves under his orders.
Even the business community subordinated themselves to the
directives of the Awami League.
FILIBUSTER TALKS
121
In Karachi, which had witnessed demonstrations in sympathy
with the Awami League’s stand. Government promulgated Sec-
tion 144 Cr P C, banning the assembly of more than four
persons for 15 days and also prohibited carrying of arms and
lethal weapons
The fateful March 25 dawned on Dacca, without an inkling
of the grim shape of coming events that night The morning
press as well as indications the previous night suggested that a
satisfactory announcement would be made by the President about
an accord reached with Mujib on the political future of Dangla
Desh and Pakistan as a whole
Bhutto met the President in the morning for 45 minutes, and at
the end of the meeting, told the press that things had become
uncertain, because negotiations were not direct Talks had become
complicated because of their indirect nature
Press dispatches dated March 25 from Dacca spoke of tension
rising in that city, following disquieting reports from Chittagong
and the north and President Yahya Khan’s failure to make an
expected declaration of virtual autonomy for East Pakistan.
The Sheikh expressed concern at the regrettable delay tn re-
solving the crisis politically and termed it "unfortunate”. He said
if a “political solution is desired ” by Yabya Khan and bis
advisers, they should "realise that it was for them to take matters
to a conclusion, and that to delay thus would expose the country
and its people to grave hazards."
Mujib added, “We have done our duty and contributed our
utmost efforts towards the attainment of a political solution”
As a protest against heavy firing upon the civilian population in
Saidpur, Rangpur and Joydevpur, Mujib gave the call for a
general strike on March 27 Meanwhile, reports of heavy firing
were pouring in from Chittagong too
Mujib’s statement observed in disgust "All this has happen-
ed while the President is at Dacca for the declared purpose of
resolving politically the grave crisis facing the country. I urge
him to order immediate cessation of such military operations.”
In Lahore, Council Muslim League Chief, Mian Mumtaz
Daultana, just back from Dacca, told the Press that the decision
to withdraw martial Jaw and transfer power to representatives of
the people had already been taken and only its mechanism was
under consideration. He said not much difference had remained
122
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
in regard to the quantum of power to be left for the Centre. The
only thing to be decided was the procedure of transfer of power.
Daultana added that Mujib was under great pressure from
extremist elements, some of whom did not appear to be interested
in the unity of Pakistan. Mujib himself wanted to keep the
country united and told them so in categorical terms.
That day at dusk. President Yahya Khan slipped out of Dacca —
like a thief in the night — when all Pakistan, and particularly East
Bengal, were eagerly looking forward to a happy denouement.
They were expecting the glad announcement of a resolution of
the political deadlock confronting the nation. Instead, their ears
met the rat-tat of machine guns and rumble of rolling tanks.
They asked for their rights. They got bullets.
The same evening, the Eastern News Agency reported that
troops were moving into Dacca and taking up positions at im-
portant points in the city.
Thirtyfive foreign correspondents were shut in at Interconti-
nental Hotel. A Pak Army officer told them : “If you go out,
you’ll get shot.”
Six shiploads of troops landed at Chittagong and Chalna, while
other troops got in by air at Dacca airport.
The attempt by the Army to disarm the police were however
frustrated by the Bengali Inspector-General of Police, who
refused to allow them to hand over their arms.
All Bengalis in the East Bengal Regiment, East Pakistan Rifles
and Armed Reserve Police and Civil Police pledged loyalty to
Mujib.
A press report stated that students raided arms shops in Dacca
and Chittagong and carried away weapons and ammunition.
Telecommunication between East Bengal and West Pakistan
was confined to army radio telephones.
RTR reported: “The situation in East Bengal is now so con-
fused that there is no knowing how it would develop.”
And hell was let loose in the land by Yahya’s Army.
11
An Anticlimax and Crackdown
Why did the talks end abruptly"* What were the causes of the
breakdown? Who was reaJJy responsible for it"*
The termination of the parleys was not only abrupt but un-
expected Until March 24. the impression created by official quar-
ters and press reports was that the parleys had moved towards
an accord and that the deadlock was about to be resolved
Indeed, agreement had been reached, according to Tajuddin
Ahmed, Prime Minister in the Bangla Desh Government, on basic
points, such as. (I) lifting of the martial law and transfer of
power to a civilian Government by a presidential proclama-
tion, (2) transfer of power in the provinces to the majority
parties; (3) Yahya Khan to remain as President and in control
of the Central Government; (4) separate sittings of the National
Assembly members from East and West Pakistan preparatory to
a joint session of the House to finalise the constitution.
“It must be made dear that at no stage was there any break-
down of talks or any indication by General Yahya Khan or his
team that they had reached a final position which could not
be abandoned,’’ slated Tajuddin Ahmad, in his statement on
April 17, 1971, issued at the inauguration of the Sovereign De-
mocratic Republic of Bangla Desh
The sudden departure of M. M. Ahmad on March 25 morning
« freer he wsi expected (a restate dcscusshas ttith Mapb’s sdtisen.
' -s therefore the first ominous sign. When Yahya Khan himself
12J
124
EAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
flew back to West Pakistan that night and the Army was turned
loose into the streets of Dacca city with blazing guns and rumbling
tanks, it became clear that Islamabad had “turned oil” the nego-
tiations and “turned on” repression.
Yahya Khan’s broadcast the next night for the first time
formally gave out that the talks had broken down. Meanwhile
rivers of blood had flowed in the streets of Dacca. The President
who until twenlyfour hours ago was purring to Mujib and
appeared to be extremely accommodating, was now breathing
fire against the Awami leader. Prima facie the speech however
sounded laboured, unconvincing and self-contradictory.
He accused Mujib of “obstinacy, obduracy and absolute refusal
to talk sense” which had led Yahya to the conclusion that “the
man and his parly are the enemies of Pakistan” — the very man
with whom he was negotiating across the table 48 hours earlier
and whom only recently he had described as the “future
Prime Minister”! Yahya now alleged that Mujib and his men
wanted East Bengal to break away completely from Pakistan.
And raising his voice in anger, Yahya declared that he could not
allow “power-hungry despots to destroy the country and play
with the destinies of 120 million people”.
The President said the Awami League leader had attacked the
integrity of Pakistan and described Mujib’s action in starting his
non-cooperation movement as “an act of treason” — “He and his
party have defied the lawful authority for over three weeks.
They have insulted the Pakistan flag and defiled the photographs
of the father of the nation. They have tried to run a parallel
government. They have created turmoil, terror and insecurity.”
The President declared, “This crime will not go unpunished.”
He announced a complete ban on the Awami League. He also
announced a ban on all political activity throughout Pakistan, a
complete press censorship and curfew in Dacca and all other
cities of East Pakistan.
Yahya however assured the people that his aim remained to
transfer power to the elected representatives of the people. “As
soon as the situation permits, I will take fresh steps towards
achievement of this objective,” he said.
Narrating the causes of the abrupt termination of the negotia-
tions, the President said Mujib had asked for the withdrawal of
martial lav/ and transfer of power prior to the meeting of the
AN ANTICLIMAX AND CRACKDOWN 125
NauoDal Assembly “In our discussions he proposed that this
interim period could be covered by a proclamation by me, where-
by martial law would be withdrawn, provincial governments set
up and the National Assembly divided into two committees, one
composed of members of East Pakistan and the other composed
of members from West Pakistan ”
“Despite some senous flaws in the scheme in its legal and
other respects, I was prepared to agree, m principle, to this plan
in the interests of peaceful transfer of power, but with one con-
dition,” continued Yahya Khan That condition was that he
must first have the unequivocal agreement of all political leaders
to this scheme.
The President said when he discussed the proposal with other
political leaders, he found them unanimously of the view that the
proposed proclamation by the President would have no legal
sanction whatsoever “It will neither have cover for martial law
nor could u claim to have been based on the will of the people
Thus a vacuum would be created and chaotic conditions would
ensue " (It could not have had less legal sanction than the mili-
tary dictator’s earlier proclamation promulgating the Legal
Frame-work Order authorising last December’s general elections
in the country!)
Yahya Khan also said that the West Pakistani leaders objected
to Mujib’s proposal for a splitting of the National Assembly into
two parts, as that would encourage divisive tendencies. “They
therefore expressed the opinion that if it is intended to lift mar-
tial law and transfer power m the interim period, the National
Assembly should meet to draft an interim consutution bill and
present it to the President for his assent. I entirely agreed with
their view and requested them to tell Sheikh Mujibur Rahman
to take a reasonable attitude on this issue "
According to the President, the political leaders met Mcijib and
on March 23 reported to the President that Mujib was not agree-
able to any changes m his scheme.
In controverting these charges, 1 Tajuddm Ahmed a partici-
pant in the Dacca talks, stated that the proposal for separate
sittings of the Assembly was actually suggested by Yahja himself
in order to accommodate Bhutto. He cited the practical advaa-
* la a statement to the Press made on Apnl 12 at the inauguration of
the Provisional Government of BaegJa Desh.
126
I*AK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
tage that whilst the Six Points provided a viable blueprint to
relations between Bangla Desh and the Centre, its application
would raise serious difficulties in the West Wing. "For this
reason, the West Wing MNAs must be permitted to get together
to work out a new pattern of relationship in the context of a
Six-Point constitution and the dissolution of one-unit.”
"Once this agreement in principle had been reached between
Sheikh Mujib and Yahya,” Tajuddin Ahmed said, "there was
only the question of defining the powers of Bangla Desh vis-a-vis
the Centre during the interim phase. Here it was again jointly
agreed that the distribution of power should as far as possible
approximate to the final constitution approved by the National
Assembly which, it was expected, would be based on the Six
Points.”
M. M. Ahmed, the President’s economic adviser, specially
flown over from Islamabad to sort out the arrangement for the
interim phase, had expressed the view that once the political
agreement had been reached, there would be no difficulty in
working the substance of the Six Points into the interim
machinery.
As to the point made by the President about the legal cover
for the transfer of power during the interim phase, Tajuddin
Ahmed said that the Awami League team had agreed that in
line with the precedent of the Indian Independence Act of 1947,
power could be transferred by Presidential Proclamation.
Tajuddin Ahmed asserted that the objection that there would
be no legal cover to the arrangement, raised subsequently by
Bhutto and endorsed by Yahya Khan, was never a bone of con-
tention between Mujib and Yahya. Tajuddin Ahmed added,
“There is not the slightest doubt that had Yahya indicated that
a meeting of the National Assembly was essential to a transfer
of power, the Awami League would not have broken the talks
on such a minor legal technicality. After all as the majority
party, it had nothing to fear from such a meeting.”
Yahya said in his broadcast that the West Pakistani leaders
opposed Mujib’s proposal for the arrangement during the interim
phase.
Of the West Pakistani leaders, Bhutto, who stayed on in
Dacca till March 26 morning while the others left on March 24
evening, sounded highly pessimistic in his talk to newsmen on
AN ANTICLIMAX AND CRACKDOWN J27
the fateful Thursday morning But then he was the evil genius
and counsellor to Yahya Khan and was mainly responsible for
the imbroglio
Bhutto told correspondents “There has been a new develop-
ment and negotiations have become more complicated because
there is no sign of reciprocity on the other side ”
Abdul Qayum Khan sounded ominously mysterious when
questioned by reporters at Karachi airport on his arrival from
Dacca, and was not prepared to give away anything about the
talks He seemed depressed, alt the same But Mumtaz Daultana
sounded somewhat optimistic when he told the Press at Dacca
airport that he was going back satisfied.
The other four leaders. Wall Khan. Ghaus Bux Bizenjo, Muft
Mahmood and Shaukat Hyat Khan, it was reported, left Dacca
in disgust and unhappy. When the talks deteriorated on the
evening of March 24, they were advised by Mujib and the Pre-
sident to leave Dacca. One foreign correspondent reported that
the leaders spoke optimistically to the press, while m private
they were very pessimistic at the “hopeless deadlock”
One of the leaders however blurted out “We still hope the
President will be able to evolve a compromise formula For our
existence as a nation is at stake. But the situation is now hope-
less and we shall need a miracle if we arc to survive as one
country.”
David Loshak in a dispatch from Dacca to the Daily Tele-
graph of London reported: “But despite carefully-calculated
leaks in the past few days, designed to give the impression that
compromise was near, there never was any real chance of a
lasting or meaningful agreement.”
Simultaneously that paper's Karachi correspondent Kenneth
Clarke warned: “Yahya who says he called elections to enable
the army to return to the barracks, does not speak for all mili-
tary commanders. There has been a talk of possible coup — there
is reliably said to be a clique of more hawkish officers whose
pressures may finally have driven Yahya into a doomed attempt
to impose the rule of the gun on Bangla Desh.”
Apart from the firm refusal, come what may. on the part of
the ruling military-bureaucratic-mdustrial clique to give up its
economic and political grip on East Bengal, the rock on which
the negotiations foundered, it was believed, was Bhutto’s stub-
128
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
born insistence that foreign trade and aid must remain a Cenlral
subject and Kashmir must continue 10 be a national bipartisan
issue. In that insistence Bhutto was fully backed by the Army,
the bureaucracy and the business interests.
Mujib equally stubbornly refused to yield on these two issues,
which were at the root of East Bengal’s troubles. For it was
Kashmir that boosted the defence expenditure and the army’s
importance in Pakistan’s political life to the detriment of the
East Wing’s economic development. And it was Kashmir again
that kept up the tension with India and thereby denied to East
Bengal its natural next-door market for its jute, fish and other
produce and source of coal and other essential commodities which
are now imported at exorbitant prices from distant countries.
Indeed, West Pakistans’ obsession with Kashmir has been a major
factor in the East Wing’s economic distress.
An equally vital grievance the East Wing has nursed against
Islamabad is that the political and economic decision-making
authority, concentrated in the hands of West Pakistanis, had
been all along exploited to the benefit of the Western wing, at
the expense of the East. Unless there was therefore decentralisa-
tion in this sphere, East Bengal could never obtain justice and
fairplay in the allocation of foreign trade and aid.
So the die was cast. On March 25 night, Peter Hazelhurst,
London Times correspondent, laconically reported, under Karachi
dateline: “Pakistan is plunged into chaos and violence. The
President flew back, with reports of shooting all over Dacca.
Troops are reported to be landing by sea and air.”
That night, in Dacca, addressing a large crowd outside his
residence, Mujib asked his people to prepare for the “supreme
sacrifice.” Later, a message broadcast on a clandestine Free
Bangla Desh radio, in the name of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman,
proclaimed East Bengal a Sovereign Independent People’s Re-
public of Bangla Desh. The message called upon the people to
continue the struggle for independence “until the last enemy
soldier has vanished.”
The broadcast said that Mujib was “the only leader of the
people of independent Bangla Desh and his commands should
be obeyed to save the country from the ruthless dictatorship of
West Pakistan.”
Would then the assumption be correct that right from the out-
AN ANTICLIMAX AND CRACKDOWN
129
set Yahya Khan never meant business and he was only filibus-
tering when he was negotiating with Mujib? Many impartial
observers as well as circumstantial evidence suggest that the
nine-day parleys staged by the President from March 16 to 24
were no more than an elaborate feint put on in order to buy
time while he (lew in the requisite number of troops Cor a pre-
meditated military crack-down on Bengali nationalism
First, as to Yahya's motivation In every public statement the
President made, before and since the Awami League's spectacular
electoral victory in December 1970. he clearly indicated that he
would never have any truck with Mujib’s Six Points, which he
had chosen to dub a secessionist demand and therefore an attack
on Pakistan's integrity
In hts March 6 broadcast. Yahya had agjm made “absolutely
clejr. no matter what happened” that so long as he was in com-
mand of the Pakistan armed forces and head of state, he would
ensure complete and absolute integrity of Pakistan In contrast,
however, as part of his policy of deception. Yahya adopted an
unusually soft and conciliatory posture m his talks with Mujib
"He expressed regrets for what had happened and his sincere
desire for a political settlement.” states Tajuddm Ahmed. "In
a crucial meeting with Sheikh Mujib he was asked to positively
state the junta's position on the Awami League's four-point
proposal. He indicated that there were no serious objections and
that an interim constitution could be worked out by the respec-
tive advisers, embodying (he four points (pre-conditions for
talks)”.
As a preliminary step, the President, on March 2. replaced
Admiral S M Ahsan. reputedly friendly with Mujib, as Governor.
It was later reported that Admiral Ahsan had expressed his
opposition to the Central Government’s plans of repression in
East Bengal.
Meanwhile, NJujib. who obviously had his own “intelligence
services", never missed an opportunity in his public speeches to
condemn the "conspiracies being hatched by vested interests” to
sabotage the democratic processes m East Bengal in order to
retain their economic hold, on the province.
In his March 7 statement to the press. Mujib referred to "a
minority group had aligned itself with certain forces to obstruct
the constitutional process and to deprive the majority of the
130
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
people of their rights.” He said. "These apprehensions were
further fortified by the steady military build-up which became
evident. This showed that a political confrontation was soon to
be followed by a military confrontation, if the majority did not
submit to the dictation of the minority.”
Then the Awami leader recalled: "Dark conspiratorial forces
had always intervened in our country whenever the people were
to take over power through the democratic process. The micro-
scopic minority which represented the vested interests of the
West Wing had, by sabotaging democracy, deprived the 75 million
people of Bangla Desh of their basic rights. In 1953 a Bengali
Prime Minister was dismissed by a conspiracy of the Punjabi
ruling clique. In 1954 an elected government in East Bengal was
dismissed and the Constituent Assembly itself was dissolved by
the same clique. When the general elections were to be held in
early 1959, the vested interests of Punjab once again struck and
usurped power. Today the Punjabi ruling coterie is attempting
to repeat this disgraceful history.”
The three Harvard professors, Mason, Dorfman and Marglin,
who carried out a study of the East Bengal problem (quoted in
an earlier chapter) concluded: “Indeed, in retrospect it would
appear that West Pakistani officials were never negotiating in
good faith; negotiations were a way to forestall an open break
until sufficient numbers of West Pakistani troops could be brought
on the scene to unleash terror, whose full dimensions arc only
now becoming known. The Awami League’s commitment to
peaceful political settlement was convincingly demonstrated by
the complete lack of preparation of the civilian population to the
onslaught of military arms which was unleashed on them on
March 25.”
Sydney Schanbcrg, New York Times correspondent, who
covered the Dacca negotiations, in an interview to the Statesman
in New Delhi also seems to subscribe to the view that the talks
were never meant to succeed. Schanbcrg said: “Nobody knows
if Yahya Khan really expected Mujibur Rahman to budge from
his position or he was using talks as cover to get more troops
into East Pakistan. But what can be said with certainty was that
as the talks progressed, troops continued to pour in each day.”
John Woodruff, correspondent of Baltimore Sun reported:
“One well-connected traveller arriving in Dacca from Karachi
AN ANTICLIMAX AND CRACKDOWN
131
shocked newsmen a week before the conflagration, by reporting
that a general he regarded as highly reliable had told him that
the army’s plan was to lull the Bengali leadership into believing
the talks could succeed, then to crack down on them without
warning ”
Woodruff added, “The events could be described only as a
carefully coordinated premeditated attack on a basically defence-
less population in an attempt to crush a movement whose mam
tactic had been nonviolent non-cooperation.’’
That Mujib himself was sceptical about the outcome of the
talks is clear from what he told Schanberg in an interview at
his Dhanmandi house on March 23 “For one, two, three, four
days we’ll see; then we’ll go our own way,” the Awami League
leader said.
Reports reaclung Indian border stated that in the 24 hours
preceding March 25 at least 10,000 troops had landed at Chitta-
gong and Chalna. They were brought in by five ships and were
dispersed to three areas, Dacca, Comilla and Jessore There were
already 60,000 troops in East Bengal.
Shortly before March 1, tanks which had been sent north to
Rangpur to defend the borders, were brought back to Dacca
and their tracks were being replaced with tyres in preparation
for street warfare From March 1, the families of army personnel
were being sent off to West Pakistan on a priority basis along
with the families of West Pakistani businessmen. The military
build-up was accelerated after March 1, and continued through-
out the talks up to March 25
Members of the armed forces, dressed in civilian clothes, were
flown in PIA commercial flights via Ceylon. C-130s, carrying
aims and provisions for the garrisons, flew into Dacca. It is
estimated that up to one division, with complementary support,
was brought into Bangla Desh between March 1 and 25. To
ensure security, the airport was put under air force control and
heavily guarded with artillery and machincgun nests while move-
ment of passengers was strictly supervised
An SSG commando group, specially trained for undercover
operations in sabotage and assassinations, was distributed in the
key centres of Bangla Desh and were probably responsible for
the attacks on Bengalis in Dacca and Saidpur in the two days
before March 25, according to Ta/uddm Ahmed.
132
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
As early as March 14, the Army took the first step to disband
the East Pakistan Rifles and the Police throughout the province.
This step was apparently prompted by the apprehension that
they would give armed support to Bengali rcsistence.
Preparatory to the decision to unload on March 24 the am-
munition-carrying ship. Swat, at Chittagong port. Brigadier Ma-
zumdar, a Bengali officer commanding the garrison in Chittagong,
had been suddenly removed from his command and replaced by
a West Pakistani. On the night of March 24. Mazumdar was
flown to Dacca under armed escort, and has not been heard of
since then.
It is reported that on March 24 night. Yahya Khan drove to
Kurmitola cantonment, the East Bengal headquarters of armed
forces, on the outskirts of Dacca. He stayed on to preside over a
late night meeting of military planners discussing the “final
solution of the East Bengal problem.” 2
Throughout the day. one after another, all military installations
in the province were intimated of the impending operations on
March 25 by coded telegraphic messages.
In Chittagong, an earlier message was decoded by the Bengali
staff of Brigadier Mazumdar and the latter, as stated earlier, was
sacked forthwith. On March 24 rebel East Bengal Regiment
men joined forces with the striking dock workers in a battle with
the Pakistani Army on quayside.
Indeed, one could sniff tension in the morning air of March 25
in Dacca and other towns of Bangla Desh. Bengali personnel of
the Bengal Regiment, East Pakistan Rifles and the local police
were agog with rumours of impending massive action.
Over the preceding several days, as reinforcements from Ka-
rachi poured in by air and sea, Bengali units had been divested
of all but bare minimum ammunition supplies. In cantonments,
ammunition dumps were placed under a 24-hour guard com-
prising exclusively of West Pakistani personnel.
Senior Bengali officers were detached from their units on
various pretexts and sent on superfluous assignments. In Jessore.
a Bengali Lieutenant-colonel was asked to go on leave and when
he refused to go. was put under arrest. In ComiJla Cantonment,
some Bengali units began to build defensive positions where
their barracks adjoined those of West Pakistani units.
2 Fazl Lohani in an article in Mainstream, May 15, 1971.
AN ANTICLIMAX AND CRACKDOWN 133
It was also reported that some senior officers had communi-
cated their fears to Awami League leaders a few days before
March 23 But they had been told that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman
was hopeful of a satisfactory settlement with the West Pakistani
rulers
From all accounts. Mujib's suspicions came true The "con-
spiracy of vested interests” seemed to have prevailed over poli-
tical realism and democratic principles The hawks among his
advisers appeared to have got the upper hand and insisted on
Yahya to call a halt at once to his flirtations with “secessionists”
and put into force the contingency plan of a crackdown on the
"recalcitrant” Bengalis
Genera] Tikka Khan, brought post-haste as Governor to
Dacca, was straining at the leash He had promised Yahya that
he could finish the job in 48 hours His intelligence men had
assured him that resistance would be confined to the towns and
that the "little Bengalis" would just bhago m the lace of an
impressive show of armed force! Yahya yielded
12
Buried Under Corpses
As tanks and guns tore across East Pakistan, Bhutto exclaimed :
“Thanks to Allah, Pakistan is at last saved!”
Peter Hazelhurst in his dispatch in the London Times
ruminated: “It is a sad commentary of Pakistan’s political life
and the role of the military machine that troops have been used
more against their fellow Pakistanis than against their so-called
foe India during the past ten years.”
At dusk, as Yahya Khan took off for Karachi, Pakistani troops
moved out of the Dacca cantonment in trucks and took up posi-
tions at strategic points in the city. First, a column proceeded to
the radio station and took possession of that vital point. Road-
blocks were laid in key parts. By 11 p.m. the city reverberated
with the cacaphony of machineguns.
One of the first targets of the army was the University campus,
where they opened machinegun fire on the dormitories and
rammed tanks into their walls. Most of the students were asleep
and shot up in their beds. Jagannath Hall and Iqbal Hall were
decimated. Professors and their families were dragged out of
their residences and butchered.
According to the Associated Press photographer Michael
Laurent, who managed to slip out and tour around the city on
March 26 morning, 200 students were killed at Jagannath Hall
alone. Troops reportedly fired bazookas into the medical college
hospital but the casualty toll there was not known.
134
BURIED UNDER CORPSES
135
Other objects of special attention of the military marauders
was the old town, the New Market, the industrial area and the
Hindu localities Barricades were already up m Mirpur Road,
near Mujib’s house
Al about 10 pm. a friend rang up the Awami League leader’s
residence to warn him of the impending army attack There were
about a dozen Awami League workers surrounding Mujib when
the phone message arrived He seemed for a moment shaken by
the news, dreading the aftermath for his people, but quickly
recovered composure He at once instructed his compatriots to
move and keep out of the Army’s reach.
They begged him to leave with them He refused, saying that
if he escaped, the Army would tear down the city, hunting for
him. A kind neighbour offered Mujib and his family shelter in
his house, but the Awami League leader thanked him and
declined the offer His eldest son Kama! and his daughter Hasma
were away, and Mujib and his wife and three children stayed on
until the Army called
Between 12.30 and lam, two truckloads of Pakistani soldiers
stopped in front of Mujib’s house. 1 Suddenly the entire area
echoed to the sound of stengun firing. A short burst, followed
by a long one. The process continued for several minutes Soldiers
from the street saw a door opening on the columned verandah
on the first floor The firing stopped Mujib in checked lungi
and white kurta came out, in measured steps, to the railing of
the verandah. Looking down on to the street, he addressed the
soldiers in Urdu. “Why are you making so much noise. If you
have come to arrest me. there is no need to open fire. I will
come down."
And that is how they took him away.
The holocaust of March 25 night in Dacca city and the savage
genocide that followed in the entire province is now an oft-told,
poignant story, fully publicised m the Indian and world press.
So this writer will content himself with highlighting certain
extraordinary features of this Greek tragedy. During the two days
and nights (March 25 and 26) the Pakistani Army, according to
conservati\e third-party estimates, butchered some 30,000 people
m Dacca city alone.
* Fazl Lohani, Mainstream, May 15, 1971-
136
I'AK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
In the entire province some three lakh people are believed to
have died at the hands of the Pak Army on the rampage. Despite
repeated claims by the authorities to the contrary, three months
after the “D” day. Dacca and Chittagong were half empty.
Factories were unable to work to normal capacity, with a large
proportion of their workers away in their villages, not daring to
come back.
According to US sources in New Delhi, some 30 million people
were still, four months later, wandering about in the countryside
in East Bengal, running from pillar to post, fleeing from the army
terror, hunting for food. Already seven million refugees had
crossed into India, and more were coming, at the rate of 50,000
every day.
Anthony Mascarenhas, a veteran Pakistani journalist, with a
conscience bursting to tell the truth to the world, fled to London
to write in the columns of the Sunday Times what he saw and
knew about the grisly goings-on in East Bengal. Mascarenhas was
one of the eight Pakistani journalists flown to Dacca towards the
middle of April and taken on a conducted tour around the
Eastern province with a mandate to give the people of West
Pakistan a “reassuring picture" of the “return to normalcy”.
And he told it in sixteen columns of the Sunday Times — a
story of incredible horror and savagery.
He wrote: the military operation had two distinctive features:
“One, the ‘cleansing process’ a euphemism for massacre. The
other ‘rehabilitation effort’ — i.e., turning East Bengal into a
‘docile colony of West Pakistan’. .
On March 27 evening, the military authorities decided to expel
the 35 foreign correspondents, who had been confined to the
Intercontinental Hotel for 48 hours, without being permitted
either to go out or file their stories. The correspondents had
been watching the fiery drama through their windows and
wringing their hands at being unable to cable out their stories.
At 8.15 p.m. a convoy of eight trucks, carrying the 35 foreign
correspondents, with soldiers in front and back, moved out to the
airports. Asked by a newsman why the correspondents had to
leave a lieutenant-colonel said: “We want you to leave because
it would be too dangerous for you. It will be too bloody.” Sydney
Schanbcrg of New York Times wrote, “All the hotel employees
and other foreigners in the hotel believed that once the newsmen
BURIED UNDER CORPSLS 137
left, carnage would begin ‘Tins isn’t going to be a hotel,’ said
a hotel official, ‘its going to be a bloody hospital ’ ”
An American national, who chooses to remain anonymous and
was eye-witness to the events in Dacca from March 25 to April
4. in a detailed 24-page report sent to his Senator, describes
what he witnessed in Dacca during the period as “one of history’s
most massive examples of genocide "*
The American national ventured out on the morning of March
27 when the curfew was lifted He wrote
“We first visited the New Market, now in smoking ruins.
Hundreds of families who lived with their goods had been
killed on their mat beds during the surprise attack on Thursday
night Most had died without even leaving their shops while
others were cut down while trying to escape The whole area
(in Old Dacca), largely inhabited by the Hindu community was
cordoned oil and burned and its inhabitants machine-gunned in
the streets Although only a witness of the fact that the Army
had cordoned oil the area, I did see. as previously reported,
the sky aglow over the old City for two nights and saw the
smoke-created twilight over the whole city throughout Friday.
March 26.”
The American visited the ruins of two Hindu temples in the
centre of the Ramna race track near the Intercontinental Hotel.
The Pakistani Army had sacked the two places of worship “The
old walls of the temples had been breached, apparently the work
of a tank," he wrote down “I saw what was described to me as
being a pit filled with bodies."
Apart from the students and faculty of Dacca University, the
next hardest hit group was that comprising the successful can-
didates (at the recent elections) and all levels of leadership of the
outlawed Awami League. “As of April 3, they were being hunted
down and shot, not just them but their families and anyone who
tned to shelter them as well.”
Describing the mass exodus from Dacca, chc Amedcxa says:
“They were gunned down outside the city, along highways and
particularly at concentration points, ie. at canal and river
* Quoicvl by V. M. Na»r in the Statesman, 21 July. 1971,
138
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
crossings, and their bodies thrown into the streams.”
“Part of the reign of terror has involved the violation of women
by soldiers. Well-substantiated incidents are far too numerous to
report individually. They seem to follow a pattern, typical of
which is that the wife or daughter of an important Bengali is
taken to the cantonment and is not heard from again.”
Rajabagh, the East Pakistan Police headquarters, was another
target. The office premises and barracks were stormed and
machine-gunned. How many of the 1,100 policemen housed there
were left at the end of the massacre is difficult to say.
The Pakistani Army next also had its revenge on the news-
papers The People and Ittefaq. Their staff were mowed down by
machincgun fire and the premises burnt down. In the Ittefae/
office, some 400 people were taking shelter. Charred furniture
and bodies were all that were left of the newspaper.
At midday on March 26, the troops suddenly poured into the
old section of the city and for the next eleven hours systematically
devastated large areas of the “Old Town”, where Mujib has his
strongest support. They drove through the streets firing into the
houses, an elderly eye-witness told Simon Dring of the
Daily Telegraph of London. It was followed by men with gasoline
tins who poured the oil all over and set fire to the entire area.
Dring reported that about 700 men, women and children died
there that day between noon and 2 p.m.
A World Bank mission headed by Peter Cargill, Director of the
Asian Division of the World Bank, after a fact-finding tour of
East Bengal in early May, reported in favour of suspension of
all development aid to Pakistan on the ground that the Govern-
ment was in no position to carry out any development projects
because of disturbed conditions.
A ten-man team of experts went round twelve administrative
districts of East Bengal, made a detailed survey of the conditions,
and declared that the situation was very far from normal. The
11,000-word report stated that fear and lack of confidence were
all-pervading in the province, “particularly among the lower
grades of civil servants and workers,” and that “there are no
signs that the situation will improve significantly or rapidly.”
The report added that people remained afraid and untrusting
and it was most unlikely that economic pressures sufficiently
strong to overcome that reserve could or would be generated.
BURIED UNDER CORPSES
139
“It is most unlikely that any significant movement in the direction
of peace will occur until there is a drastic reduction in the
presence of the military,” concluded the Bank mission’s report
The report was accompanied by vivid field studies The
following are excerpts from one of the studies, carried out by
Hendrik Vander Heijden, an economist member of the mission,
who toured western parts of East Bengal.
“An awesome panorama of destruction and damage — with
people looking terrified, shocked and dazed was like
morning after a nuclear attack ”
Kushtia looked “like a German town in the Second World
War after Allied strategic bomb attacks Ninety per cent of the
houses, shops, banks and other buildings were totally destroyed.
People were sitting around dazed. When we moved around,
everyone fled The population was down from 40,000 to
5,000 When the insurgents withdrew, the army punitive
action started and it lasted 12 days, leaving Kushtia virtually
deserted and destroyed”
“Kushtia is the My Lai of the West Pakistan Army. .
Thousands of farmers have fled Everything is abnormal there
and it was a shattering experience"
“Scores of totally destroyed villages were visible from the
air while the team was approaching Jessore A building was
still on fire, and to the eastern side of the runway, a good many
houses had been destroyed . . some 20,000 people were killed
in Jessore. The damage to housing in Jessore district was so
severe that the authorities themselves estimated that 2,50,000
people out of a total population of 4,50,000 might have been
affected. Half a million had fled to India"
“The town of Mungla, where the labour for Chalna anchorage
h\cd, has been virtually obliterated by naval shelling. The
population therefore is down from 22.000 to 1,000. Damage
was extreme, houses, the market place, the telephone exchange,
power distribution lines, etc. arc totally destroyed.”
“Perhaps the most impressive visit I made was to Phultala,"
»ro!e Hejjdrn. "Fifty per cent of the population of this thana
has fled (some 20.000 of 42,000) mostly Hindus. leaving behind
unattended plots of land, houses, etc., everything had been
disrupted there : the livestock officer had been killed, the whole
administration was in chaos, the people bewildered It is
140
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST IJENGAL
doubtful whether any Government can effectively deal with
these people in the near future. It is at the tliana level where
the shock waves of the army action hit the hardest. It was at
this level where the hope for agricultural development was.
It has been set back by at least five years.”
“Khulna city has been substantially damaged. Very heavy
destruction was observed in the areas alongside the road and
along the river leading up to the newsprint factory ... as a
result of the disturbances, the destruction of houses and the
continuing uncertainty regarding life and property, the popula-
tion of greater Khulna is down from 400,000 to 150,000.”
According to the field studies, there were areas in all cities
visited by the World Bank team that had been razed, and in all
districts visited, there were villages which “have simply ceased
to exist.”
Schanberg, of the New York Times reported from Faridpur, in
Bangla Desh, on June 29: “The Pakistani army has painted big
yellow H’s on the Hindu shops stili standing in this town, to
identify the property of the minority, eighth of the population,
that it has made its special targets.”
On July 4, from Dacca. Schanberg reported a “foreigner who
has lived in East Pakistan for many years” as exclaiming:
“Doesn’t the world realise that they (the West Pakistani soldiers)
are nothing but butchers? That they killed — and are still killing
— Bengalis just to intimidate them, to make slaves out of them?
That they wiped out whole villages, opening fire at first light
and stopping only when they got tired?”
Again on July 13, Schanberg cabled: “Although at first the
targets were both Muslims and the 10 million Hindus, the army
is now concentrating on Hindus in what foreign observers
characterise as a ‘holy war’ . . . The killing, though it is more
selective and less wholesale, has not stopped, and the outlook,
most observers believe, is for a long and bloody struggle . . , The
killings have been matched by the property damage the army has
inflicted everywhere. In the countryside — for miles at a stretch
some times — villages after villages have been burnt to the
ground on both sides of the road.”
Meanwhile, the guerilla fighting inside East Bengal was
intensifying. So much so, Pak troops dared not move out except
in groups. The incidents of sabotage of communications were
BURIED UNDER CORPSES 141
multiplying According to Clare Holhngworth of the Daily
Telegraph of London, who loured Hast Bengal in the first week
of July, “Vietnam- type situation has been taking shape (in that
province) in which the army controls the towns and mam centres
of communication, while the remote countryside, especially at
night, becomes a Bangla Dcsh enclave ''
Murray Saylc of the Sunday Tunes. London, toured East Bengal
in the second week of July, and particularly visited the refugee
reception camps that Yahya’s Government claims to have
established along the border His verdict: “Only a very brave
or very foolish refugee would even try to return as things are,
and that his welcome would be very doubtful if he did Only
a peaceful joint operation by India and Pakistan will gel any
substantial number of refugees home, and this seems totatly out
of the question as things stand " In any case, they have nothing
to go back to — their houses, shops and land have been taken
over by non-Bengalis.
We in India of course know that nothing short of the establish-
ment of a friendly Awami League regime in Bangla Desh and a
complete withdrawal of the brutal Pakistani Army from the
province would persuade a proportion of the nine million
refugees now in India to go back
There was method in the Pakistani Army’s madness It had a
diabolical, premeditated plan — a plan to exorcise, once and for
all. the devil of Bengali nationalism from the body politic of
Pakistan. So it concentrated its savagery on the intellectuals —
the politicians, teachers, professional men, and the students and
the young — the leaders of today and tomorrow, and the day
after.
The Pakistani army devoted special attention to the liquidation
of the Hindus because they considered the Hindus as the “niggers
in the pile". Numbering ten million in a total population of 78
millions, the Hindus were primarily responsible, according to the
Pakistani rulers, for the Awami League's secular politics. “So
kill as many Hindus as possible, and drive the rest to India” —
that seemed to 6e their mandate. That way the PalisCaat rulers
would simultaneously be solving East Bengal’s political and
demographic problems. Reports from West Pakistan say that
Islamabad is now pl anning to transplant the immigrant Muslim
population from West Pakistan to fill the vacuum in East Wing.
142
PAK COLONIALISM IN HAST UEN'GAL
In case Islamabad succeeds in crushing by brutal military force
tire righteous democratic cause, represented by the liberation
movement in Bangla Desh, one shudders to think of its repercus-
sions on the future behaviour of Governments towards dissent in
their countries, or indeed its impact on the United Nations
Declaration on Human Rights-
For shooting down twentytwo civilian men, women and children
in My Lai in the Viet Nam War. an American Lieutenant was
convicted by an United States Court on a charge of murder.
Jurists and intellectuals in the United States traced the “war
crime" far higher, up to the President of the US. in his capacity
as the Commander-in-Chief of the country’s armed forces.
What happened in Bangla Desh under the direct orders of
President Yahya Khan was My Lai multiplied a million times.
It is genocide as defined by the Nuremberg Doctrine as well as
by the United Nations Convention.
The Nuremberg Doctrine recognises that war criminals are not
only those who have committed crimes against peace and viola-
tions of the laws or customs of war, but those who have cairicd
out “crimes against humanity” whether or not such crimes violated
the domestic law oj the country in which they took place.
Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter of 1945 reads: "Crimes
against international law arc committed by men, not by abstract
entities, and only by punishing individuals who committed such
crimes can the provisions of international lav/ be enforced.”
The UN Convention of 1948 defines genocide as the “com-
mitting of certain acts, with intent to destroy wholly or in part,
a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such.” The Con-
vention declares that genocide, whether committed in time of
peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which
the contracting states “undertake to prevent and to punish.”
Pakistan is one of the contracting states to the Convention on
Genocide which have undertaken "to prevent and to punish”
genocide.
Both under the terms of the Nuremberg Doctrine and the UN
Convention on genocide, President Yahya Khan stands convicted
of war crime and of genocide. For Article 4 of the Convention
demands that the accused “shall be punished whether they are
constitutional rulers, public officials or private individuals.”
13
Why Did He Do It ?
At this point, a question that frequently occurred to this writer
was: why did Mujib not go underground, so that he Was available
to his people — so essential for the conduct and success of the
struggle — to lead and direct the fight It is not as though he
was taken by surprise
In his speeches in the preceding twenty days or more, Mujib
repeatedly referred to "conspiracies" to sabotage the restoration
of democracy in the country and to the Army reinforcements
rushed iiom the West Wing to the East in order to suppress their
movement. He had warned the West Pakistani rulers of the
consequences of any attempt on their part to deny East Bengal
the fruits of their overwhelming electoral victory
In his statement of March 7. replying to Yahya Khan's broad-
cast holding out threats against the Aw ami League, Mujib
referred to the security measures being taken m the province and
stated that it now appeared that the political confrontation was
soon to be followed by military confrontation, if the majority
did not submit to the dictation of the minority group. He then
warned: "Neither the democratic way of life could be established
nor power could be transferred to the people if the minority
group conspired with the vested mterests to frustrate the
democratic process."
By letting himself be a nested at the very outset of what he
would ha\c known to be a hard and bloody battle against the
143
144
PAK COLONIALISM IN LAST BENGAL
ruthless Pakistani militarists, did he not then lay himself open to
the charge of opting for the easy way — that of the comparative
comfort of a prison, while his people went through hell at the
hands of the Pakistani Army?
That jail under the Islamabad regime is not what it was under
the British rule in India during the freedom struggle — no ‘A’
class treatment; indeed far from it — is underlined by Mujib’s
statement made in February 1969 before the tribunal that tried
him and other accused in the notorious trumped-up Agartala
Conspiracy case, which was later unceremoniously dropped by
tlie Government. It is a sordid story of persecution, of framed-up
cases and of warrants chasing Mujib, one after the other, so as
to make sure that he was kept continuously behind the bars.
It often meant solitary confinement.
Mujib described to the court how on the Awami League
adopting the Six-Point programme of autonomy, the leaders of
the Government party, including the President (Ayub) threatened
him with the ‘language of weapon’ and ‘civil war’ and started
harassing him by instituting more than a dozen cases against
him.
“They arrested me first in April 1966 at Jessore, while I was
returning to Dacca after holding a public meeting at Khulna via
Jessore, where I was intercepted and arrested under a warrant
of arrest issued from Dacca for an alleged prejudicial speech. I
was produced before the sub-divisional magistrate, Jessore, who
granted me interim bail.
“On reaching Dacca. I appeared before the Sub-Divisional
Officer, Dacca Sadar, who refused to grant me bail, but as I
was granted bail by the sessions judge, Dacca, the same day. I
was released. I came to my home at about 7 p.m. At 8 p.m. that
night the police came to my house again with a warrant of
arrest from Sylhet for an alleged prejudicial speech there.
“I was arrested and taken to Sylhet under police escort that
very night. Next morning my bail plea was rejected by the sub-
divisional magistrate of Sylhet who sent me to jail. The following
day, the Sessions Judge of Sylhet was kind enough to grant me
bail. On my release, I was arrested at the jail gate by the police
on a warrant of arrest from Mymensingh for an alleged
prejudicial speech delivered by me there at a public meeting.
“That very night I was escorted by the police from Sylhet to
WHY DID 116 DO IT?
145
Mymensingh I was produced before the sub-divisional magistrate.
Mymensingh, who similarly refused to grant me bail and sent me
to Mjmensingh jail All these series of arrests and harassraents
took place in April, 1966. The following day, the sessions judge
of Mymensingh granted me bad. and on release from jail, I came
back to Dacca
“It was in the first week of May, probably May 8, 1966, that
I addressed a public meeting at Narayanganj and came to my
Dacca residence at night At one o’clock that night I was arrested
by the police under Rule 32 of the Defence of Pakistan Rules
This was followed by the simultaneous arrest of a large number
of my party leaders
“Ever since my detention I was facing a number of trials in
Dacca Central jail where the courts were being held After about
21 months of detention on January 18, 1968, at one o’clock, 1
was released from detention and from the jail gate some military
personnel forcibly brought me to Dacca cantonment, where I was
detained in a closed room I was segregated and kept in solitary
confinement and was not allowed to see anjone I was not
allowed to read newspapers In fact I was completely cut off
from the rest of the world for five long months During this
period I was subjected to inhuman mental torture and I was
denied all physical amenities . .
“I am President of the East Pakistan Awami League, a con-
stitutional political party haviog a definite and constructive
manifesto and programme for the economic, political and social
uplift of the country. I wanted justice to both the wings of the
country as envisaged by the Six-Point programme What I think
good for the country I have always expressed openly within the
constitutional limits and still then I have been made to suffer
by the ruling clique and vested interests who want to perpetuate
their exploitation of the Pakistani masses, parucularly East
Pakistanis by suppressing me and my party.”
If such persecution and vindictiveness failed to break Mujib's
spirit, he would not now turn faint-hearted when a struggle he
threatened to resume, was precipitated hy the Government.
One answer to the riddle is that Mujib was possibly taken in
by Yahya Khan's protestations of his sincere desire to restore
democracy in the land and thereafter to fade out of the pohucal
arena, and thus he did not expect the latter would use the Army
146
I* A IC COLONIALISM IN LAST BLNGAL
with such a heavy hand to crush a people’s unanimous demand,
demonstrated through an unprecedented electoral victory.
He believed that, at the most, the Government would arrest
him and other leaders and disperse protesting demonstrators with
tcargas or even rifle fire and seek to suppress the movement;
but not go beyond that point. The brutality and the genocidal
magnitude of the Army’s assault on the East Bengali people as a
whole not only took Mujib napping, but according to eye-
witness accounts, stunned and. for a moment, mortified him to
inaction.
It is also possible that Mujib was deceived by Yahya Khan’s
tolerant and accommodative posture at the negotiations (though
it contrasted with the tone of his broadcast of March 6). The
President seemed to acquiesce in the new order, as Mujib took
over the administration of the province without a hitch, and
ran it for over twenty days, with every official, from the judiciary
and the Police to the banks and commercial houses, carrying out
his behests. The new Bangla Dcsh flag fluttered from the top of
public and private buildings, without a ripple of protest from the
authorities. Could it be that all this flattered Mujib into over-
estimating his strength and influence in the land and letting his
guards down?
Nevertheless, it is difficult to believe that such an experienced
politician, so familiar with Islamabad’s actions and reactions to
political developments in East Bengal, could fail to anticipate
the military junta’s sharp reaction to his seizure of power. Indeed,
the disarming and disbanding of East Pakistan Rifles and the
Police and the demobilisation of the Bengal Regiment should
have proved an unmistakable warning to Mujib of the coming
events.
The Satyagrahaic element in his make-up is however underlined
by Mujib’s insistence on the dismantling of road blocks put up by
the Chatra League after an incident in which a Punjabi was
killed by an angry mob. There was a moment, this writer was
reliably told, when the considerable Bengali clement in the
security forces (Bengal Regiment, East Pakistan Rifles and
Armed Police) were ready to carry out a coup, if only Mujib
would give the signal. But Mujib would not give the signal.
By March 25, there were signs that the extremists in the party
and outside had taken the bit between their teeth and that Mujib
WHY DID HE DO IT**
14?
was unable to control the situation On March 24 , n Chittagong
mobs mounted action, on their own, at the harbour when the
Pakistani Army sought to unload the ship. Swat, carrying
ammunition, in the face of dock labour’s boycott
The nagging question, however, sull persists but why did the
Awami League, which had fully anticipated a confrontation with
Yahja's army for quite some lime before it actually came, not
prepare its leaders and rank and file to face it with appropriate
weapons and tactics 0
There were indications that while till the very last moment
Mujib hoped that a political solution of the deadlock would
materialise, he was preparing for struggle m die eventuality of
the Government resorting to violent repression Th e formation of
Sangram Samitis was evidence of the Awami League’s conscious-
jness of ihc coming storm
Any preparation of the people for such an eventuality would
however have meant training volunteers in the use of arms and
guerilla warfare, which would have called for a longer period
of time than available to them and secretive and underground
methods The Awami League volunteers were given super-
ficial training, more in the tradition of the pre-Independence
Indian Congress Seva Dal, who drilled with dummy rifles and
lathis, strutted in formation at parades, helped t 0 keep order
and discipline at public meetings and demonstrations At the
most, the training and discipline imparted to these volunteers
enabled them to face the police lathis and shooting bravely but
non- violently. Theirs was not the psychology that could adjust
their tactics against the brutality of a trigger-happy, soulless army.
It is argued that a good commander-in-chief always assesses
correctly the strength of the enemy forces in the context of his
own, before essaying into the battlefield Was it not part of
practical wisdom for Mujib to lower his sights and not pitch bis
demands too high when he lacked the requisite material strength
to back them? For he should have known that a refusal of ins
demands would precipate a showdown in which armed force was
bound to get the upper hand. Should he have, then, stretched
the dispute to the point of snapping?
But in political battles, unlike as in military battles, there
sometimes comes a moment when principles cannot be com-
promised without doing incalculable damage to the cause and
148
I>AK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
losing the battle altogether. To Mujib the 90-per-cent-vote
electoral victory on the plank of the Awami League’s Six Points
was an irreducible mandate on which he could compromise only
at the risk of incurring the censure of his people.
Indeed, as the parly enjoying an absolute majority in the
Constituent Assembly and therefore in a position to enforce
democratically, through the Constituent Assembly, the mandate
given to it by the people. Mujib rightly refused to be cast in
the role of a supplicant before Bhutto or Yaliya Khan. He was
negotiating from a position of strength. They should be the
supplicating party, seeking, and not demanding, concessions from
the leader of the majority parly and be resigned to whatever
crumbs he deigned to oUer.
That is the way democracy works the world over. But then in
Pakistan, they lost touch with democratic practices long ago,
and have been used to the ways of authoritarianism and “palace
intrigue." Indeed, the rulers of Pakistan have always shunned
and distrusted democracy and invented excuses to sabotage its
return, for democracy spelt the death knell of their totalitarian
rule and colonial exploitation of East Bengal.
But could not Mujib have waited until the Constituent Assembly
met and he was installed as Prime Minister before raising
controversial issues with President Yahya Khan that, he knew,
were bound to lead to a deadlock and a bloody confrontation?
Some observers have asserted that there was a moment, soon
after the announcement of the election results, when the President
would have agreed to an Awami League Government taking
office with a few concessions on the part of Mujib.
Once in command in the Government and the National
Assembly, it is suggested, Mujib could have, with the help of
his powerful majority and even support from the minority pro-
vinces of the West Wing, got adopted a constitution after his
heart, and declared the National Assembly sovereign and then
denied to the President the power of veto that the latter granted
himself under his Legal Framework Order.
Michael Hornsby of the London Times, looking back and
reviewing developments in East Bengal, wrote: “There is broad
agreement among witnesses of the pre-March events in Islamabad
and Dacca that there was a period when he (Mujib) could have
become Prime Minister of Pakistan without sharing power with
WHY DID HE DO IT? 149
Mr. Bhutto, if he had been prepared to make some concessions on
certain points.”
But Hornsby knocks down his own argument when he concedes
that the issues over which Mujib was expected to make conces-
sions were “key points such as the right of the provincial govern-
ments to determine trade policies and the amount of revenue to
be consumed by the armed forces ” Mujib just could not have
yielded on those issues — that was asking for the impossible
Besides, these issues were raised at the outset not by Mujib but
by Bhutto, backed and prodded by the military-bureaucratic clique
in Islamabad Bhutto it was who insisted on a prior understand-
ing on the points before the convening of the National Assembly.
Bhutto also made it very clear that he and West Pakistan would
never agree to hand over taxation and foreign trade and aid to
the provincial government in East Bengal, come what may That
cussed attitude and threat of boycott by Bhutto straightaway flung
the fat into the fire
Nor was Mujib prepared to compromise on the fundamentals
of his stand (the Six Points) or wait till the Constituent Assembly
was convened and the A warm League Government installed in
order to raise the controversial aspects of his party’s political
programme After East Bengal’s bitter experience of the past,
he dare not take chances with the West Pakistani ruling clique.
In 1954, the Fazlul Huq Ministry that came to power following
an overwhelming victory by an indigenous United Front against
the official Muslim League, was summarily dismissed for no
reason than that it spoke the language of autonomy for East
Bengal Soon thereafter the Pakistani rulers even invented an
excuse to abrogate the constitution and proclaim an emergency
in the land, because the constitution threatened to circumscribe
the authoritarian powers of the head of state.
Any one who has known Mujib would of course reject the
slightest suggestion that he ratted from a bloody sequel. Here is
a leader who has spent a major part of the last twenty years in
Pakistani prisons and whose proven courage, selflessness and
capacity for sacrifice, should dispel any such unworthy aspersions.
A plausible ex plana tion was given to this writer by Rahman
Sobhan. Mu jib's admirer and close associate. Apart from the fact
that as a Satyagrahi it went against his grain to run away from
arrest and imprisonment, Mujib possibly felt that Bangla Dcsh’s
150
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST I1ENGAL
struggle was inexorably moving from its peaceful, constitutional,
nonviolent phase to that of violence and armed warfare, that the
weapons in his armoury were exclusively fashioned for a non-
violent struggle, and that therefore he had none to oiler for use in
the new phase. The latter called for a new set of leaders, ap-
propriately equipped with the new weapons. He was therefore
passing on the sacred torch of the struggle for the emancipation of
Bangla Desli to them.
Mujib was an unhappy, embittered man. He had been deli-
berately misrepresented by the military-bureaucratic complex in
power in Islamabad and dubbed a secessionist, when he was
desperately striving to keep East Bengal part of Pakistan through
a formula that sought to satisfy the East wing’s genuine grievances,
while keeping it firmly within Pakistan.
On the contrary, he was stoutly resisting the pressure from the
extremists among his own people for a switch to a violent struggle
and to strike for complete independence. The Chatra League,
the mass wing of the Awami League, advised Mujib to put
no more faith in constitutional talks, while the pro-Bashani paper
Natun Desk, on March 28, editorially pleaded with him: “When
with these very bastards you arc busy in a mysterious conference,
some of them have killed innocent Bengalis at Joydevpur. Isn’t
that enough to open your eyes? Isn’t it high time for you to rise
against them? Oh, Sheikh Mujibur, we are still waiting for you.
Come and join with us. We shall crush the bastards of the West.”
Bhutto and Yahya played a stellar role in staging this terrible
Greek tragedy. Mujib strove to avert it by channelising his people’s
boiling rage into a peaceful nonviolent, non-cooperation move-
ment. Intellectuals in both die East and the West wings publicly
acknowledged (that is, until March 25) the patriotic part that
Mujib sought to play at a critical juncture in Pakistan’s history
and they blamed Bhutto (publicly) and Yahya Khan (privately)
for frustrating Mujib’s efforts.
The arbitrary postponement of the Constituent Assembly pro-
voked spontaneous demonstrations of protest in Dacca and other
cities of East Bengal on March 1. The Army decided to suppress
them by force, as a result of which, according to the military
authorities themselves, 172 were killed, while the Dacca corres-
pondent of the London Observer put the figure nearer 2,000.
Despite these bloody provocations, the Harvard study by
WHY DID HU DO IT?
151
Professors Mason, Dorfman and Marglin points out “The Awami
League refrained from declaring independence. Instead, they
launched civil disobedience to demand the return of the troops
to the barracks and an enquiry into the firings The campaign of
non-cooperation effectively transferred civilian authority to Mujib,
but even at the massive rally on March 7, Mujib still spoke of
a united Pakistan with autonomy for each province
Dann of March 10 wrote “Indefinite postponement of the
National Assembly roused mass anger in East Bengal which inter-
preted it as another attempt to obstruct East Pakistanis from
achieving their rights It led to a spontaneous mass movement
and Mujib has been trying his best to control and discipline it”
“Today after the elections the only legitimate source of authority
in the country arc the elected representatives of the people.”
patiently argued Mujib in the course of bis reply to Yahya Khan’s
haughty March 6 broadcast attacking the Awami League. “No
individual can claim authority superior to that of the elected
representatives. We, as representatives of the overwhelming
majority of the people of Bangla Desh. assert that we are the
only legitimate source of authority for BaDgla Dcsh. Indeed, by
virtue of our majority position, we are the legitimate source of
authority for the whole country."
Mujib then added. “So long as this state of confrontation as
also the inflow of army personnel and arms from the West Wing
conunucs, so long as the atmosphere of repression is maintained,
so long as there are daily reports of military firing upon civilians in
different parts of Bangla Dcsh, the members from Bangla Desh
could hardly be expected to contemplate participating in the
National Assembly at gunpoint ”
As early as February 28, in an arUclc in Dmn. A. H M
Kamaruzzam, Secretary-general of the All-Pakistan Awami
League, assured the rulers and people of West Pakistan “The Six-
Point programme is a national strategy whose object is to remove
from the federal sphere the mam sources of discord.”
“Let the army come and take me to prison,” Mujib scoffed in
an interview to Paul Martin of London Tunes, during the critical
days immediately before the fatefuf March 25. “ Look foe } ourself.
I have nobody guarding me. They have all the guns. They can
kill me. Indeed, they can kill my family But let them know that
they cannot kill the spirit of 78 million people.”
152
PAR COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
Mujib was fighting on two fronts, wrote Martin. The ardent
hope that the Pakistan crisis could be settled within the framework
of democracy, promised by the country’s general election,
compelled him to work tirelessly in negotiations with Yahya
Khan. The call for Bengali independence, which infected the
populace in the past month, bringing province-wide civil dis-
obedience in protest against the military regime, pitted his political
prestige and personal support against the challenging voice of
extremists within his own movement.
Martin pronounced: “Mujib though representing the essence
of Bengali nationalism, is undoubtedly a greater patriot than many
leaders from West Pakistan who support the regime’s latest
militant stand.”
“We have our rights, and these were underlined in the results
of the elections,” Mujib told Martin. “Mrs. Gandhi was sworn in
as Prime Minister only a few days after her election. My election
was last year but I am still waiting to be sworn in.”
There is a Gandhian quality about Mujib’s greatness — a
greatness entirely based on his sacrifice, suffering and dedication
for the cause of his people and their emancipation. Single-mind-
ed and fiercely determined in the pursuit of his political objec-
tive, he is absolutely fearless and incorruptible. He scorns
power.
During his twenty-year political career, he has been a Minis-
ter just once, and that for a few months; but has spent about ten
years in jail. After many years of struggle and travail, the cov-
etted Prime Ministership of the entire country was within his
grasp. But he spurned it and stuck to his guns and preferred to
go to jail, once again, for his principles.
Unlike his distinguished predecessors of an earlier generation,
Fazlul Huq and Shaheed Suhrawardy, who often succumbed to
the lure of power, Mujib could not be bought over by the rulers
for any price. That was the secret of his political strength and
power over his people and that is what made him the most fear-
ed and hated man to the colonialist rulers in Islamabad. They were
furious that they could neither tame him nor buy him out. At the
negotiating table, he showed a tremendous tenacity of purpose
that could not be unbent by any kind of pressure, coercion or
cajolry. Like Gandhi, he too was a good organiser of the masses.
Early in his career he realised that communalism was a bogey
WHY DID lie DO IT ?
153
raised and fostered by colonialist rulers to keep the people divid-
ed and demoralised in their political struggle In East Bengal,
the rulers used the dastardly device to instigate the Bihan Mus-
lims to start Muslim -Hindu riots He saw that it was a poison the
rulers sought to inject to paralyse the Bengalis’ demand for poli-
tical and economic justice
Mujib decided that secularism was an imperative element for
the success of the Bengali struggle for identity, whose founda-
tions were Bengali language and culture and was therefore en-
tirely secular He was instrumental in shedding the word “Mus-
lim” from (he "Awami Muslim League” and (hrowing it open to
Hindus and other non-Muslims This was not only a clever move,
but politically a wise step because ibe Hindus who constituted
10 per cent of East Bengal's population were a vital factor in the
province’s political life and could play a key role at elections
It was a master-stroke that at once strengthened the autonomy
movement by bringing the highly politicised and experienced
Hindu intelligentsia to its ranks and imparted a rare unity to the
movement.
At the end of the one-year detention and trial in the Agartala
conspiracy case. Mujib emerged a national hero of East Bengal
Popular demonstrations and strikes had followed his arrest and
continued throughout the trial period He thereafter became the
focal point for Bengali nationalism Indeed, the political unrest
sparked off in the country by Mujib’s arrest and trial was a con-
tributory factor to the downfall of Ayub
One more question Did Mujib issue the declaration of inde-
pendence for Bangla Desh broadcast on March 25 night on the
clandestine Free Bangla Desh radio?
The martial law authorities stated Mujib was arrested on the
night between March 25 and 26 at his residence and that the
news reports claiming lliat * he had issued any statement or made
any broadcast were completely false and without foundation.” A
PTI dispatch reporting the broadcast announcement stated that
it was not made by Mujib but by an unknown announcer.
There are. however, indications that the declaration was made
with his approval. Earlier in the day, Peter Hazelhurst of the
London Times, reported from Karachi that Mujib had that day
issued directives to commercial concerns in East Bengal that in-
dicated that separation was on the cards. Foreign shippers had
154
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
been asked not to refuse to accept cargo from East Bengal. The
order also said that jute trade should be resumed immediately.
Foreign companies were asked to negotiate all export deals
through the two East Bengal banks — the Eastern Banking Com-
pany and the Eastern Mercantile Bank. Foreign telegraph com-
panies were instructed to route all telecommunications with
foreign countries through Manila and London instead of Kara-
chi in West Pakistan.
Addressing a large crowd that night in Dacca. Mujib exhorted
the people to prepare themselves for the “supreme sacrifice”.
14
The Pakistan That Was
Pakistan as we have known it is no more Pinch might as well
write off the Eastern Wing History will name Yahya Khaa and
Zulfikar All Bhutto as the architects of Pakistan’s disintegration
It was hard enough, without Yahya’s and Bhutto’s contribu-
tion, for such a geographical monstrosity to hang together
Between the two they have not only hastened the process of
disruption but underscored the nonviability of a nation tied
together with the tenuous thread of common religion
I>avid Ho/den described Pakistan as a “pantomime horse
stitched together by the thread of Islam After a quarter century
of increasingly ungainly manoeuvres on the world stage, the hind-
legs of East Bengal have parted, at last, from the fore-legs of
the West.”
No sooner the euphoria roused by the achievement of the
miracle of Pakistan subsided than doubts began to harass the
minds of the architects of Pakistan about the viability of this
State based on the archaic tie of religion, whose two wings were
separated not only by a thousand miles but also by ethnic, cul-
tural and racial differences.
The “Father of Pakistan". Mohamed All Jinnah was himself
conscious of the fatal shortcomings of his handiwork and was
anxious that the “Homeland of Muslims" should start on a clean
slate as a secular modem democratic Slate in which all inhabi-
tants, irrespective of their religious faith, were equal citizens. In
155
156
I'AK COLONIALISM IN LAST I1ENGAL
his address opening Pakistan Constituent Assembly, on August
11, 1947, the Qaid-c-Azam declared: “Now, I think we should
keep that in front of us as ideal (“that we are all citizens and
equal citizens of one State") and you will find that in course of
time, Hindus would cease to be Hindus, and Muslims would
cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is
the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense
as citizens of the State."
In February 1948 broadcasting to the United States of America,
Jinnah said of the constitution of Pakistan: “1 am sure it will
be a democratic type . . . equality of man. justice and fairplay to
everybody ... In any case, it is not going to be a theocratic state.
We have many non-Muslims - Hindus. Christians, Parsis. But
they are all Pakistanis. They will enjoy the same rights and pri-
vileges as any other citizens and will play their rightful part in
the affairs of Pakistan".
That the Qaid-e-Azam’s followers and successors soon com-
pletely forgot those generous and civilised sentiments is however
another story.
Later in the month in a broadcast to Australia Jinnah showed
an even keener awareness of the problem created by the physical
separation of the two wings of Pakistan. He said: “West Pakistan
is separated from East Pakistan by about a thousand miles of the
territory of India. The first question a student abroad should ask
himself is — how can this be? How can there be unity of Govern-
ment between areas so widely separated? I can answer the
question in one word. It is ‘faith’ in Almighty God, in ourselves
and in our destiny.”
“Jinnah envisaged a democratic constitution for Pakistan.”
writes Chaudhri Muhammad Ali.’ “A federal constitution with
sufficiently strong central government to safeguard the integrity
and security of Pakistan. He was keenly aware of the difficulties
which the geographical separation of East and West Pakistan
presented and wanted to forge every instrument of unity between
the two wings.”
But, alas, his autocratic temperament did not permit him to
unbend and bow to a legitimate popular demand and dictates of
democracy. His successors in office were even more rigid of
mind.
1 Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, Emergence of Pakistan.
THE PAKISTAN THAT WAS
157
Chaudhn Muhammad All, a former Prime Minister and stal-
wart of Pakistan, was equally conscious of the “strains and
stresses inherent in that structure”, though through a process of
auto-suggestion he convinced himself that "the powerful binding
forces of Islam — a common ideology, a common history as a
single community in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent, a common
struggle for independence from British rule and Hindu domina-
tion, a common fear of Hindu designs, and the instinctive sense
of common destiny — had created a state of unique structure.”
Muhammad All adds, “The nation, in the first flush of inde-
pendence won by unity, faith and discipline, felt certain of
enduring as a single entity ” This almost sounds like whistling in
the dark for courage For within less than a year doubts turned
into realities, as East Bengal began to strike a discordant note
on the floor of the Constituent Assembly and outside
The moment the negative bonds like the hatred of the alien
imperialist rule and fear of Hindu domination disappeared, the
fallacy inherent in the Pakistan ideology began to show itself to
prove that religion was not enough to bind disparate groups of
people into a nation
Indeed, opinion surveys of students of Dacca University, taken
in the sixties, revealed that there was no longer great regard for
the Islamic bond of unity “A breaking away from Islam among
educated youth is acknowledged by many observers of the Pakis-
tan scene," wrote John E Owen’ in an article way back in 1968.
“If this process permeates the popuiauon (as it may do with
rising education and urbanism) the rationale for Ihe foundation
of Pakistan is lost. .If Pakistanis discard the Islamic ideal (as
some writers contend they already have) then the new nation
would in effect be conceding that the Islamic ideal for society is
irrelevant or unequal to the demands of the 20th century.”
Owen attributed political instability in Pakistan partly to a
dichotomy between the growing secularised nationalism and a
nationalism oriented towards Islamic theocracy. “The reconcilia-
tion of an ancient faith with the 20th century is not easily
achieved in any culture,” he commented, "and Pakistan provides
a permanent example. ”
Owen then prophetically added. “Whether Islam can main-
1 In an article, "Social Structure in Pakistan," in the Middle East Forum
Quarterly. 1963, Vol. XLIV, No 3.
158
I’AK (OLONIAMSM IN HAST DUN GAL
tain itself in a pure (traditional) form under the current stress
of modernisation and secularisation remains problematical."
Giving expression to the doubts harassing the minds of the
modern generation. Prof. Mahmud Husain, of Karachi University,
delivering the key-note address at a seminar on Pakistani Nation-
hood. in 1%!. wondered aloud: “After all there must be some ex-
planation of the fact that in spite of the great cementing force of
Islam, the world of Islam could not. except in the earliest times,
be united into a single state during these so many centuries." 1
Karl von Vorys, a Fulbright Lecturer at the University of
Dacca, l%l-62, put his finger on the problem when he wrote:
“The call of Islam, as perhaps that of other religions, is basically
universalis! and somewhat exalted, To reach all mankind, or at
least all the faithful, is its object . . . When it comes to a political
unit that is smaller in scope and founded on nationalist aspira-
tions, Islam can offer little ideological help. The teachings of the
Prophet do not easily adjust to a value pattern which has at
its core the predominance of national interest.” 4
Vorys added. “More modern Muslim leaders do not lind
nationalism contradictory to Islam (as Maulana Maududi, head
of the Jaat-i-Islami does), but they too have doubts about the
latter’s efficacy as a driving force for national cohesion.”
The repercussions of the current fateful developments in the
East wing could be far-reaching. Mujib’s bold example has
stimulated the ftssiparous trends lying not so dormant in three
of the four provinces that constitute West Pakistan. The Pathans
and the Baluchis have never reconciled themselves to the Punjabi
rule. The Sindhis have been the loudest in their grievances against
the Central Government that took away from them their greatest
asset, Karachi city, and in addition, were saddled with Punjabi
domination in the political, administrative and economic life of
the country.
The overweening ambition of Bhutto brought the temple down
around Yahya’s ears. It is evident that the soldier-president found
the political crisis beyond his depths and turned to the military-
bureaucratic-industrial-clique backing him, and in particular to
the evil genius of Bhutto, to find a way out of the imbroglio.
The ruling clique seemed more concerned with retaining their
3 The Morning News, Nov. 6, 1961, Dacca.
4 Karl von Vorys, Political Development in Pakistan.
THE PAKISTAN THAT WAS 159
strangle-hold on East Bengal than preserving political peace and
harmony in Pakistan
Any political tyro could see that a rebellion of 75 million
people, 1200 miles away, could not be stamped out by any army,
however strong and brutal. Immediately, brutal armed force
might prevail over unarmed but embittered people, and Yahya’s
men might claim to have established peace in that troubled land
The dictator would however soon find that he had produced the
peace of the graveyard and realise the harsh truth that one could
do anything with a sword except sit on it'
Pakistan's misfortune was that at the moment of the gravest
crisis in its history, it had at its head a soldier who knew next to
nothing of politics and who could think of only a military solu-
tion to a difficult problem The situation, on the other band,
called for a high degree of political acumen and statesmanship,
which were beyond him
Michael Hornsby described Yahya Khan as a blunt amiable
soldier, ‘•intellectually and temperamentally unequipped to make
the sort of responses that might just conceivably salvage some-
thing from the disaster in the east ”
In an article in the London Times he wrote: “When President
Yahya Khan ordered his troops into action in East Pakistan on
March 25. to quell what he considered a dangerous threat to
the integrity of the country, it is unlikely that he foresaw the
consequences - a people living in terror of the army and econo-
mic life disrupted, and ahead only the prospect of a prolonged
military occupation of the colonial type, harassed by the increas-
ing activity of guerilla groups Nor, alas, is there much sign that
the President, who depends entirely on his military commanders
for information, has any clear grasp of the consequences now
(three months later)”
For a long, long time, many a patriotic Pakistani will ruefully
recall that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s Six- Point programme was
negotiable, and indeed the only practicable formula, within the
tramework of Pakistan as a nation comprising two widely sepa-
rated wings.
The three Harvard professors' study* testifies: "His (Mujib's)
preparedness for negotiation and commitment to the unity of
Pakistan was demonstrated by his continuation of the talks for
1 Profs Mason, Dorftnan and Marglia of Harvard University
160
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
the next two weeks despite a well-advertised influx of West
Pakistani troops. . . - The Awami League’s commitment to a peace-
ful political settlement was convincingly demonstrated by the
complete lack of preparation of the civilian population to the
onslaught of military arms which was unleashed on them on
March 25.”
The study further added that after Mujib’s overwhelming victory.
“Political and military powers of West Pakistan tried to pressure
Mujib into compromising on his Six-Point autonomy mandate.
In particular. Bhutto demanded that control of trade and aid
should remain with the Central Government. When Mujib refused
to compromise on these instruments of past economic domination,
Bhutto announced boycott of the National Assembly. Yahya
Khan used this pretext to postpone the National Assembly
indefinitely.”
It was Bhutto and Yahya that pushed the Sheikh and East
Bengalis to the brink of demanding complete independence.
Yahya Khan’s political bad faith in refusing to stand by his
own plighted word is responsible for the present tragedy. When
the result of the general elections he himself ordered, proved
distasteful to him, he went back on his pledge by seeking to
nullify the near-unanimous electoral verdict of the people of
East Bengal.
The logic of his own plan — and his insistence that Pakistan
is one integrated nation — required that Yahya should hand over
power to the majority party, namely Mujib’s Awami League, and
let the National Assembly thus constituted fashion a constitution
it chose for a one-Pakistan, without any kind of external pressures.
Logically, that would have meant a Bengali majority party ruling
Pakistan and a federal or even confederal constitution, with a
quantum of autonomy for East Bengal adequate enough to
prevent the kind of exploitation it had sufTcrcd at the hands of
West Pakistan hitherto.
Besides it stands to reason that if Pakistan is one nation —
which Yahya Khan and Bhutto insist that it is — then Mujib’s
majority party should automatically take office, with Bhutto’s
second largest party, occupying the position of the main opposi-
tion. Bhutto’s claim to equal status with Mujib on the plea that
his was the majority party in the West Wing was absurd and
untenable.
THE PAKISTAN THAT WAS
161
It was even more outrageous that President Yahya Khan
should have seized upon Dhutto’s far-fetched claim and exploited
it to deny democracy to Pakistan and power to Mujib’s Awami
League at the Centre. Yahya thereby handed to Bhutto a veto
against political progress m the country and provoked a rebel-
lion m East Bengal
The self'Contradictory broadcast made by President Yahya
Khan on March 26 at once betrayed the weakness of his case
against Mujib and revealed the extent to which he played into
the hands of Bhutto and was prepared to go to carry out the
entrenched null tary- burea ucra uc-md ustnal complex ruling m
Islamabad.
The current crisis in Pakistan underscores the stark truth that
as long as East Bengal is part of Pakistan there will be no demo-
cracy for East Bengal, nor for West Pakistan — a truth that
Bhutto is now chewing at leisure after serving as cat’s paw to
the military-bureaucratic ruling clique to deny East Bengal its
rights and economic justice. For, the moment democracy is res-
tored in Pakistan, the Bengalis will wrest power at the Centre
from the West Pakistani minority, firmly entrenched in office for
the last twenty-three years. The latter can remain in power per-
petually so long as they command the armed forces and levers of
civilian power in the country, provided democracy is kept out
The political history of Pakistan of the last seventeen years is
the sordid story of an oligarchy manoeuvenng to retain absolute
exccuuve authority, and to that end. sabotaging every attempt to
restore democracy in the land. This cynical aim was achieved by
a systematic process of discrediting politicians through such arbi-
trary measures as PRODA and EBDO and propagating the line
that the people of Pakistan were unfit for democracy. In the only
two elections held — the provincial elecuons in East Bengal in
1954 and the national elections in 1970 — when the electorate
gave an unmistakable verdict against the ruling clique, the latter
invented excuses to sabotage the outcome, a return to democra-
tic life,
Nevertheless the intriguing question will continue to be ask-
ed: why did Yahya Khan initially promise the country a return
to democracy, if he did not intend to fulfil that promise?
It is clear that Islamabad was not particularly afraid of restitu-
tion of democracy m West Pakistan as that would have only led
162
I'AK COLONIALISM IN HAST 11KNGAL
to a continuation of the old order. But the rub was that it also
meant simultaneous return of democracy to East Bengal, and
that could prove disastrous for the West Pakistani rulers and their
colonial hold on East Bengal.
But Yahya Khan, backed by his intelligence reports from the
East Wing, it is believed, felt convinced that the Awami League
could never capture absolute majority in the National Assembly
and therefore there was no danger of that Bengali Party’s ex-
tremist programme being translated into action at the Centre. At
the most, lie expected the Awami League to emerge as the larg-
est single party which would compel it to go into coalition with
other parlies from West Pakistan and thus to dilute its Six-Point
programme.
The assessment of the election results however proved a tragic
miscalculation on the part of the President. Now that the elec-
tions had been held and the result had proved adverse to the
regime, Yuliya's only hope was that he might be able to persuade
or coerce Mujib to trim down his Six Points to jettisoning extreme
demands like transfer of foreign trade and aid from the centre
to the province.
Yahya hoped that the bait of Prime Ministership and the op-
portunity to rule Pakistan from Islamabad, plus intimidatory
warnings that any “threats to the integrity of Pakistan” would be
sternly dealt with by the Army, would induce Mujib to climb
down. To make matters doubly sure, he insisted upon a prior
agreement between Bhutto and Mujib on the fundamentals of
the Constitution before convening the National Assembly.
The ten-day negotiations in Dacca that abruptly terminated on
March 24, were directed to that end. When Yahya found that
Mujib refused to budge even an inch from his position, he put
through his contingency plan of a crackdown on the Awami Lea-
gue and its sympathisers.
There again, the President was misled by “men on the spot”
who promised him that the job of stamping out the Bengali up-
rising would be no more than a four-day operation. The Army
authorities in Dacca had assured the President that the trouble
would be largely confined to urban areas, which the Army could
crush quickly and enforce Islamabad’s writ in the land in no
time. But it turned out that the Bengali revolt was widespread
and the rural population was equally infected and defiant, and
THE PAKISTAN TIUT WAS
163
that, indeed, every blade of grass in the land proved hostile to
the "army of occupation”, as it now came to be called
Michael Homsby of the London Times comments . “The Gov-
ernment and the army are the victims of their own propaganda.
They are convinced that Bengali nationalism was the artificial
creation of a minority of extremists who can be isolated and
eliminated ’’ And they thought genocide could accomplish the
objective effectively
World opinion is however aghast at the foolhardiness and
gumption of an authoritarian regime, that came to power through
a coup and itself lacked legitimacy, in questioning the Awami
League’s legitimacy and right to form government. Having sought
to flout the verdict of the ballot box — something unthinkable
in the modem democratic era — Yabya decided to crush dis-
sent with machine guns and tanks, and with genocide. Thereafter
the soldier-PresiUent was naive enough to issue a White Paper
that threw the entire blame for the massacres in East Bengal on
Bengalis, and with a straight face, claimed that it was the Ben-
galis who had committed genocide by killmg non-Bengalis on a
mass scale' The world dismissed the White Paper as a great
joke.
Yahya's latest is to stage a secret trial of Mujib by a special
tribunal and invite universal ire and disgust All the world, in-
cluding West Pakistanis, know that Mujib did no more than to
demand of the President implementation of the verdict of the
ballot box, and that constitutionally and non-vio!ently At no
time till March 25. did the Awami League speak of independ-
ence for East Bengal. Mujib scrupulously stuck to the term
"emancipation” in his statements and speeches right through.
Establishing an improvised self-government for some twenty
days following a successful and unprecedented non-violent, non-
cooperation movement, with the willing and full acquiescence
of the entire administrative machinery of the province, backed by
a thumping electoral victory, can under no stretch of imagination
be labelled “waging war against Pakistan.”
Little minds and nation-building go ill together. Wise rulers
would realise that the jcanwng for political identity on the part
of a subnational group is not sccessiomsm but an inevitable
phase in the political evolution of an emergent and developing
country. Refusal to make concessions to such legitimate political
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
164
aspirations could only lead to an explosion, as it has happened
in East Bengal. We in India have learnt that lesson betimes and
avoided disaster. Indeed, this has been possible in a democracy
which possesses built-in safety-valves to meet such eventualities,
which a totalitarian system completely lacks.
The ruling military-bureaucratic clique in Pindi — like the
obdurate White supremacists of South Africa — has perversely
decided to suppress the people's legitimate aspirations in East
Bengal and are thinking up new plans and devices to insulate
them against modem political concepts and trends.
Thus among the Hitlerian measures seriously being contem-
plated now are the doctoring of school text-books and the re-
writing of history to bolster up the tottering ideology of Pakis-
tan, so that the communal theocratic character of the State is
preserved, whatever the cost.
To this end also the Pakistan Times, the mouthpiece of the
present regime, has unabashedly advocated the revival of separ-
ate communal electorates for the Hindu community and other
minorities in Pakistan, not with a view to protecting their inter-
ests, but to preserving the communal. Muslim character of the
State!
The Pakistan Times attributes the Awami League’s over-
whelming triumph at the December elections to the powerful
backing given to the party by the Hindus of East Bengal who
number one crore and were therefore in a position to piny a
pivotal role at the hustings. But the heavy percentage of votes
scored by Awami League candidates indicates that they would
have won equally convincingly without the benefit of the Hindu
vote.
The newspaper concludes that Pakistan’s integrity can never
be secure until the Hindus arc politically cribbed and cabined
under a separate electorate and kept out of political mischief, so
as to ensure that the ‘evil of secularism never raises its head
in Pakistan.
Arguing with a perverse logic, Z. A. Suleri, editor, in his weekly
commentary in the Pakistan Times, contends that the Pakistan
ideology and joint electorates were a contradiction in terms and
that it is therefore of the essence of survival that the separate
electorates should be instituted in place of joint electorate ”
Under joint electorate, “it will be humanly impossible for a
THE PAKISTAN THAT WAS
165
Muslim candidate not to take into account the interests of the
Hindu voter which may well ensure his success,” continues
Suleri “The requirements of politics have a logic of their own.
But why should he be put in such a predicament? Were there
separate electorates, he could afford to be uncompromisingly
Muslim in his outlook.”
In another article the Pakistan Times pointed at the danger
of permitting a disproportionately large number of Hindu teach-
ers in schools in East Bengal, and held them responsible for
sowing the seeds of Bangla nationalism and cultural separatism
in young formative minds and urged their replacement by Mus-
lim teachers
Thus in its diabolical thoroughness the Yahya regime recalls
to mind Hitler’s plans to "dispose of” the people of conquered
territories Hence also the special attention paid by Yahya's
murder gangs to the Hindu community in the towns and vil-
lages during their campaign of genocide in East Bengal. This
was as good an opportunity as any to liquidate the community
which the rulers have always wanted to get rid of and now con-
sidered the springs of secularism and Bengali nationalism. So the
Army embarked upon pogroms on Hindus that put m the shade
the anti-Jewish pogroms m Hitler's Germany and in medieval
Europe.
Even so do the King Canutes of Pindi seek to stem the on-
rushing tide of modem political ideas and thoughts in Pakistan.
Now what about the King Canutes among the Muslims of
India?
15
King Canutes oj India
Twentyfour years ago the people of the Indo-Pakistan sub-
continent went through the trauma of partition. Today they arc
witnessing the drama of a great myth exploding and its fallout
convulsing, once again, the entire sub-continent. It was a time-
bomb built into the very fallacious structure of Pakistan, destin-
ed to explode sooner or later.
For Pakistan was a myth conjured up in hate-filled minds, that
defied any rationalisation and could never stand up to the harsh
glare of reality. For quite some time however blind hatred of
the other community and fanatical fervour for a communal state
of their own covered up its inherent weakness and fuelled its
engines. But soon with this fuel running out, the engines began
to stall.
That fateful moment was triggered off in East Bengal in De-
cember 1970, with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s overwhelming vic-
tory at general elections on the plank of political identity for
the Eastern Wing. It was in effect a unanimous demand by East
Bengal for ethnic and cultural self-determination — a secular
and regional cry put forth by the “better half" of Pakistan, con-
stituting the majority of the State’s population.
Thus Yahya Khan’s stake in East Bengal was not only the
preservation of West Pakistani economic domination in that
foreign-exchange-earning province which was also a highly lucra-
tive consumer market. Mujib’s “emancipation” movement chal-
166
KINO CANUTES OF INDIA 167
Ienged the very basic ideology of Pakistan If the movement was
allowed to succeed, its repercussions on the rest of Pakistan could
be fatal. Once the dam was breached, the flood might sweep
away the remaining ethnic regions of Pakistan in the West,
which have never been reconciled to losing their individual iden-
tity and being bossed over by the arrogant Punjabi ruling class.
Hence the desperate fury with which Yahya set upon the
Swadhin Bangla Desh agitators whose basic thesis is that com-
mon culture, economic interests and shared history and tradition
— and not common religion — are the right bonds and criteria
to qualify for nationhood.
The Swadhin Bangla Desh movement goes a step further and
proves to the hilt, on the basis of East Bengal’s bitter experience
of the last 24 years, that shared religion constitutes no bar to
one ethnic group, more advantageously placed, from exploiting
another, for its own economic aggrandisement.
Indeed East Bengal’s bitter experience of living under a reli-
gious state is a powerful refutation of Pak ideology That expe-
rience exposes the internal contradictions, fallacies and unwork-
abihty of the ideology. But instead of drawing the right lessons
from the working of the Pakistan experiment for over two decades
and remodelling itself to the political reahucs. the rulers of Pa-
kistan, as though driven by inexorable Fate, seem to be set on
the course of disaster.
A statesmanlike regime would have been expected to respond
to popular trends and the peculiar needs of a bifurcated nation
and refashion Pakistan's constitutional structure into a modem,
secular, democratic federal state that could effectively meet its
special challenges and recognise and appreciate the political need
m emergent developing countries to satisfy the urge for sclf-idcn-
tity of ethnic groups.
Now what about the Rip Van Winkles of India — the Indian
Muslims? The strange reactions and inhibition displajed by
many of their leaders and newspapers on the frightful events in
East Beogal arc, to say the least, baffling. Those reactions how-
ever underline the ambivalence from which the Indian Muslim
communuy as a whole suffers on matters Pakistani.
Responding through their “conditioned reflexes” many Indian
Muslims seem to have taken the pro- Pakistani line even at the
risk of being accused of callous indifference to the inhuman suffer-
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
168
ings of brother Muslims in East Bengal — and to salve their
conscience, they would like to believe those atrocities were no
more than the figment of the imagination of an Indian Press
allegedly motivated by their desire to see Pakistan disintegrate!
It may be noted that Muslim separatism, though born in Dac-
ca, was nurtured at Aligarh, and flourished in U.P. and Bombay.
And when it bore fruit in partition and Pakistan, the elements
that felt the need for it most and fought and sacrificed for the
two-nation theory, largely remained behind, while Pakistan came
into being in the Muslim-majority regions in the north-west and
north-east of the country.
Thus Indian Muslims generally tend to look upon Pakistan as
Jews of the world look upon Israel, with the same emotional
attachment and loyalty. The secession of East Bengal from Pakis-
tan would undermine the very validity of the two-nation theory
and knock the bottom out of the Pakistan ideology as a state
based on religion — a concept tried and discarded in the rest
of the world long ago as invalid and impractical in modern
times.
Nevertheless, in their heart of hearts Indian Muslims have al-
ways felt aggrieved over the creation of a Pakistan that left them
behind, abandoned and exposed, even though it was they who
needed protection from the Hindu majority and had fought for
Pakistan, and were made to pay the price for it.
Even such champions of Pakistan and fighters for the cause
as Shahced Suhrawardy and Chaudhri Khaliquzzaman before
long had second thoughts on the two-nation theory. Indeed
Suhrawardy remained behind in India for quite a few months
after partition in the hope of staying on in this country. He even
joined Sarat Bose in working for an independent united Bengal
— a project which Jinnah readily blessed, as it would have meant
an independent, undivided Bengal ruled by Muslims! But
The Great Calcutta Killings” engineered by him had trailed
behind Suhrawardy and turned Bengali Hindus as a whole against
both Suhrawardy and his proposal, and they now insisted on
partition of Bengal.
Yet it is interesting and instructive to recall what thoughts
were harassing the minds of the stalwarts of the Pakistan move-
ment on the morrow of the attainment of the “Homeland for
Muslims”.
KINO CANUTES OP INDIA
169
Chaudhun Khahquzzaman, at first President of the All-Indta
Muslim League, and soon after. President or its Pakistani count-
erpart. commenting upon a letter he received from Shaheed
Suhrawardy dated September 10, 1947, observes. "Suhrawardy
doubted the utility of the two-nation theory which to my mind
also had never paid any dividends to us But after the partition
it proved positively injurious to the Muslims of India, and on
a long-view basis for Muslims everywhere. Many of the queries
in Shahced’s letter are only offshoots of the first question con-
cerning the two-nation theory I would have replied to him in
detail but certain events intervened
Suhrawardy m his letter had stated- "Personally I think that
Pakistan has provided a homeland for the Muslims living in
those majority areas but not a homeland for the Muslims of
India, Muslims of the Indian Union have been left high and dry
and must shape their own destiny and the question arises what
should be our future organisation The fact that there is a Pakis-
tani government of course has given a certain amount of reflect-
ed prestige to the Muslims of India, but at the same time makes
them a target for antagonism, and we have to choose between
the two.
“I think Muslims of the minority provinces will have to chalk
out their own plan The Qaid-c-Azam and the Muslim League
in general are too busy with doiog nothing in Pakistan. I think
the solution lies in finding some ways and means to induce all
governments, whether they arc in Pakistan or Hindustan, to ac-
cept the minorities as their own and to destroy the complex of
superiority in the majority population For this purpose an all
round effort should be made and we are extremely lucky in having
Mahatma Gandhi as the spearhead of this movement, for herein
lies peace with dignity and honour and also the dictates of
humanity."
Suhrawardy’s letter to Khahquzzaman stemmed from his con-
cern over the future role and place of Muslims still living in In-
dia. He sought the UP Muslim League leader's guidance: "You
must base thought over these problems because these problems
have been with you (in UP) for much longer tune than wrtft tts
( Muslims of Bengal).”
As Suhrawardy saw the problem, he laid out three alternatives:
* Kh*Uqu2zt[am, Pothfay to Pakistan.
170
I’AK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
“(1) Hold fast to the two-nation theory — in this we must be
ready for sacrifices and look to Pakistan for support and pro-
tection . . . and I doubt whether Pakistan can come to our rescue
... I am not in favour of this.
“(2) To remain on friendly terms with Hindus on the basis of
common citizenship of the Indian Union. But the snags here are:
(a) Will the Hindu accept you as an equal and as a common
citizen or will he try and assert his superiority in every way and
humiliate Muslims? (b) Will he treat you with cordiality? ...
here the question what should be our attitude towards the Hin-
dus is very important : keep on in the Muslim League’s role vis-
a-vis the Congress? They may refuse it. In a system of joint
electorate, will we support the breed known as nationalist Mus-
lims? (c) complete subservience and submergence in some places
as in Bihar. This is the attitude of Hindus towards tire Muslims.
In order to prevent this there are three alternatives: — (1) Mus-
lims should form themselves into strong pockets — with Hindu
co-operation. (2) transfer of populations .... I still think it an
impossibility. (3) I think we should take risks and stand fast lo
where we live.
“(3) Annihilation — unthinkable.”
Indian Muslims’ “conditioned reflexes” apart, there is how-
ever evidence that Muslim opinion in India has been badly
shaken by the East Bengal tragedy. Starkly put, the issues high-
lighted by Bangla Desh today are:
That the regional and cultural sentiment is more powerful
than the religious tic.
That Muslims arc capable of committing brutality and gen-
ocide against brother Muslims.
That, maybe, the two-nation theory was all wrong and
therefore Pakistan could not survive in the face of the power-
ful winds of ethnical and cultural aspirations for identity.
That while most Muslims outside East Bengal grudged
sympathy to suffering brother Muslims of East Bengal. Bengali
Hindus were going all out to fraternise and provide aid and
comfort to their suffering Bengali Muslim brethren.
Will the psychological shock springing from Bangla Desh to
political thinking among Indian Muslims lead to disillusionment
and jolt them out of the communal rut into secular politics? Does
it give the secessionists in Kashmir second thoughts? If such was
KING CANUTES OF INDIA
171
the fate of Bengalis who form 54 per cent of Pakistan’s population,
what could be the treatment meted out to a small minority like
Kashmiris by the Pakistani rulers? It has now been demons-
trated that a common religion does not debar one people from
exploiting another and turning their country into a colony.
Sheikh Abdullah, with his clamour for the democratic rights
and self-determination of the Kashmiris, will have something to
chew here. He condemns as repression J & K. Government’s
enforcement of law and order against self-confessed secessionists
and Pakistani saboteurs striving to produce chaos in that State.
One is curious to know what term the Sheikh would now use
to describe Vahya Khan's savagery against the Bengalis demand-
ing the implementation of the verdict of the ballot box!
Bihan Muslims who in 1947 left their homes and moved to
East Bengal in the expectation of finding a new heaven and a
new earth in the “Muslim homeland”, have their own lessons
to draw from Bangla Desh. As they live in perpetual tension and
insecurity in East Pakistan, they obviously cannot help thinking
of their Muslim brethren they left behind who continue to live
in peace, security and harmony with their Hindu neighbours in
Bihar. In their case disillusionment is inescapable as the hatred
of the native Bengalis haunts them in their day-to-day life.
In short, the two-nation theory, and the ideology on which
Pakistan is based has been blown sky high In East Bengal the
majority community came to realise the fallacy of the dangerous
theory of two nations "in every village, every street”, the hard
and bitter way. There have been cases, particularly after 1965,
of Bengali Muslims zealously protecting their Hindu compatriots
from non-Bengali Muslims’ attacks. Indeed, there has been an
instance in which the Bengali Muslims gave an ultimatum to the
authorities that if the non-Bengali Muslims did not stop com-
munal rioting against the Hindus, the Bengali Muslims would
start counter-attacking the non-Bengali Muslims
On a Friday a Muslim from West Asia and a Muslim from
India may pray side by side m the same mosque. That docs not
alter the fact that one is an Arab national and the other an
Indian citizen. If the Pakistan ideology were sound and correct,
the Muslims of Asia and Afnca would be one nation; and so
would the Catholics of the world be one nation.
Under Kamal Ataturk, Turkey shed its medievalism and opt-
172
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
ed for a modern secular state more than fifty years ago. In West
Asia, the Arabs think in terms of an Arab nation and not an
Islamic one. With the exception of perhaps Saudi Arabia, Pakis-
tan is the only modern state in the world which boasts of being
the “Islamic Republic of Pakistan” and in which non-Muslims
have no place except as second class citizens.
This is a self-evident truth that docs not need to be laboured
over for proof. But in the early forties, blinded by communal
passion and fired by sectional political ambition, Indian Muslims
failed to see the obvious. But no sooner partition of the country
was accomplished than the blinkers fell off their eyes to uncover
the ghastly fallacy of it all.
“We were swept by the passion of communalism. I too made
that mistake .... We all made it. Now we are paying the price,”
confessed Nasir-ul Islam, an Awami Leaguer and lawyer in Ma-
dura, a town near Jessore in East Bengal, in an interview to
Martin Woollacott, correspondent of the Australian, during the
early days of the Bangla Desh liberation fight.
The essence of patriotism is the powerful sentimental attach-
ment to a common land, with such affinities as common language
and culture, common food tastes and habits, climate and flora
and fauna, rivers and mountains, common history and geogra-
phy. But of all these requisites, language is the strongest. This
has again been proved in the Bengalis’ struggle for self-identity.
The magic of common language as an ingredient of fellow-feel-
ing and patriotism is particularly demonstrated when Indians and
Pakistanis meet abroad, and when Bengalis from India fraternise
with Bengalis from Pakistan and embrace each other like long lost
brothers and lapse into their “lingo” and then completely forget
the rest of the world! This is equally true of the Punjabis from
Pakistan coming across Punjabis from India. The spectacle is
moving indeed. The emotional, nostalgical agonies that South
Indian Muslims settled in Pakistan go through every time they
come upon South Indians has to be actually experienced to be
believed.
But to expatiate on the fallacy of Pakistan ideology is not to
desire an annulment of partition and reunion of the subcontin-
ent. Today, twentyfour years after the event, no Indian wants a
reunion, much as people might regret the partition when it took
place. It is neither practicable nor desirable. Not even the Jana
KINO CANUTES OF INDIA 173
Sanghi in lus heart ot hearts really believes that Partition could
be undone now after 24 years.
Much water — and blood too — has flowed since 1947. The
two countries have developed their respective new economic roots,
ways of life and political habits If a quarter of a century ago it
was diflicult for Hindus and Muslims to merge into a common
political life, it would be all the more diflicult, if not impossible.
HOW
What is true of India as a whole, is equally true of Bengal
Nobody in West or East Bengal now thinks of a united Bengal.
Ejst Bengali Muslims arc struggling for self-identity in their own
region and economic salvation for themselves Nor are the West
Bengali Hindus looking forward to a reunion with the East Ben-
galis that could only upset the political equation in the state
and create new problems in India's “problem" state.
There js however intense, and naturjJ. desire on both sides to
live as brothers, though separately, with so much in common
between the two. with such powerful cultural and economic
bonds. Doth sides have grown wise enough to realise that these
bonds have a better chance of getting stronger and closer if the two
brothers live separately as good and loving neighbours.
It is indeed a matter of time — of months, not years — before
Bangla Dcsh becomes a sovereign independent State, de facto as
well as de jure. The impact of such an independent state of Ban-
gla Dcsli is going to be farreachmg on South-east Asia and the
world as a whole It will be the third largest Muslim State and
the seventh largest country in the world.
Simultaneously, Pakistan would be reduced from the largest
Muslim state in the world, with all the prestige attached to that
status in the eyes of Islamic countries, to one of the many smal-
ler Muslim States. That would mean less of Pakistani sabre-
rattling against India and a dc-fusing of the Kashmir question,
bringing thereby peace, tranquillity and relaxation of tensions in
the Indian subcontinent. That will enable both India and Pakistan
to reduce their expenditure on defence and put all that money into
the much needed development of the two countries.
•Tor, once Bangla Dcsh is free, tensions in South Asia will be
reduced.” concludes the study on East Pakistan carried out by
the three Harvard Professors.' “And the Kashmir issue will sub-
* Mason. Dorfman »nJ Margin.
174
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
side in importance because West Pakistan without the economic
support of the East Wing will be unable to sustain the level of
pressure it has been able to mount until now.”
Above all. India will have a friendly independent country on
its eastern border, instead of a hostile one, in an area which has
proved a strategic and logistical nightmare for India. Hitherto
a hostile East Pakistan has interdicted our communications to our
strategically important and isolated north-eastern region. With
an independent Bangla Dcsh one could expect resumption of
goods and passenger traffic to the north-eastern region through
East Bengal. That would be, strategically speaking, a great boon.
An independent East Bengal will be a new addition to the
group of South-east Asian countries, as also second largest in
population (next to Indonesia), with much to contribute to the
political and economic affairs of the region.
It is this possibility of a radical change in the geopolitical
landscape and disturbance of the power balance in the Indo-
Pakistani sub-continent, and indeed the entire South-east Asian
region, that has evoked such keen interest and strange moves
in this subcontinent by the super powers of the world who fear
an upset of the status quo to their disadvantage.
16
The Refugee Explosion
Meanwhile, the refugee problem is soaring up like the jinn
out of a bottle, menacing the very social and economic fabric
of an already ailing region of India.
From 3 million in April to S million, and then to 8 million;
their number now threatens to reach 12 or even 15 million —
the equivalent of the total population of Yugoslavia or Czechos-
lovakia.
The problem is escalating at such an alarming rate that the
Government of India was hard put to it to take some immediate
and drastic action to solve it. And yet in any attempt to tackle
it. New Delhi had few options open to it.
Thus Yahya’s folJy was not only disrupting Pakistan but was
also strainmg-almost equally India's economy by pushing across
the border as large a chunk of East Bengal’s population as his
murder gangs could. Indeed, there was much truth in the cynical
boast of a West Pakistani abroad (in conversation with an In-
dian') that Pakistan was in any case sinking, but as it went
down, it would see to it that India too was dragged down with
it! It would of course take some dragging to sink India! But it
gave an insight to the way the minds of the rulers of Pakistan
worked tft this desperate moment in t’neir country s Me.
On August 30. 1971. according to R. K. Khadilkar. Minister
of State for Rehabilitation, the total of refugees touched 8 267
1 Subranunia Swanu. in an article in the Motherland
175
176 PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
million, of which 5.7 million were looked after in Government-
maintained camps. Till the last week of August, only 275,453
refugees had been dispersed, as more came in at the rate of
40,000 per day, to add to the anarchy prevailing in the over-
congested border areas. Of these, 205,590 were moved out of
West Bengal to neighbouring States; 43,661 to camps in the in-
terior of West Bengal; and 26.202 were moved from Tripura to
Gauhati.
New Delhi was spending at the rate of Rs. 40 crores per
month, and has already expended Rs. 120 crores on refugee re-
lief. According to the Rehabilitation Minister, foreign aid was
slow in coming. Of the Rs. 109.99 crores of foreign aid expected,
only Rs. 8.4 crores had been received till the end of August. The
six-month period stipulated by the Government for the liquida-
tion of the refugee problem ended in September, 1971. By then,
the Government of India would have spent Rs. 316 crores on
refugee relief, with the solution of the problem still nowhere in
sight. In October, at a press conference in Washington, with the
refugee figure reaching the nine-million mark, Finance Minister
Yeslnvantrao Chavan estimated that the total cost of looking
after the refugees in India would come to Rs. 525 crores. Of this
amount, other nations had promised to provide Rs. 112.5 crores.
The balance of Rs. 412.5 crores had to be borne by India.
In 1947 following Partition, eight-and-a-half million refugees
entered India from Pakistan; but in return seven-and-a-half mil-
lion evacuees went over to Pakistan, reducing the problem, in
effect, to one of rehabilitating one million people.
Besides, it was feared that a majority of the current flood of
refugees may not go back at all and would have to be absorb-
ed in the already congested territory of West Bengal and the
backward regions of Tripura and Meghalaya, which could hard-
ly bear the strain. Nor can the latest influx, apart from their
staggering numbers, be easily assimilated in the local population,
coming as they do as aliens, twenty-four years after partition.
Indeed they incur the local inhabitants’ hostility as they par-
take of the limited employment opportunities and raise prices
of commodities and generally add to the difficulties of life.
When they come on such a massive scale and in such desperate
straits, the refugees bring in their train many baffling problems
to the recipient country, such as security and health hazards.
THE REFUCCB EXPLOSION
177
economic disequilibrium, social tensions and a threat to law and
order, and an unbearable strain on the local administration and
civil amenities,
Indeed, the dimensions of the problem are so gigantic that not
even the Government of India’s resources could do justice to it,
without unbalancing the country’s entire economy and upsetting
its development planning Such was the staggering sacrifice de-
manded of India by the refugee explosion on its territory rgmled
by Yahya Khan
The Government of India is pledged to send the refugees back
to their homes in Bangla Dcsh New Delhi has also declared that
the refugees would go back only when favourable, congenial con-
ditions were created in their country
But who is to create these favourable conditions in Bangla
Dcsh? Yahya Khan? Nor be Obviously, be would nol have, in
the first instance, chased them out. if he were prepared to take
them back later 1 Even though the first wave of refugees were
Muslims, Awami Leaguers and others identified with East Ben-
gal’s struggle for freedom from West Pakistani tyranny, after the
first week, the majority of the people who crossed over from East
Bengal were Hindus.
And neither Pakistani rulers nor Press have made any secret
of the fact that the mass-scale ouster of the Hindus from East
Bengal by the Pakistani Army was preplanned and deliberate,
with a clear political purpose It is therefore idle to expect the
Pakistani authorities, voluntarily and wiihng\y, to take them back.
Would the international community, that is, the United Nations
actively intervene, in the name of Human Rights, to create those
favourable conditions in East Bengal?
It is apparent by now. that apart from making sympathetic
noises about the “human problem” and sending some aid to the
refugees, that international body has washed its hands oS the
Bangla Desh problem Nor are the Super Powers prepared to
take a direct hand in resolving India's refugee problem satisfac-
torily — indeed, the problem is now very much India s.
The truth is that the refugee problem cannot be liquidated un-
less Pakistani rule over East Bengal is liquidated and an Awami
League regime established in Us place — a truth to which those
who advocate a “political solution” of the problem turn a blind
178
PAK COLONIALISM IN LAST LENGAL
The grim logic of the situation therefore demands that the
Government of India because the refugee problem is in their
lap — and the provisional Government of the Republic of Ban-
gla Desh — for it is part of their raison d'etre — have to take
the initiative for any action to create the favourable conditions
in East Bengal that would enable the refugees to go back.
But what are the options before New Delhi for achieving that
goal? Ihese options are limited to either direct military inter-
vention or all-out assistance to Bangla Desh freedom lighters in
attaining their objective of liquidating the Yahya military rule
in their country and establishing their own regime in its place.
. ° aS l ndia ,s c °n«rned. the mounting crisis stemming
ie esca ating refugee problem, makes an earliest solution
imperative.
Thanks to the Indo-Soviet Treaty, the first alternative seems
India ° Ut ' ^ 1CaVCS ° nly tilC StfCond option open to
Granting that India would go all out to equip and help Bangla
Bo t it Tho UC " l ° Und Cr ° de the -le in East
issue or win T aX , ,0maUc thal gorillas cannot clinch an
issue or win a war. which task has to be carried out bv a con
ventional army of a strength adequate successfully to over*
Muiibna'o CC,UipPCd With modern arms
is S readvTAl 10 , ^ fUlIy , aIiVC C ° lhis ^sh reality and
geuing ready tor that eventuality One muLi ,\r
and Balie Dthtlr^": s 0 ^„T a r WCCn ““ “
are feverishly preparing for it. ' JCCOums ’ both sides
There should however be no l
that Yahya Khan’s Army would put up pX/ “ ° f fight
grip of a life-and-death struecle for P> , PjklstJn ,s tocJ ay in the
turned to bay. Pakistan and 8 Yahya Khan' an * mal
upon to put up a desperate and de/rndned fiX l d<tpended
nothing in their effort to defend the in/ ^ Jnd ° Stop at
Yahya Khan would therefore not hesitateTX f C ° Unlry -
he has in battle, not only tanks and n P m ever ything
bombers. y and artl)Ie O'. but fighters and
TUB RCrUGCB EXPLOSION
179
scared of a likely Indian military intervention in East Bengal to
put the refugees back in their homes It was therefore a des-
perate man's voice squealing when Yahya Khan threatened a
total war against India, if the latter invaded East Bengal
This brings us to the topic of the Twenty-year Indo-Sovict
Treaty signed in New Delhi on August 9, 1971
An immediate effect of the treaty was the generation of a
sense of relief and security in the country, which had been dis-
turbed by Peking's blatant collusion with Islamabad over Ban-
g!a Desli and President Nixon’s open support of Yahya Khan
and declaration that he was not prepared to countenance a dis-
integration of Pakistan
The treaty has banished a likely war on the Indo-Pakistan sub-
continent over Bangla Desh. while also shutting off the possibility
of an Indian military intervention in Bangla Desh to help the
refugees get back to their homes.
The joint communique issued at the conclusion of the Gromyko
mission to New Delhi stated'
"The Minister of External Affairs of India explained the
heavy burden placed on India’s resources due to over 7 million
refugees who had entered India Both sides, after a detailed dis-
cussion reiterated their firm conviction that there can be no mili-
tary solution (italics author’s) and considered it necessary that
urgent steps be taken m East Pakistan for the achievement of a
political solution and for the creation of conditions of safety
for the return of the refugees to their homes, which alone would
answer the interests of the entire people of Pakistan and the
cause of the preservation of peace in the area "
Article IX of the Treaty provides “In the event of cither
party being subjected to an attack or threat thereof, the high
contracting parlies shall immediately enter into mutual consul-
tations in order to remove such threat and to take appropriate
effective measures to ensure peace and the security of their
countries."
It is to be noted, however, that this Article comes into force
only "in the event of cither party being subjected to an attack
or threat thereof”. The article therefore primarily serves as a
deterrent to Yahya Khan embarking on a mad military misadven-
ture against India, and also as a deterrent to China actively
colluding with him.
180
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
In other words, the treaty has the effect of de-fusing an ex-
plosive situation in the region by preventing any armed conflict
and ensuring peace in the subcontinent.
But how does the Indo-Soviet treaty help in the resolution of
cither the refugee problem or the Bangla Desh question?
It is apparent, that just as a military intervention in East Ben-
gal to solve the refugee problem is debarred by the treaty, a
recognition of Bangla Desh by India is also discouraged, by im-
plication, by the treaty — because if a war is to be avoided then
any step like recognition that might risk a war must also be
avoided. In return, presumably, Moscow promises India to use
its good offices to persuade Islamabad to bring about a “political
solution” for which purpose, states the joint communique, “both
sides considered it necessary that urgent steps be taken in East
Pakistan.”
In return for this commitment on the part of India would
Moscow bless India’s all-out assistance to the Bangla Desh Free-
dom Movement to attain its political objective? One looks in
vain for such an assurance either in the treaty or in the two joint
communiques issued in New Delhi and Moscow or the statements
by Premier Kosygin.
In any case, after the Indo-Soviet Treaty, that is the only re-
course left for New Delhi, which it has to exploit to the full and
for all it is worth, if the refugee problem, which might soon suf-
focate India’s economy, is to be resolved.
Thus the conclusion is irresistible that the Indo-Soviet
Treaty while ensuring peace on the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent,
offers no speedy and effective panacea for India’s greatest head-
ache of the moment — with which we seem to be doomed to live
for quite a long time to come. It is significant that both Washing-
ton and Peking, far from being critical, have reacted favourably
to the Indo-Soviet Treaty and interpreted it as a move calculated
to de-fuse the explosive situation developing in the Indian sub-
continent and ensure peace in the region.
APPENDIX 1
THE SOLUTION ORmLLS : MUJIBUR RAHMAN’S
R. T. C. SPEECH ^
{Text of Mupbur Rahman's statement at the Round Table
Conference tn Rawalpindi, 10 March, 1969)
The nation today is experiencing a crisis which has shaken its
very foundations For all of us who love the nation and recall
the sacrifices which were made to create Pakistan, this is a time
of grave anxiety. In order to resolve the crisis, it is imperative that
its nature should be understood and its causes identified. Nothing
would be more catastrophic than the failure to come to grips
with the basic issues which underlie the upheaval which has taken
place in the country. These issues have been evaded for twenty-
one years The moment has arrived for us to face them squarely.
I am convinced that a comprehensive solution must be found for
our problems What is at stake is our survival.
It is this conviction that obbgcs me to expound a comprehen-
sive solution to our basic problems If the demands that have been
expressed by different sections of the people arc carefully examin-
ed, it will be seen that there are three basic issues which underlie
them.
The first is that of the deprivation of polmcal rights and civil
liberties.
The second is the economic injustice suffered by a vast majority
of the people, comprising workers, peasants, low and middle in-
come groups, who have had to bear the burden of the costs of
181
182
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
development in the form of increasing inflation while the bene-
fits of such development are increasingly concentrated in the hands
of a few families, who in their turn were concentrated in one
region.
The third is the sense of injustice felt by the people of East
Pakistan who find that under the existing constitutional arrange-
ments their basic interests have consistently suffered in the absence
of effective political power being conferred upon them. The former
minority provinces of West Pakistan feel similarly aggrieved by
the present constitutional arrangement.
The issue of deprivation of political rights finds expression in
the 11-Point Programme of the students of East Pakistan, as also
in the 6-Point Programme of the Awami League, as a demand for
the establishment of a parliamentary democracy, based on the
principle of the supremacy of the legislature, in which there is
representation of all units on the basis of population, and to which
representatives are directly elected by the people on the basis of
universal adult franchise.
The issue of economic injustice is reflected in the 11 -Point Pro-
gramme in the form of clearly formulated demands for re-organisa-
tion of the economic and education system of the country. The
6-Point Programme of my party clearly recognises the need for
radical economic re-organisation, and the demand for regional
autonomy, as outlined in it, is insisted upon as an essential pre-
condition for economic re-organisation and the implementation of
effective economic programmes.
The issue of justice for the different regions and units of Pak-
istan is the basis of the demand for the establishment of a federa-
tion providing for full regional autonomy, as embodied in the
6-Point Programme as also in the 11-Point Programme: this is
also the basis of the demand for dismemberment of One-Unit and
the establishment of a sub-federation in West Pakistan.
The Democratic Action Committee has held detailed delibera-
tions regarding these grave and challenging national issues. There
has always been complete unanimity in the Democratic Action
Committee on the imperative necessity of effecting the following
constitutional changes;
(а) The establishment of a federal parliamentary democracy,
(б) The introduction of a system of direct elections based on
universal adult franchise.
APPENDIX 1 183
A consensus lias also been apparent among Jbe members of the
committee on the following matters*
faj The dismemberment of One-Unit and the establishment
of a sub-federation in West Pakistan.
(6) Full regional autonomy being granted to the region
The committee further agreed that its members should be at
liberty to present further proposals, which m their view were es-
sential for achieving an effective and lasting solution of the prob-
lems that arc at the root of the present crisis
Since we arc here for the very purpose of seeking to find such
an effective and lasting solution, 1 have felt it my bounden duty
to press before this conference with all earnestness that everyone
sitting at this table should realise that constitutional changes to
provide representation on the basis ol population in the federal
legislature as well as for the granting of full regional autonomy,
as outlined in the 6-Pomt Programme, arc essential for achieving
a strong, united, and vigorous Pakistan
I would like (o state (hat the Awami League is a party of the
freedom fighters for Pakistan. Its founder, H S Suhrawardy. is
indeed one of the founders of Pakistan I recall with some pride
that, under his leadership my colleagues and I were in the vanguard
of the struggle for Pakistan Such proposals as I am presenting
before the conference are based on the conviction that they are
absolutely essential in order to preserve and indeed to strengthen
Pakistan
The demand for representation in the federal legislature to be
on the basis of population stems from the first principle of demo-
cracy. viz. one man, one vote In the national forum, as envisaged
in the six-point scheme, only national issues would arise for con-
sideration. The representatives would, therefore, be called upon
to deal with matters from a national point of view, and hence
the voting would not be on a regional basis. Further, national
political parties would be represented in the federal legislature
which would ensure that vou'ng would be on a party, and not
on a regional basis. Indeed the experience of the last twenty-one
years bears out the fact that voting in the national assembly has
invariably been on a party basis.
It is the principle of panty in representation of each Wing
184
PAR COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
which is based on the false premise that representatives in the
federal legislature are likely to vote on a regional basis. It is thus
the parity principle that places an unjustified emphasis on regional-
ism as a factor in national politics. The entire historical experience
of the last 21 years fully bears out the fact that East Pakistan
has always subordinated its regional interest to the over-riding
national interest, notwithstanding the fact that it had the majority
of the population.
It should not be necessary to recall that in the first Constituent
Assembly East Pakistan had 44 representatives as against 28 from
West Pakistan, yet this majority was never used to promote any
regional interest. Indeed, six West Pakistanis were elected to
the Constituent Assembly from East Pakistan.
Despite being in a majority. East Pakistan accepted the prin-
ciple of parity not only in representation in the legislature but
also in other organs of the Stale. It is painful to record that parity.
So far as representation in the legislature was concerned, this
was promptly implemented, but the benefit of parity in representa-
tion in the other organs of the State including the Civil, Foreign
and Defence Services was never extended to East Pakistan.
East Pakistan had even acquiesced in the federal capital as
well as all the defence headquarters being located in West Pakistan.
This meant that the bulk oj the expenditure on defence and civil
administration, amount ini; to about Rs ■ 270 crorcs or over 70 per
cent oj the Central Budget is made in 1 Vest Pakistan. Should our
West Pakistani brethren persist in refusing us representation on
a population basis in the federal legislature. East Pakistanis will
feel constrained to insist on the shifting of the federal capital
and the defence headquarters to East Pakistan.
It would be a positive step cementing the relations between
the two wings of Pakistan if our West Pakistani brethren were to
affirm their confidence in the federal legislature on the basis of
population. Such a step would pay rich dividends by way of
building up mutual confidence and trust between the people of
East and West Pakistan.
The adoption of the federal scheme presented in the 6-Point
Programme is an essential prerequisite for the achievement of
a political solution for the problems of the country. I would
reiterate that the spirit underlying the 6-Point Programme is that
Pakistan should present itself to the community of the nations
APPENDIX 1
185
as one single united nation of one hundred and twenty million
people This object is served by the federal government being
entrusted with the three subjects of defence, foreign affairs, and
currency It is the same objective of the facts of geography by
granting full regional autonomy to the regions in order to enable
them to have complete control in all matters relating to economic
management
I cannot too strongly emphasise the imjicrative necessity of
removing economic injustice, if we arc to put our society back on
an even keel The 1 1 -Point Programme of the students for which
I have expressed support contains proposals regarding the re-
ordering of the economic and educational system Their demands
stem from the basic urge for the attainment of economic justice.
I would, however, like at this time to confine myself to outlining
the constitutional changes which arc necessary for the attainment
of economic justice between man and man and between region
and region.
The centralisation of economic management has steadily aggra-
vated the existing economic injustice to the point of crisis 1 need
hardly dilate on the subject of the 22 families who have already
achieved considerable notoriety both at home and abroad on
account of concentration of wealth in their hands resulting from
their ready access to the corridors of power Monopolies and cartels
have been created and a capitalist system has been promoted, in
which the gulf between the privileged few and the suffering multi-
tude of workers and peasants lias been greatly widened Gross
injustices have also been inflicted on East Pakistan and the min-
ority provinces of West Pakistan.
The existence of per capita income disparity between East
and West Pakistan is known to all As early as 1960, the Chief
Economist of the Planning Commission estimated that the real
per capita income disparity between East and West Pakistan was
60%.
The mid-plan review made by the Planning Commission and
other recent documents show that the disparity in real per capita
income has been steadily increasing, and therefore, would be much
higher than 60 per cent today. Underlying such disparity js the
disparity in the general economic structure and infrastructure of
the two regions in the rates of employment, in facilities for educa-
tion, in medical and welfare services. To give just a few examples.
186 PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
power generating capacity in West Pakistan is 5 to 6 times higher
than in East Pakistan, the number of hospital beds in 1966 in
West Pakistan was estimated to be 26.200. while in East Pakistan
was estimated to be 6.900 during 1961-66. only 18 polytechnic
institutes were established in East Pakistan as against 48 being
established in West Pakistan-
Further, the disparity in the total availability of resources has
been even higher. More than 80 per cent of ail foreign aid has
een utilised in West Pakistan in addition to the transfer of East
akistan s foreign exchange earnings to West Pakistan. This made
i possible for West Pakistan over 20 years to import Rs. 3.109
crores worth of goods against the total export earnings of Rs. 1,337
crores whde during the same period East Pakistan imported
S ' < 2™ rcs uortb S°°ds as against its total export earnings
Rs. 1.650 crores. All these facts underline the gross economic
injustice which has been done to East Pakistan. There has been a
failure to discharge the constitutional obligation to remove dis-
parity between the provinces in the shortest possible time. The
NMn rr ° n disparit y for ‘he year 1968 placed before the
increase * rcports that dis Parity has continued to
mile h rahw n , tralisati0r l ° f u cconomic management has thus failed
has failed ° u ^ objectlvc of attaining economic justice. It
dhnIr v h f mC the . COnStUutional obligation to remove economic
fnu in cen . eCn , rC8!0n ^ refii ° n - Ins£cad - therefore. of persist-
deliver the Ton. ‘ mana8cment which has failed to
to this chall n ’ ^ S ad ° Pt a b ° Id and ^aginative solution
ProgrLme R 7 ' The fcderaI Schemc of the 6-Point
if l 7s the a u L7 VICW ’ such a bold and imaginative solution.
economic malgemen " to If regb" This't
l e icr7enia°iised a eco hiS aI ° nC ““ '"**'"* ^^he' problems.
^ 1 ^:: ~ y h ° f , C ° Umry in lack of ZZ
* r c tir' opmcm ob ‘ ainine
not be centralised. £ onom,c management should
The speciflc proposals embodied in the d PrUn, v>
regard to currency, foreirn trade , Programmc Wlth
taxation are all designed tn o’ ’ t i, 0 ' 80 excban 2 e earnings, and
designed to g.ve full responsibility for economic
APPENDIX 1
187
management to the regional government The proposals with
regard to currency are designed to prevent flight of capital and to
secure control over monetary policy The proposal regarding
foreign trade and foreign exchange are demanded to ensure that
the resources of a region are available to that region and to
ensure that it obtains the maximum amount of foreign exchange
resources for development purposes The proposal regarding taxa-
tion is designed to ensure control by the regional gov emments over
fiscal policy, without in any way depriving the federal government
of its revenue requirements
The substance of these proposals are as follows
(a) With regard to currency, measures should be adopted to
prevent flight of capital from one region to another and to
secure control over monetary policy by the regional govern-
ment This can be done by the adopting of two currencies or
by having one currency with a separate Reserve Bank being
set up in each region, to control monetary policy, with the
State Bank retaining control over certain defined matters
Subject to the above arrangements, currency would be a
federal subject.
( b ) With regard to foreign trade and aid, the regional governments
should have power to negotiate trade and aid within the
framework of the foreign policy of the country, which shall
be the responsibility of the federal ministry of foreign affairs
(c) The foreign exchange earnings of each region should be
maintained in account in each regional Reserve Bank and be
under the control of the regional governments, the federal
requirements of foreign exchange would be met by appropria-
tions from the two regional accounts on the basis of an
agreed ratio
(d) With regard to taxation, it is proposed that the power of tax
levy and collection should be left to the regional governments,
but the federal government should be empowered to realise
its revenue requirements from levies on the regional govern-
ments. It should be clearly understood that it is not at all
contemplated that the federal government should be at the
mercy of the regional government for its revenue needs.
I would emphasize that there would be no difficulty in devising
188
PAK COLONIALISM IN PAST BENGAL
appropriate constitutional provisions whereby the federal govern-
ment’s revenue requirements could be met, consistently with the
objective of ensuring control over fiscal policy by the regional
governments. The scheme also envisages that there v/ould be just
representation on a population basis of persons from each part of
Pakistan in all federal services, including defence services.
If these principles arc accepted, the detailed provision can be
worked out by a committee consisting of experts, to be designated
by both parties.
This scheme holds enormous promise of removing the canker of
economic injustice from the body-politic of Pakistan, while at the
same time removing the mistrust and frustration which centralised
economic management has fostered over the years.
I am confident that the people of West Pakistan would give
their whole-hearted support to this scheme.
I urge the participants in this conference to come forward with
open minds and with large hearts, in a spirit of fraternity and
national solidarity, to adopt the federal scheme presented above,
as the only means of overcoming what has been one of the most
formidable problems confronting the country, i.e., that attain-
ment of economic justice. No source has fed the current crisis more
than the sense of economic injustice. Let us remove it, let us
tackle problems at their source. Any attempt to avoid coming to
grips with these basic problems will jeopardise our very survival-
Neither Almighty Allah nor history will forgive us if at this
time of national crisis we fail to rise to the occasion and to adopt
bold solutions in order to restore the formidable problems which
have created a national crisis. This is a great opportunity, and one
which may not present iLsclf again, to face our national problems
squarely. We must, therefore, strain every nerve to agree upon and
implement the required solutions. Let us strive together to lift
our beloved Pakistan out of the tragic situation in which she is
placed, and to lay the constitutional foundations for a real living,
federal parliamentary democracy, which will secure for the people
of Pakistan full political, economic, and social justice. Only thus
strong and united, Pakistan can face the future with hope and
confidence.
‘Pakistan zindabad.’
APPENDIX 2
PROMISE OF TRANSFER OF POWER
(Broadcast by President Yahya Khan, 28 March, 1970 )
In my address to the nation on November 28 last. I had. as you
know, given out a ptan for the transfer of power to the elected
representatives of the people and had indicated certain major
policy decisions that I had taken
It is a matter of great personal satisfaction to me that the plan
that I had laid before the nation was accepted by the people in
every part of the country with great enthusiasm. This fact reaffir-
med my assumption that the proposals outlined by me were
based on popular wish. Let me now apprise you of the progress
that has been made towards the achievement of the various
objectives mentioned in the plan.
The Committee appointed for the purpose of working out the
details of the dissolution of one unit has completed its draft action
plan and has submitted Us proposals with regard to financial and
administrative arrangements
A President's order setting out all the relevant details will be
published shortly.
The provincial administration of each new province of West
-Raiisiaa »i.U Jw In .soon and wall hemme /uUy jyvyaliyp
by the 1st of July 1970. which is the commencement of the new
financial year.
Thereafter, West Pakistan will revert as closely to the pre*one
unit position as possible.
189
190
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
The arrangements for the holding of elections are going accord-
ing to plan and the Chief Election Commissioner has kept you
informed of developments from time to lime. I foresee no difficulty
whatsoever in keeping to the date that I had indicated in my last
address.
The Legal Framework Order 1970 will be published on the 30th
of this month (March. 1970). This order will form the main base
for the operation of the National Assembly in their task of con-
stitution-making. 1 might at this stage mention some of the salient
features of this order which has been formulated as a result of
my assessment of the wishes of the people.
The National Assembly will consist of a total of 313 members.
Of these. 13 seats will be reserved for women. The allocation of
seats to various provinces will be based on the population as
recorded in the census of 1961 which is the latest official record
available to the Government.
The order also provides for the holding of elections to the Pro-
vincial Assemblies.
At one stage, when plans for the transfer of power were being
formulated, our thinking was that election to the Provincial Assem-
blies should be held after the constitution is finalised. The question
was further examined in greater detail by my Government and
we have come to the conclusion that politically it will be in the
country’s interest to hold the provincial elections soon after the
elections to the National Assembly.
The main reason for this is that it will facilitate and speed up
the transfer of power to the elected representatives as soon as the
constitution is finalised. Further, it will relieve the politicians and
their parties from a new election campaign immediately after the
business of constitution-making is over. I consider that once the
constitutional issues are settled, our leaders should address them-
selves to the major nation-building tasks rather than entering into
a fresh round of electioneering.
Taking all these factors into consideration, I have decided that
provincial elections will be held not later than October 22. 1970.
The Provincial Assemblies would, however, start functioning, when
duly summoned, after the constitution has been framed and
authenticated by me.
When the Legal Framework Order 1970 is published you will
notice that in the schedule dealing with the Rules of Procedure.
APPENDIX 2
191
the voting procedure for the National Assembly has not been
included This is a matter which is best settled by the house itself
and it is my earnest hope that there would not be too much
divergence in views on this issue Unanimity would of course be
ideal In any case I do not personally like to talk on this subject
on the basts of percentages.
The point that I made earlier and would like to emphasise again
is that a constitution is not an ordinary piece of legislation but it
is an agreement to live together It is therefore essential that all
regions are reasonably satisfied with the voting procedure that
may be evolved by the house because unless they are so satisfied,
the constitution will not readily and genuinely be acceptable to
the people of different provinces and regions as such a document
should be I am sure it should be possible to arrive at some
suitable arrangement
The Legal Framework Order does not only state how the
Assembly will come into being, what its strength would be and
such other matters relating to the setting up of this Assembly, but
it also lays down certain basic principles for the future constiti'tion
of Pakistan Most of these principles are based on previous
constitutions but I thought it necessary to highlight some of these
in the Order so that Assembly makes a consutution which is
acceptable to highlight some of these in the whole
Firstly, the Order lays down that the constitution of Pakistan
must preserve Islamic ideology which, as we all know, was the
basis of the creation of Pakistan
Secondly, the constitution must ensure independence, territorial
integrity and national solidarity of Pakistan In order to attain
these objectives it has been laid down m the Legal Framework
Order that the territories now and hereafter included in Pakistan
must be united in a federal union which must preserve the
territorial unity of the State of Pakistan which will be called the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
The third fundamental principle of the future consutution is that
it must be a democratic one in which such basic ingredients of
democracy as free and periodical elections on the basis of popula-
tion and direct adult franchise are included. Further, the constitu-
tion must include the independence of the judiciary, and the
fundamental rights of the citizens
The fourth basic principle of the new coasutuuon is that it
192
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
must be a true federal one in which powers including legislative
administrative and financial shall be so distributed between the
r - ~
*™ iv r nd “ p °"“ s - - d
in, III ', l !UJ ' C l,mKr ' "'eluding legislative, administrative
external and iurriTj 'd^’T " s ^ponsibNitios ,,, relaiior, ,o
territorial integrity Ztl 2“ '***'' «* °»>
rz'z;i::T:;z:: r idc ru "
visualised by [lie Fallicr of , 1 , . m a Mrons nallon as
Ali Jinnah. L atlon ’ Ouaid-i-Azam Mohammad
in "a , Ueul ra,nK " wk ll “‘
regions of PakTian L ™ dc “ va,h , bl ' '° People of various
branches of national activhv "^i lh °‘ m to P artici pate in all the
must be stalutorv nrovi\i ^ l ° ac llcve t * ,ls objective there
cular economic disoaritv ° n 10 rcniovc a,J disparities, in parti-
tan within a fixed period Jm ° nS ^ Van ° U:i provinccs of Pakis *
co^ d S a a S ^ P " 0 ^" ari “" "> *». regions of the
SSU
S0 ?4 di znr? remov ‘ ,ws
National Governmem peL"^ "? .‘" al Wl,ilc in fu.ure
opportunity to play their mn rCfil0n musl llavc the fullest
7 * 7 */ pokian ^ mity and
allowed to be adversely alTectcrf n ’• Jnd must not b "
grounds. y d on regional and parochial
Pakistan was established on the bask n f ,,
land for the Muslims of this snhr- • ^ le ldca onc b°me-
“ft. of .1,= lives Of a rniLn M ; n ° m ' " Ms “Wev«l a, the
.sacrifice to go in vain. The assert ^ ^r ^ c . cannot allow that
APPENDIX 2
193
expressed in certain quarters that it would not be possible for (he
National Assembly to make a constitution within the stipulated
period of 120 days I must express my complete disagreement
with this point of view I believe that given the will and spirit
of accommodation which the nation has a nght to expect from
its responsible representatives, the National Assembly will find
no difficulty in completing ns task within the given time
As we all know, the Members will have two or three drafts
available to them for their consideration in the form of previous
constitutions. So it is not as if this Assembly will have to start
from scratch
The basic groundwork in respect of the preamble, the Directive
Principles and many other matters, has already been done in the
previous constitutions and most of it continues to apply. I may
also add that I have done everything possible to facilitate and
speed up the Assembly’s work Adult franchise, population basis
and dismemberment of one umt are now settled issues On the
procedural side a complete set of Rules of Procedure will be in-
cluded as a schedule in the Legal Framework Order
It was against this background that my Government had care-
fully worked out a reasonable period for framing the constitu-
tion and we considered that 120 days would be quite adequate
Let us therefore eschew all further doubts and fears on this
account.
In the end. my dear countrymen, I would like to say once
again that it is my own and my Government’s firm resolve to
bring back democracy to our country I need hardly say that
in the achievement of this objective we expect full cooperation
and unflinching support from every one of you. For without such
cooperation and support our task will be made infinitely more
difficult.
Our people arc intensely patriotic. They will, therefore, tolerate
most things except an act of sabotage against the integrity of
Pakistan. If anyone thinks that he can let down the country and
the people or entertain any ideas destroying the basic unity of
our people, he is very much mistaken. The people will not stand
for this.
As I said earlier, everyone has a right to offer his solution to
the constitutional, political, economic and administrate e problems
of the country, but no one has a right to offer a solution which
194
1>AK COLONIALISM IN HAST BENGAL
would adversely affect the solidarity of the people of Pakistan.
This no one would tolerate. We will refuse to be silent spectators
to any attacks against Pakistan’s entity as a nation.
Major changes cannot be brought about without courage and
patriotism of the highest order on the part of the whole nation.
The country is passing through a phase when personal and all
other considerations must be sacrificed for the bigger cause — the
cause of Pakistan.
Let me assure >ou that 1 have not the slightest doubt that by
the grace of Almighty God. we shall overcome our present
difficulties.
APPENDIX 3
OUR STRUGGLE MUST GO ON
The following is the text of speech of Sheikh Alujibur Rahman,
President of the Pakistan Aw anti League, released jointly by
Radio Pakistan and the Pakistan Television Corporation on
November 28, 1970
My dear fellow citizens, brothers and sisters. Assalam 0
Alaikum .
I must begin by offering monajat for those heroic martyrs who
shed their blood and laid down their lives for the cause of the
people It is their sacrifices and that of countless thousands who
have defied tyranny m movement after movement leading up to
last year’s histone mass upsurge, that has earned the people’s
struggle forward Indeed, even the fact that I am able to speak
to you over the national radio and television network may be
counted as one of the initial gains of the people's struggle, since
uptil this time this privilege was monopolised by those in power.
Our struggle must go on
Our struggle must go on For the real goal lies ahead. Power
has to be won by the people. The exploitation of man by man and
ot tegjna by region, must, be brought to an end. The powerful cote-
ries, which have ruled Pakistan for 22 years, will do everything
possible to prevent transfer of power to the people. It is they
who are actively conspiring to frustrate the holding of the general
195
196
1>AK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
elections, and even after elections, they will continue to obstruct
every effort to end exploitation. They have money; they have
influence; they have the capacity to use force against the people.
History, however, testifies that a determined people can success-
fully resist and overcome such forces of oppression.
Die for Freedom
The most solemn pledge that Awami League can make to
the people of Pakistan is that it shall stand by their side and
indeed lead them in resisting the forces of oppression and exploita-
tion. No people have secured freedom and justice unless they
have been geared to die for it. We, therefore, serve notice upon
the forces of reaction in our society that we. along with the people
of Pakistan, will confront them and if democratic processes are
obstructed, we shall resist them by every means possible.
Born in Adversity
Awami League was born in adversity and has grown in adversity.
Under our great leader, the late Huseyn Shahecd Suhrawardy,
we came into existence to defy the attempt of the ruling party
to form a one party State. We thus began the struggle to establish
democracy in Pakistan. The struggle continues till this day. Our
party has faced onslaught after onslaught from the ruling group.
Our leadership and our workers have spent the better part of
their lives in jails. We have faced and overcome every form of
repression. It is this that gives us the courage and confidence today
to commit ourselves to the task of confronting the anti-democratic
forces.
To overcome the crisis that engulfs the nation, we must resolve
those issues which are its cause. The first is the deprivation of
political freedom. The second is the sense of economic injustice
felt by the overwhelming multitudes of our people. The third is
the deep sense of injustice created by widening economic disparity
between the regions. It is this that underlines the anguish and
the anger of the Bengali people. The same sentiment is also
reflected among the down-trodden people of the neglected areas
of West Pakistan.
Manifesto
Our manifesto sets out a comprehensive strategy for resolving
APPENDIX 3
197
these fundamental issues. A real living democracy must be
established. In which all the fundamental freedoms shall be
constitutionally guaranteed. Our manifesto outlines a framework
for the healthy growth of political parties, trade unions and local
self-government. We do pledge to restore complete freedom of the
press and academic freedom and to eradicate corruption which
has grown like cancer in our society
The present economic system, which has established an in-
tolerable structure of injustice, must be radically altered
7ho dozen families
Today, barely two dozen families have acquired control over
60 per cent of the nation’s industrial assets, 80 per cent of its
banking assets and 75 per cent of its insurance assets. 82 per cent
of the total bank advances are concentrated in only 3 per cent of
the total accounts. The tax structure in existence is one of the
most regressive in the world. Only 2 per cent of the GNP is being
realised as direct taxes as against 6 per cent in other developing
countries, while oppressive indirect taxes are imposed on such
essential commodities as salt.
Protected markets, tax holidays, huge subsidies in the form of
bonus vouchers, credits and grants of foreign exchange at the
artificially-Iow official rate have created specially favourable condi-
tions for the growth of monopolies and cartels
Despite nominal land reforms, feudal lords have retained
princely estates. They enjoy vast privileges and their prosperity
increases, while the lot of (he poor peasants becomes more and
more desperate. In a bid for survival, there is movement of people
from the villages to the cities According to official estimates.
1/Sth of the total labour force or about 90 lacs people are unem-
ployed. This alarming figure continues to grow. The industrial
workers arc suffering the full impact of the sharp rise in the cost
of living. The cost of living is increasing more rapidly than the
increase in money wages. The impact of the unending rise in the
cost of living is also acutely felt by school and college teachers,
low paid officers and employees, particularly the 4th grade
employees of Government.
Appalling Economic Disparity
To turn now to the appalling record of economic disparity.
198
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
it is seen that during the last 20 years, out of the total revenue
expenditure of the Government, only about Rs. 1,500 crores (that
is only one fifth of the total) was spent in Bengal, as against over
Rs. 5000 crores in West Pakistan. Of the total development
expenditure during the same period, Rs. 3,000 crores (that is only
one-third of the total) was spent in Bengal, as against over Rs.
6,000 crores in West Pakistan. Over 20 years, West Pakistan has
imported goods worth more than Rs. 3,000 crores as against its
own foreign exchange earning of barely Rs. 1,300 crores. Imports
into West Pakistan have been three times the value of the imports
into Bengal.
It is made possible for West Pakistan to import goods worth
Rs. 2.000 crores in excess of its export earnings by allocating to
it Rs. 500 crores of the foreign exchange earnings of Bengal and
allowing it to utilise over 80 per cent of all foreign aid.
The record in the field of government services is just as deplo-
rable. After 21 years Bengalis account for barely 15 per cent in
central government services and less than 10 per cent in the defence
services.
The total economic impact of such discrimination has been
that the economy of Bengal is today in a state of imminent col-
lapse. Near famine conditions are prevailing in the majority of
the villages. Some 15 lac tons of rice has had to be imported only
to save the people from starvation.
Inflation
While inflation has been mounting, those who are worse hit are
the poor people of Bengal. The price of essential commodities
has been 5 per cent to 1 per cent higher in Bengal than in West
Pakistan. The average price of coarse rice in Bengal is Rs. 45 to
50 per manund as against Rs. 20 to 25 per maund in West
Pakistan, and that of wheat is Rs. 30 to 35 per maund in Bengal
as against Rs. 15 to 20 per maund in West Pakistan. Mustard oil
sells in Bengal at Rs. 5 per seer as against Rs. 2.50 per seer in
West Pakistan. The gold price is Rs. 135 to 140 per tola in
Karachi as against Rs. 160 to 165 per tola at Dacca. Even a
Customs ba™. has been imposed against carrying gold from
West Pakistan to Bengal.
for ^ P roc ^ uct of the management of the economy
- y rs by the Central Government. The Central Government
APPENDIX 3
199
is incapable of redressing such injustices This is borne out by
the Fourth Five-Year Plan The Fourth Plan allocations are a
confession of the failure of the Central Government, however
powerful it might be, to redress past injustices
The Awami League’s Six Point programme, which is embodied
in the 11-point programme, presents a rational solution to this
problem of regional injustice With a central bureaucracy in which
Bengalis account for barely 15 per cent and with the nature of
the power structure being what it is, to expect justice from a
centralised system of economic management would be to expect
the impossible Attempts to secure larger allocations by political
representatives of Bengal and other under-developed areas would
only aggravate regional tensions and threaten the viability of the
Federal Government. The only feasible solution is the reordering
of the constitutional structure by giving full regional autonomy
to the federating units on the basis of our Six Point formula.
Such autonomy in order to be effective must include the power of
managing the economy This is why we insist upon federating
units having control over monetary and fiscal policy and foreign
exchange earnings and other powers to negotiate foreign trade
and aid. By giving to the federating unit full control over its
economic destiny, while entrusting to the Federal Government
responsibility over foreign affairs and defence, and subject to
certain safeguards, currency, we believe a just federal balance
will be attained
Our federal scheme envisages the abolition of all Pakistan
services and its replacement by federal services in which persons
shall be recruited on the basis of population for all parts of
Pakistan.
We also believe that the maintenance of a militia or a para-
military force by the federating units will effectively contribute
towards national security This federal scheme by removing the
sources of doubt, distrust and discrimination will ensure a strong
Pakistan.
Tins scheme will understandably be opposed by those in one
region who would like to treat another region as a colony or a
market. Wc believe, however, that this scheme will have the full
support of the common people of Bengal and West Pakistan.
Within this constitutional framework, wc believe, it will be pos-
sible to bnng about a social revolution through the democratic
200
PAK COLONIALISM IN LAST IIENGAL
process and to create a socialist economic order, free from
exploitation.
Rapid economic growth is an imperative necessity in order to
meet the needs of our growing population. To achieve it, enor-
mous effort and sacrifices are required of our people. Our people
can be expected to respond to our call for making a big collective
effort only if we can assure them that the burden of sacrifices
as well as the fruits of economic prosperity shall be equitably
shared among all sections of the people and all regions of the
country. To ensure this, certain radical changes must be made in
the structure of our economy.
We believe that it is imperative to place key areas of the
economy, including banking and insurance, under public owner-
ship through nationalisation. Future development in these areas
should take place in the public sector. In the new order, workers
should share in the equity capital and management of industrial
enterprises.
Eliminate Monopolies
The private sector also, in its own sphere, must make their
full contribution to the economy. Monopolies and cartels must
be totally eliminated. The tax structure must be made truly pro-
gressive and drastic restrictions must be imposed on the consump-
tion of luxuries.
Extensive support and encouragement must be extended to
small-scale and cottage industries. Such support should include
ensuring regular supply of raw materials, such as yarn and
dyestuffs to handloom weavers at reasonable prices. Marketing
and credit facilities must also be made available to them.
Small-scale industries must be developed through co-operatives
and dispersed throughout the countryside, reaching into the depths
of the rural areas, so that desperately needed employment oppor-
tunities arc extended to our rural masses.
Jute has suffered from criminal neglect. A discriminatory ex-
change rate and parasitic middlemen have denied to the jute
growers a fair price. Nationalisation of the jute trade, and much
greater emphasis on jute research aimed at improving quality and
yield per acre, will enable jute to make its rightful contribution to
our economy.
Cotton needs similar attention, and therefore, we believe that
APPENDIX 3
201
cotton trade should also be nationalised and measures adopted
to improve quality and yield. Our major cash crops, tea. sugar
cane and tobacco still suffer from appallingly low yields due to
neglect of previous Governments
In a resource-poor country every effort must be made to ensure
rapid increase m productivity. A fair and stable price to the
growers should also be ensured
Agriculture
Indeed our enure agricultural sector needs to be revolutionised
The Jagirdan, Zamindan and Sardan systems in West Pakistan
must be abolished The entire land system has to undergo a radical
reorientation in the interest of the actual tillers of land Ceilings
must be imposed on land holdings Land above such ceilings
and government Kbas lands must be re-distributed to landless
cultivators.
Agriculture must be modernised The obstacle presented by
the fragmentation and sub-division of Iand-holduigs must be
overcome. An immediate step in the right direction would be to
induce the tillers to group their holdings under multipurpose co-
operatives Government could provide effective inducement for
this purpose by funnelling through such co-operatives vital inputs
such as irrigation, embankment, drainage, deep tubcwclls, power
pumps, fertilisers, improved seeds, agricultural implements and
machinery, credit and instruction in modem agricultural techniques
As a measure of immediate relief to our peasants, who are
groaning under the burden of land revenue, we would abolish
land revenue in respect of holdings upto 25 bighas and wnte-ofl
all arrears in respect of such holdings Ultimately, we aim to
abolish the present system of land revenue
Three vital areas which form part of the infrastructure of the
economy must be accorded the highest priority The first is flood
control. A comprehensive flood control programme must be
implemented on an emergency basts Measures to prevent water-
logging and salinity in West Pakistan must also be implemented
at an accelerated pace.
Electrification
The next vital area is that of power- There must be massive
expansion in power generation and distribution.
202
PAK COLONIALISM IN HAST BENGAL
An extensive rural electrification programme must be launched
to take electricity to the villages, so as to make it possible for
small-scale industries to be established. We aim to attain power
generation capacity of 2500 mcgwatts in Bengal within 5 years.
Every source of power must be harnessed to maximise power
generation capacity. The Rooppur Nuclear Power Project and
Jamalganj Coal Project must be immediately implemented. Natural
gas must also be fully utilised.
The third vital area is that of transport and communications.
The highest priority is accorded by us to the construction of a
bridge over the river Jamuna to enable direct communications to
and from North Bengal. Bridges should also be built over different
points on the river Indus in Sind and the Punjab and over
Buriganga, Sitalakhy and Karanaphuli.
The development of ports, both seaports and inland river ports,
as also roads and railways must be accorded the highest priority.
Education
No investment is as vital for the healthy development of our
society than investment in education. It is an alarming fact that
the number of primary schools in Bengal has declined since 1947.
Only 18 per cent of our population has attained literacy and the
number of illiterates is increasing by over one million persons per
year. Primary education is denied to more than half of the nation’s
children. Only 18 per cent of our boys and 6 per cent of our
girls complete the first five years of elementary school. We believe
that at least 4 per cent of the Gross National Product should be
committed to education. The salary of college and school teachers,
and in particular school teachers, must be substantially increased.
Illiteracy must be eradicated by adoption of extraordinary methods.
A crash programme must be launched to extend free compulsory
primary education to all children within 5 years. Secondary edu-
cation should be made readily accessible to all sections of our
people. New universities, including medical and technical univer-
sities, must be rapidly established. Poverty should not be allowed
to deprive meritorious boys and girls of the opportunity to pursue
higher education.' Immediate steps should be taken to ensure that
Bengali and Urdu should replace English in all walks of life,
while every effort should be made to encourage the development
of regional languages.
APPENDIX 3
203
Turning to the problem of the cities, we find low income
groups living in sub-human conditions The so-called improvement
trusts have been busy developing luxurious residential areas for
the wealthy, while the poor have been left to fend for themselves
Future urban development must concentrate on providing for
the needs of the poor majority of city dwellers Low cost urban
housing must be accorded the highest priority
Health
Itl the field of health, even a minimum measure of medical
relief is denied to over 90 per cent of our population Immediate
measures should be undertaken to establish a rural medical centre
at every union, and a hospital at every thana headquarters Na-
tional service in the rural areas should be introduced for medical
graduates, and para-medical personnel must be trained in large
numbers to staff the rural health centres
Industrial workers play as vital a role in the economy as in
the people’s struggle Their basic rights to form trade unions to
bargain collectively and to strike must be guaranteed A living
wage and the basic amenities such as housmg. education and
medical care for themselves and their children must be assured
All labour laws which restrict the basic rights of workers must
be repealed. By ensuring that workers are given a stake in the
industry, they can be expected to make their full contribution
towards increasing industrial productivity Productivity in all
sections of the economy must be increased to the maximum extent
possible if we arc to meet the needs of our society.
The wage structure m all sectors of the economy must be
altered in keeping with the dictates of justice Price stabilisation
measures must be adopted to protect the real wages for the workers
and low paid employees against spiralling inflation
Equality
We firmly believe in the equality of all citizens. The members
of the minority community should know that we have always
stood against every form of commuoalisrn They shall enjoy
equal rights with all other citizens and shall enjoy equal protection
of the laws. Every effort must be made to develop our tribal
areas so that these areas can be fully integrated with other areas
and the tnbal people are able to enjoy equal opportunities with
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
204
oilier citizens in all walks of life. Our brothers in the Chittagong
Hill Tracts, in the otl shore islands and the coastal areas, require
special assistance to develop their latent resources, in order to
enable them to play their rightful part in our national life.
Mohajirs should be integrated into the national life so that
they may become assimilated with the local people and thus
enjoy equal rights and opportunities with them in all walks of
life.
I must repudiate once and for all the false propaganda that
Islam is endangered by the 6-Point formula of our economic pro-
gramme. Nothing which promotes justice between region and re-
gion, man and man can be opposed to Islam. We have affirmed our
commitment to the constitutional principle that no law should
be enacted or imposed in Pakistan which is repugnant to the
injunctions of Islam as contained in the Holy Quran and Sunnah.
Foreign Policy
To turn to the important area of foreign policy, we believe
that it is imperative for us to avoid involvement in global power
conflicts. We must, therefore, pursue a truly independent non-
aligned foreign policy. We are committed to the immediate
withdrawal from SEATO, CENTO and all other military pacts,
and to avoid any such involvements in the future. We support
the struggle of the oppressed people of the world against imperia-
lism, colonialism and apartheid. In keeping with the principle
‘friendship for all and malice towards none’, we believe in peace-
ful coexistence in all states and in particular with our neighbours.
We believe that normalisation of our relations with our neigh-
bours would be to the best advantage of our peoples. We,
therefore, attach the highest importance to the settlement of our
outstanding disputes. We have emphasized the importance of a
just settlement of the Kashmir dispute in accordance with United
Nations’ resolutions. The threat of grave and permanent damage
to the economy of Bengal posed by the completion of Farakka
Barrage must be immediately met. Every effort must be made for
a just solution of this problem without further delay.
But these programmes and policies can only be implemented
if power is won by the people. Elections will serve as a referendum
on basic national issues, particularly that of autonomy on the
basis of the Six-Point formula.
APPENDIX 3
205
The elected representatives of the people alone can give to
this country a constitution which will be a durable basis for
Jiving together. It is for this reason that we have repeatedly pointed
out that restrictions sought to be imposed on the constitution-
making powers of the elected representatives of the people are
not legitimate We would once again urge upon the President
to repeal the restrictive provisions of the Legal Framework
Order. It would also help to create conditions congenial for
restoration of democracy if all pending cases and warrants against
political workers, students and labourers arising out of political
activities and out of last year’s mass upsurge, are withdrawn, and
all sentences imposed in such cases are commuted All political
prisoners detained without trial should also be released
We Shall Face the Challenge
It is imperative for the security of the nation that our armed
forces should not have to cany the burden of civil administration
or to have to involve itself in politics These highly trained profes-
sionals should be left free to devote themselves exclusively to
the vital task of defending the nation’s frontiers
I would like to end by saying that as a nation we must prove
equal to the challenge that faces us A real living democracy
must be established. The different people who make up Pakistan
can only live together within a democratic framework
Any attempt to destroy democracy would in ihe process destroy
Pakistan. Justice between region and region must be ensured by
granting full regional autonomy to the federating units on the
basis of our Six-Point formula. Within such a federal democratic
framework, radical economic programmes must be implemented
to bring about a social revolution.
The Awann League h3s resolved to face tins great challenge.
We believe that with the support and confidence of the people,
which our party enjoys, we shall. Inshaallah. be able successfully
to meet the challenge.
Pakistan Zindabad.
APPENDIX 4
PROCLAMATION OF THE GOVERNMENT
(Proclamation dated April 10, 1971 )
The Proclamation of Independence Order, dated the 10th day
of April, 1971.
Whereas free elections were held in Bangla Desh from Decem-
ber 7, 1970 to January 17, 1971 to elect representatives for the
purpose of framing a constitution and:
Whereas at these elections the people of Bangla Desh elected
167 out of 169 representatives belonging to the Awami League,
and of the people to meet on March 3, 1971, for the purpose of
framing a constitution and:
Whereas the Assembly so summoned was arbitrarily and ille-
gally postponed for an indefinite period, and
Whereas instead of fulfilling their promise and while still con-
ferring with the representatives of the people of Bangla Desh, the
Pakistan authorities declared an unjust and treacherous war, and
Whereas in the facts and circumstances of such treacherous
conduct Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the undisputed
leader of 75 million people of Bangla Desh, in due fulfilment of
the legitimate right of self-determination of the people of Bangla
Desh, duly made a Declaration of Independence at Dacca on
March 26, 1971 and urged the people of Bangla Desh to defend
the honour and integrity of Bangla Desh, and
Whereas in the conduct of a ruthless and savage war, the Pak-
206
APPENDIX 4 207
istani authorities committed and are still committing numerous
acts of genocide and unprecedented tortures, amongst others on
the civilian and unarmed people of Bangla Desb, and
Whereas the Pakistan Government by levying an unjust war
and committing genocide and by other repressive measures made
it impossible for the elected representatives of the people of Ban-
gla Desh to meet and frame a constitution, and give to themselves
a government, and
Whereas the people of BaDgla Desh by their heroism, bravery
and revolutionary fervour have established effective control over
the territories of Bangla Desh,
We, the elected representauves of the people of Bangla Desh
as honour-bound by the mandate given to us by the people of
Bangla Desh whose will is supreme, duly constitute ourselves
into a Constituent Assembly, and
Having held mutual consultations, and
In order to ensure for the people of Bangla Desh equality,
human dignity and social justice.
Declare and constitute Bangla Desh to be a Sovereign People’s
Republic and thereby confirm the Declaration of Independence
already made by Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and
Do hereby confirm and resolve that till such time as a constitu-
tion is framed, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman shall be
the President of the Republic and that Syed Nazrul Islam shall
be the Vice-President of the Republic, and
That the President shall be the Supreme Commander of all the
armed forces of the Republic.
Shall exercise all the executive and legislative powers of the
Republic including the power to grant pardon.
Shall have the power to appoint a Prime Minister and such
other Ministers as he considers necessary.
Shall have the power to summon and adjourn the Consutuent
Assembly, and
Do all other things that may be necessary to give to the people
of Bangla Desh an orderly and just government
We. the elected representauves of the people of Bangla Desh
do further resolve that in the event of there being no President
or the President being unable to enter upon his office or being un-
able to exercise his powers and duties due to any reason what-
soever, the Vice-President shall have and exercise all the powers.
208
1*AK COLONIALISM IN LAST BENGAL
duties and responsibilities herein conferred on the President.
NVe, further resolve that we undertake to observe and give effect
to all duties and obligations devolved upon us as a member of the
family of nations and by the charter of the United Nations.
We, further resolve that to give ellect to this our resolution we
authorise and appoint Professor M. Yusuf Ali our duly constitut-
ed potemiary to give to the President and Vice-President oaths
of office.
APPENDIX 5
TO THE PEOPLE OF BANGLA DESH
English translation of an address by Mr Ta/uddin Ahmad.
Prime Minister, on behalf of the Government of Bangla Desk
headed by Sheikh Mupbur Rahman, broadcast by Snadhin Dan -
gla Desh Betar Kendra, 11th April, 1971
Heroic and brave brothers and sisters of Independent Dangla
Desh,
In the name of your President. Banga Bandhu Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman and the Government of the People’s Republic of Bangla
Desh, we salute you and pay homage to the departed souls of the
martyrs who have sacrificed their lives in the defence of their
motherland They will shine in our memory as long as Bangla
Desh exists, as long as a single citizen of Bangla Desh lives Since
the proclamation of independence by your leader. Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman, after General Yahya had on the midnight of 25th
March, ordered his Army to commit genocide on the peace-loving
people of Bangla Desh, you have joined the ranks of the im-
mortals amongst the freedom fighters of history Your epic resist-
ance against the colonial army of occupation from West Pakistan
is an inspiration to the freedom loving peoples of the world
Each day of struggle adds a new and glorious page in the saga
of our liberation struggle. Each martyr wins us a thousand friends
m the world who cannot but salute your heroism
By your determination and ability to withstand the murderous
210
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
onslaught of Yahya’s gang of professional killers you have shown
that a new Bengali Nation has been born amidst the ruins of the
battlefield. To the world we were a peace-loving people, friendly,
humane, fond of music and dance, imbued with an awareness of
culture and beauty- War and violence were thought to be foreign
to our nature. But today whilst we remain true to our heritage,
Bengalis have shown that they are also a warrior people, with an
unconquerable will and courage to face an aggressor who enjoys
overwhelming superiority in the use of weapons.
Had you failed to resist this first onslaught, the newly inde-
pendent Republic of Bangla Desh may have gone under and the
world may have had to wait many years before resistance raised
its head once more. But you faced their tanks and bombers with
your bare hands armed only with faith in the cause of a free
Bangla Desh. Today you have put the murderous enemy on the
defensive. Most of Bangla Desh is liberated. The world’s Press
roams at will in Free Bangla Desh and reports your victories to
an amazed and now admiring world. As news of the resistance
spreads throughout Bangla Desh. young men and women are
coming forward in their thousands to join the fight for freedom.
Today a mighty army is being formed around the nucleus
of professional soldiers from the Bengal Regiment and E.P.R.
who have rallied to the cause of the liberation struggle. These
have been joined by the Police, Ansars and Mujahids and now
by thousands of Awami League and other volunteers and are
being trained into a fighting force ready to use the captured wea-
pons from the defeated West Pakistani mercenaries and fresh
arms being purchased from funds collected by our Bengali bro-
thers overseas.
In the Sylhct/Comilla region, we have commissioned Major
Khaled Musharraf of the Bengal Regiment to take command of
military operations in the region. The courage and daring of his
Force has already reduced the presence of the Pakistan Army
to the Cantonments of Sylhet and Comilla where they will soon
be liquidated by the closing ring of the Liberation Army.
In Chittagong and Noakhali we have commissioned Major Zia
Rahman of the Bengal Regiment to take full command of oper-
ations. His heroic defence of Chittagong city against overwhelm-
ing odds, which included attacks from the air and sea. will take
its place with the defence of Stalingrad in the annals of warfare.
APPENDIX 5
211
Today, thanks to his resistance, Chittagong is still not secure in
the hands of the enemy, whilst the whole of Chittagong and Noa*
khali districts, outside limited pockets of Chittagong town arc
liberated areas
In the Mymensingh/Tangail area, we have commissioned Major
Safiullah of the Bengal Regiment to take command of operations
in the region. He has liberated the major part of the area under
his control and is ready to march on Dacca
The three Commanders have already met and prepared a joint
plan of battle designed to mop up surviving pockets of resistance
in their respective areas preparatory to a combined onslaught on
Dacca
la the South-West Region, wc have commissioned Major
Osman of the E P R to take command of the Kushtia-Jessore
zone, while Major Jahl has been given charge of Faridpur-Barisal-
Khulna-Patuakhali zone After the historic victory of Kushtia,
the Liberation Force has already driven the Pakistan army out
of the whole area and confined them to the cantonment of Jessore
and parts of Khulna town
In North Bengal a Unified Command is being set up from the
forces of Bengal Regiment and E P R. Our liberation forces
under the command of Major Ahmed have pushed out enemy
forces from Rajshahi district. Major Nazrul and Major Nowazesh
arc laying siege to the hard pressed occupation army respectively
in Saidpur and Rangpur. The Liberation force have already driv-
en the Pakistan army out of the whole Dinapur, Bogra, Pabna and
Rangpur districts except the limns of cantonment areas and are
ready for the final assault
Tlic brilliant success of our fighting forces and the daily addi-
tions to their strength in manpower and captured weapons has
enabled the Government of the People’s Republic of Bangla Dcsh,
first announced through Major Zia Rahman, to set up a fulJ-
fledged opera Uonal base from which it is administering the liber-
ated areas Whilst the interim capital is located in the liberated
area of the Western zone, wc have set up a regional seat of gov-
ernment located in the liberated area of the Sylhct/Comilla zone,
which is delegated to exercise full administrative authority over
all areas in the eastern regions.
Wc arc now in a position to invite the world’s Press, diplomatic
and political observers to tour the liberated areas and witness the
PAK COLONIALISM IN HAST BENGAL
reality of a free Bangla Dcsh. At the same time we ask all friend-
y ^ VCr " m i e, ^ s and P e °P |es as well as international agencies, such
as the Red Cross, who are willing to extend us aid on human-
itarian grounds but have been prevented from doing so by the
inhumanity of Islamabad, to make direct contact with the Gov-
ernment of the People’s Republic of Bangla Desh
Whilst humanitarian aid is welcome from all sources it must
e remembered that what we need above all is arms to repel
the aggressor from the sacred soil of Bangla Desh. Today our
av.lun population are underequipped and outgunned by the
modern mechanised army of occupation which has been equip-
ped with the latest weapons from the arsenal of the big powers-
to this l ° ! l ° SUSpCnd aI1 funhcr urms deliveries
'7 ° f i mUrdCrerS - Thcsc wea POns were given for defence
on innnr- ^ Je8rciMon and not [ ° commit wanton murder
and , child ™ in Bangla Desh. Much of these
ing masses of" R ' P ^ ^ ^ lhC bI °° d and SWcat of thc toi, ‘
thousands bv , 1 ^ “ ° tfSh Wl, ° arc now bein 8 butchered in their
to nol onlv su n SC , Sa n C WCap ° ns ’ Wc a PP‘ al to these powers
weapons of d .. ^ ^ ° chvcrics but to insist that these
sr thc task ° f —
wod°d onin'r 1 i hat Yai,ya ’ S mcrccilar ics remain insensitive to
gah we ann d r C ° nt,nUe wilh lhcir P Ja ""‘ d genocide of Ben-
aid have foue armS fr ° m aH C ° UnlriCS Wll ° vaIu ‘ freedom
alfo d we ' u a8grC T n m t,1Cir ° Wn limc - Ia «*king aid from
a spirit of ZL ° Ur fnends lhat this should b ° given in
in -lely to aid us
for its self-determination to 8 ,t ’ aS StrUgg,cd far 100 Jon g
one’s satellite Bengalis -,h i W tbcmse i vc:i to become any-
sation of funds and o\»7 ^ ‘° Ste P U P *eir ^obili-
•y *0 *h» liberated ‘'“'l 3 ''" ‘" Cm Pr °"""'
trained and equipped in their use. volunteers eon be
may not’ be so^quippei “for ZZtiw * ask you" WCaP °" S "
have^'role t
dos and agents who operate 31108 . Cnemy Paratroopers, comman-
have a role to atoTf.-*" 1 ' ‘ n ,hc libcia " d areas. You
Play in cutltng roads, preparing ambushes and
APPENDIX 5
213
booby traps, guarding the waterways and even in direct combat
with the enemy if they ever come to close quarters To equip
yourselves for this task, group yourselves for training and instruc-
tions under the Sangram Panshads whose field commanders
should report for briefing to their military Area Commanders Our
irregular warfare units must operate as a disciplined fighting force
in close co-ordination with the professional vanguard of the Ban-
gla Desh Liberation Army who will deploy them according to
plan.
The military part of the struggle is however only one aspect
The war for survival must also go on within Bangla Desh We
therefore invite all administrators, technicians and intellectuals and
any other person anxious to join in the Liberation struggle to
come to the liberated areas and put their services at the disposal
of the Government of Bangla Desh A variety of tasks are ahead
in the struggle requiring various skills and each in his own way
can make a valuable contribution to the fight Wc particularly in-
vite all political leaders of all political parlies of Bangla Desh
to join us in a united struggle against the aggressor Our struggle
today rises above conventional political boundaries and must be
seen as the struggle of the 75 million people of Bangla Desh for
protecting their freedom.
There should be no collaborauon with the army of occupation
Jf any self-styled leader thinks that be can. under the cover of
Martial Law, rise up from the political grave where he was
consigned by the 75 million people on 7ih December. 1970. he
does so at his peril. There can be no Quislings in BangTa Desh
and those who are so blinded by fear or treachery to play this
role, will be destroyed by the people themselves
We must however remember that this is a time of war and it
is not possible to ensure that normal economic life will remain
undisturbed. Jn the face of possible shortage we impress on all
citizens of Bangla Desh to exercise self discipline and maximum
austerity in their daily habits. Shopkeepers and traders arc ask-
ed to avoid hoarding and blackmarketing and as far as possible
lo keep the prices of daily necessities within the means of the
common people.
Tide tan now be no doubt about the outcome of the final
struggle, victory is ours, earned by our own courage and
sacrifice. This is now being gradually realised by the enemy They
214
. . — •’"ai.in.m in HAST BENGAL
quickly intimidated 0 by ^ “ nd tl,al , 3 cn S a,is would be
should withstand tliei/m. i “ ° f n,odcrn weapons. That we
upset their aHack and "™ ^ back has
stuffs. With all coinniuni - U •' ""T ° ,f f ro,n al1 sourccs of food-
cut of! by the people i|, c** IO ? S V ' 11 1 lllcir headquarters in Dacca
ments is through uirdrops'VhetT'f-’ ^ >r ''T'’’ 05 . a " d rcinforCc *
of aviation fuel and rh ‘ c klun P exhaustion due to lack
makes fiymg dangem^ Thw'r thC , Norw “‘ w which
sea which threatens to nv- ^ ‘! tC er ‘‘ duaI isolation in a hostile
ralisation and panic ar • v^n” ' ,Cm any day and • si « ns of ^mo-
planes to cause need!-*" t'^' ^ ' flC ' r dcs Pcrate attempts to use
The world 'comniunity^j's **• ^- C ^berated -as.
notice of this miior n. bq: """ng to sit up and take
largest country the Peool afc ’ rallon ra S ,n S m the world's eighth
cr does the Islamabad Gov ‘ PUbI, . C °! D ^ N ° ,on S-
and order in Dacca and Lnimu) ‘ s hes about enforcing law
conviction. As iourn-.i; . ° atIainmcnt of normalcy carry any
i,orrors of wariava^ f i/cns . csca P e '«>*" thc
atrocity, massacre loot - in d t ^ ‘ lcy brin S la,cs of war.
ous hordes. As journalists , Tc ,nfl,C, . cd by Ya,1 > a ’ s murdcr-
they bear witness to the si- ree * y ,n Illc liberated regions
the heroic resistance of ill- au ^ llLr a,1 d destruction and confirm
Already the USSR r I *? p,C ° f Ban « ,a Desh.
cid c and the USSR has’ ur Jl P 1’^ ,akcn noticc °f the geno-
repression. Even Britain in V k ' Stan to dcsist from its acts of
don whilst Ceylon and Burma C ° 8n,sancc u[ the conflagra-
y refusing refuelling richts rA rcs P ondc d to world opinion
cargo of death to Dacca ° ,ls,an ' planes carrying their
Whilst there is still nm ;
internal afTair of Pakistan ir". S £ n,C countries of this being an
saerc Of 75 million people and 'rh CCOrning evident that the mas-
1 C for freedom suppress their strug-
sions which threatens the conse-G™ 31100 ^ ,SSUc °f rnajor dimen-
regton. The Government of Banol'^n^i. mucb as ‘he peace of the
v c « Of patriotic B “ “one a Dcsh has already used ll,c scr-
of Ihe world. We will «« plfeh. to the notice
anga Dcsh to the capitals of tl °u/ ° Ur ° Wn em, ’ssarics from
^.tion and assistance in o Ur n ^ to Scck d *Pl°matfc re-
c appeal to our beleaguered ~t C ^° r ^ rccc *om end survival.
8 CrCd broll >“-' and sliders in the
APPENDIX 5
21S
occupied territories who live day and night under the shadow
of death and dishonour from the savages who call themselves
the Pakistan Army to take courage and have faith in our cause
and the strength of the Liberation Army Those who wish to
serve us, come out and join the struggle Those who must of
necessity stay on. we send a message of hope and inspiration
that victory will be ours, Inshallah
The battle will not be long because our strength multiplies
daily as our plight gets wider recognition in the world But we
can expect much blood to be shed by these butchers and much
wanton destruction and pillage before they are wiped out by the
Liberation Army.
We must, therefore, look ahead to the task of reconstruction
and the rebuilding of a new Bangla Desh on the ruins of East
Pakistan.
We must in this task never forget that this has been a people’s
war in the truest sense of the word and that had J! not been for
the courage, patriotism and faith of the common man in the
cause of a Free Bangla Desh we would never be able to enjoy
the fruits of independence We must therefore build a new world
for the toiling masses of Bangla Desh. free from exploitation of
man by man. In this new world, we promise freedom from hunger,
disease, illiteracy and unemplo>ment To this task, we want to
mobilise the unlimited energy and dedication of 75 million Bengalis
who have secured our freedom with their blood and must now
rebuild Bangla Desh with their sweat, into a modem, democratic
society of and for the people, based on the principles of social
jusUce and equality.
“JOI BANGLA”
"JOI INDEPENDENT BANGLA DESH”
APPENDIX 6
CHALLENGE OF RESPONSE
°l BmglJ DeshAprit'ly^ig?/) AI ""C,I. Prime Minister
^ t ^dMi 1 Zta‘, haS eivc " b u , ,o secure
81 tr ;c;;dr r s *-“ ra ' ion *"*
10 tlistort the facts in a ^ thC Govcrnmcnt of Pakistan
of genocide in Bangla Desh ? ti?^ Ul [ C . mpl t0 covcr U P their war
stances under which the non ,d must b * ‘old the circuni-
dnven to substitute a^d Tr °T S r pc0pI ^ * bangla Desh were
realise their just aspirations. ° ^ par!,amcnta ry politics to
in p tikistan P had t ' fo[wa ‘‘l* ‘P 1101 ^’ for Desh with-
League as the last possible soluri ^ U 1 Slnccnty by the Awami
. ak,sLan - Lighting the elections to^hJN^^^ ^ inlCfirily of
issue of six points, the Awami I ° Natlonal Assembly on the
fr°™ bangla Desh in , won 167 on, of ,69 sees
so ccisivc that i, won 80 ’ ls e'lecloral viclory was
decisive nature of its victory nh!. ,C popu!ar vo <e cast. The
the National Assembly. U ,n a c,car majority within
Lhe post election period un-
people spoken so decisively i n the 1 '™° ° f h ° Pe ’ for Ilcver ,lad a
cracy - 11 was **
216
APPENDIX 6
217
stitution based on the six points could be worked out The Pakis-
tan People’s Party, which emerged as the leading party in Sind
and Punjab, had avoided raising the issue of six points in their
election campaign and had no obligation whatever to its elector-
ate to resist it In Baluchistan, the dominant party, the National
Awami Party, was fully committed to the six points In the
NWFP, the NAP was dominantly for autonomy The course of
the elections, which marked the defeat of the reactionary parties,
therefore, gave every reason to be optimistic about the future of
democracy in Pakistan
Preparatory to the convening of the National Assembly, talks
were expected between the main parties in the political arena
However, whilst the Awami League was always willing prepara-
tory to going to the Assembly, to explain us constitutional posi-
tion and to discuss alternative proposals from the other parties
it believed that the spirit of a true democracy demanded that the
constitution be debated and finalised in the National Assembly
rather than rn secret sessions To this end. it insisted on an early
summoning of the National Assembly In anticipation of this
session, the Awami League worked day and night to prepare
a draft constitution based on six points and fully examined all the
implications of formulating and implementing such a constitu-
tion.
The first major talks over Pakistan’s political future took place
between General Yahya and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in mid-
January. In this session. General Yahya proved the extent of the
Awami League's commitment to its programme and was assured
that they were fully aware of us implications But. contrary to
expectation. General Yahya did not spell out his own ideas about
the constitution. General Yahya gave the impression of not find-
ing anything seriously objectionable in the six points, but em-
phasised the need for coming to an understanding with the PPP
in West Pakistan.
The next round of talks took place between the PPP and the
Awami League from January 27, 1971 in Dacca where Mr. Bhutto
and his team held a number of sessions with the Awami League
to discuss the constitution.
As in the case with General Yahya, Mr Bhutto did not onng
any concrete proposals of his own about the nature of the con-
stitution. He and his advisers were mainly interested in discuss-
218
I'AK COLONIALISM IN LAST BENGAL
mg the implications of the six points. Since their responses were
essentially negative and they had not prepared a brief of their
own, it was not possible for the talks to develop into serious
negotiations where attempts could be made to bridge the gap
between the two parties. It was evident that as yet Mr. Bhutto
tad no formal position of his owai from which to negotiate.
It must be made clear that when the PPP left Dacca there was
no indication from their part that a deadlock had been reached
with the A warn 1 League. Rather, they confirmed that all doors
were open and that following a round of talks with Pakistani
sabers, tic PPP would either have a second and more substan-
ivc roun o talks with the Awami League or would meet in the
a iona ssem ly whose committees provided ample opportuni-
ty for detailed discussion on the constitution.
r Bhutto’s announcement to boycott the National Assembly.
l Wl '' came as a complete surprise. The boycott decision
dat’d r ^ >riSI ' li ’ wCau se Mr. Bhutto had already been accommo-
for an enH Y PfCsidcnt vvhen refused Sheikh Mujib’s plea
t in line w y d S M 10 ^? AsS ‘ mb! >' ° n F ‘bruary 15 and fixed
U. m me wnh Mr. Bhutto’s preference, for March 3.
launchedTcam • ‘° b ° ycott thc Assembly. Mr. Bhutto
West Pakistani gn im,midation a S ai ™ all other parties in
task the ' i o , PrCVCn c UlCm fr ° m altcnclin S the session. In this
Snil ^^;u^ nCC / hal 1 Lt - Gcn ’ Umcr. chairman of the Na-
Khan with a^L 7* ^ d ° SC associate of President Yahya
>y r bi,m,o ' s i,and - —
bly. In spite of this display of nJ* ^ ‘° attCnd t,lc assem '
Lt.-Gen. Umer all m 7 Y P rcs sure tactics by Mr. Bhutto and
Pakis'n c/cepf I pp? f f , Nalimal As “ mbl >' W«
(QML). had booked their seat, tn'p. Q p yy “ m Musl,m L “ 8 " 5
of March 3. ‘ 0 Fast Pakistan for the session
seats and thcre^re soils’ ^ T* membcrs had booked their
members were wanting to coml^o PPP mMy
down of this joint front . . • ° Ddcca - Paced with the break-
obliged Mr. Bhutto on Ma^chTh^ 081 * DCSh ’ Gcncral Yah y a
sion not for any finite period but Y - pos . t P on,n S thc assembly scs-
ed the Governor of E^t P ak L t • 1 °^’ he
was believed to be one of th ’ Adm,ra l S. M. Ahsan. who
one of the moderates in his administration.
APPENDIX 6
219
The cabinet with its component of Bengalis was also dismissed so
that all power was concentrated in the hands of the west wing
military junta.
In these circumstances, Yahya’s gesture could not be seen as
anything but an attempt to frustrate the popular will by colluding
with Mr. Bhutto The National Assembly was the only forum
where Bangla Desh could assert its voice and political strength,
and to frustrate this was a clear indication that Parliament was
not to be the real source of power in Pakistan
The reaction to the postponement in Bangla Desh was inevi-
table and spontaneous and throughout the land, people took to
the streets to record their protest at this arbitrary act People
now feft sure that Gen Yahya never really intended to transfer
power and was making a mockery of parliamentary politics The
popular mood felt that the rights of Bangla Desh could never be
realised within the framework of Pakistan, where Gen Yahya
could so blatantly frustrate the summoning of an assembly
proclaimed by his own writ, and urged that Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman must go for full independence
Sheikh Mujib, however, continued to seek a political settle-
ment. This was in itself a major gesture in the face of the cold-
blooded firing on unarmed demonstrators on March 2 and 3
which had already led to over a thousand casualties
The course of the non-cooperation movement is now a part of
history. Never in the course of any liberation struggle has non-
cooperation been earned to the limits attained within Bangla
Desh between March 1 and 25 Non-cooperation was total No
judge of the High Court could be found to administer the oath of
office to the new Governor, Lt Gen Tikka Khan The entire
civilian administration, including the police and the civil service
of Pakistan, refused to attend office The people stopped the
supply of food to the army. Even the civilian employees of the
defence establishment joined the boycott.
Non-co opera Uon did not stop at abstenuon from work The
civilian administration and the police positively pledged their
support to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and put themselves under
his orders.
In this situation, the Awami League without being a formally
constituted Government, was forced to take on the responsibility
of keeping the economy and administration running whilst non-
220
PAK COLONIALISM IN HAST BENGAL
cooperation lasted. In this task they had the unqualihed support
not only of the people but the administration and the business
community. The latter two subordinated themselves to the direc-
tives of the Awami League and accepted them as the sole autho-
rity to solve their various problems.
In these unique circumstances the economy and administration
were kept going in spite of the formidable problems arising out
of the power vacuum which had suddenly emerged in Bangla Desh.
In spite of the lack of any formal authority. Awami League
volunteers in cooperation with the police maintained a level of
law and order which was a considerable improvement on normal
times.
Faced with this demonstration of total support of the Awami
League to this historic non-cooperation movement. General Yahya
Khan appears to have modified his tactics. On March 6, he still
seemed determined to provoke a confrontation when he made
his highly provocative speech putting the full blame for the crisis
on the Awami League and not even referring to the architect
of the crisis. Mr. Bhutto. It seems that he expected a declaration
of independence on March 7. The army in Dacca was put on
full alert to crush the move and Lt. Gen. Tikka Khan was flown
to replace Lt. Gen. Yakub to signify the hardening of attitudes
within the junta.
Sheikh Mujib, however, once again opted for the path of poli-
tical settlement in spite of massive public sentiment for
independence. In presenting his four-point proposal for attending
the National Assembly he not only had to contain the public
mood but to leave a way open for Yahya to explore this last
chance for a peaceful settlement.
It is now clear that General Yahya and his generals never had
the slightest intention of solving Pakistan’s political crisis peace-
fully but were only interested in buying time to permit the rein-
forcement of their military machine within Bangla Desh. General
Yahya s visit to Dacca was a mere cover for his plan of genocide.
It now becomes clear that contingency plans for such a crisis had
already begun well in advance of the crisis.
Shortly before March 1, tanks which had been sent north to
Rangpur to defend the borders were being sent off to West
Pakistan on a priority basis along with the families of West
Pakistani businessmen.
APPENDIX 6
221
The military build-up was accelerated after March 1 and
continued through the talks up to March 25 Members of the
armed forces dressed in civilian clothes were flown in PIA
commercial flights via Ceylon. C-130s carrying arms and provi-
sions for the garrisons flew into Dacca It is estimated that up
to one division, with complementary support, was brought into
Bangla Desh between March 1 and 25 To ensure security, the
airport was put under strict Air Force control and heavily guarded
with artillery and machine-gun nets whilst the movement of
passengers was strictly supervised An SS commando group
specially trained for undercover operations in sabotage and
assassination was distnbuted in key centres in Bangla Desh and
Saidpur in the two days before March 25 to provoke clashes
between locals and non-locals so as to provide a cover for
military intervention
As part of tins strategy of deception, General Yahya adopted
the most conciliatory posture in his talks with Sheikh Mujib In
the talks beginning on March 16 he expressed regrets for what
had happened and his sincere desire for a political settlement. In a
crucial meeting with Sheikh Mujib he was asked to positively
state the junta's position on the Awami League’s four-point
proposal. He indicated that there were no serious objections and
that an interim constitution could be worked out by the respective
advisers embodying the four points
The basic points on which agreement was reached were
(1) Lifting of martial law and transfer of power to a civilian
Government by a Presidential proclamation
(2) Transfer of power in the provinces to the majority parlies
(3) General Yahya to remain as President and in control of e
Central Government-
(4) Separate sittings of the National Assembly mem rs rom
East and West Pakistan preparatory to a joint session oi
the house to finalise the constituuon
Contrary to the distortions now put out by both
and Mr. Bhutto, the proposal for separate sittings o H{ .
was suggested by General Yahja to accommodate Mr.
erte'd the practical advantage .ha, J
viable blueprint to regulate relations betw ?
222
I'AK COLONIALISM IN LAST IlENGAL
the Centre, its application would raise serious difficulties in the
west wing. For this reason tire west wing MNAs (Members of
the National Assembly) must be permitted to get together to
work out a new pattern of relationship in the context of a six-
point constitution and the dissolution of one unit.
Once this agreement in principle had been reached between
Sheikh Mujib and General Yahya there was only the question of
defining the powers of Bangla Desh vis-a-vis the Centre during
the interim phase. Here, it was again jointly agreed that the
distribution of power should as far as possible approximate to
the final constitution approved by the National Assembly which,
it was expected, would be based on the six points.
For working out this part of the interim settlement Mr. M. M.
Ahmed, Economic Adviser to the President, was specially flown
in. In his talks with the Awami League advisers he made it clear
that provided the political agreement had been reached there were
no insuperable problems to working out some version of the six
points even in the interim period. The final list of these amend-
ments to the Awami League draft which he presented as sugges-
tions, indicated that the gap between the Government and Awami
League position was no longer one of principle but remained
merely over the precise phrasing of the proposals. The Awami
League at its sitting of March 24 had accepted the amendment
with certain minor changes of language and there was nothing to
prevent the holding of a final drafting session between the advisers
of General Yahya and Sheikh Mujib when the interim constitution
would be finalised.
It must be made clear that at no stage was there any break-
down of talks or any indication by General Yahya or his leant
that they had a final position which could not be abandoned.
The question of legal cover for the transfer of power is merely
another belated fabrication by General Yahya to cover his geno-
cide. He and his team had agreed that in line with the precedent
of the Indian Independence Act of 1947. power could be
transferred by a Presidential proclamation. The notion that there
would be no legal cover to the arrangement raised subsequently
by Mr. Bhutto and endorsed by General Yahya was never a bone
of contention between Sheikh Mujib and General Yahya. There
is not the slightest doubt that had General Yahya indicated that
a meeting of the National Assembly was essential for transferring
i'PLNDIX 6
223
power, ihe Awami League would not have broken the talks on
such a minor legal technicality After all, as the majority party
it had nothing to fear from such a meeting and us acceptance of
the decision for a separate sitting was a decision to accommodate
Mr Bhutto rather than a fundamental stand for the party
Evidence that agreement in principle between contending
parties had been reached is provided by Mr Bhutto’s own press
conference on March 25. It is not certain what transpired m the
separate session between General Yaliya and Mr Bhutto, but
there is evidence that deliberate falsehoods about the course of
the talks with the Awami League were fed to the PPP. who were
told that Sheikh Mujib was determined to have a showdown and
was escalating lus demands Needless to sa>. not the slightest
indication of these misgivings had been raised in the meeting
between the Awami League team and General Yah>a Khan’s
advisers, where amicability and optimism had prevailed to
the end
Whilst hope for a settlement was being raised, more bad
signs of the intentions of the army were provided by their sudden
decision to unload the munition ship. MV Swat, berthed at
Guttagong port Preparatory to this decision Brig Mazumdar.
a Bengali officer commanding the garrison in Guttagong. had
been suddenly removed from his command and replaced by a
West Pakistani. On the night of March 24, he was flown to Dacca
under armed escort, and has probably been executed Under the
new command, notice was given to local authorities of the
decision to unload the ship, inspile of the fact that the army
had abstained from doing so for the last 17 dajs in the face of
non-cooperation from the port workers. The decision to unload
was a calculated provocation which immediately brought 100,000
people on the streets of Chittagong and led to massive firing by
die army to break their way out. The issue was raised by the
Awami League with General Peerzada as to why this escalation
was being permitted whilst talks were sail going on He gave no
answer bejond a promise to pass it on to General Yahja Khan.
Following the final meeting between General Yahja’s and the
Awami League’s advisers on March 24 where Mr. M. M. Ahmed
passed on lus amendments, a call was awaited from General Peer-
zada for a final session where the draft could be finalised. No such
call materialised and instead it was learnt that Mr. M. M. /Mimed.
224
i’AK COLONIALISM IN LAS I' BENGAL
“‘" ral 10 I|<C n<-SOIiation s . had suddenly led f or Karachi
Cal!™ 8 ° f M “ rC " 25 ' Vi "' 0U ‘ ^ ■- S
S5tlrtew° rar ? ■""■ ory : '* r*™** »f «**£
lion of Dacca by' Vhe'mid'nigh, ^£^““'2'* P ° 1 ’" 11 '
given 10 tile Atvami League bv Gen Y d 1 * U “ mMm was
issued when the machine guns ar l-r l “ rd,:r 1K,S
unleashed their reicn of d..,Y '? d Qn, “ ' :ml '
iu» P^madi
s r°
children, had been butclte red D ae c “ had' b “T "7‘" a " d
inferno with fires r-, • ad b ° Ln Iurni -‘ d 11110 an
inhabitants, who had bam" 1 ! m0it corners °f the city. Sleeping
started by the military' ° wer^^" .k'” t! ’ Cir ll0nK ‘ S by t,ie fire:i
escape the flames. ° mac lin e-gunned as they ran to
heroic ^resisu, nee ' Cl |'|i .*" C E ' >R i* “™ed volunteers pul up a
innocent and the' iiiisusnwi'' rCmaincd weak, the
their thousands We ar> cn' ng | WI0 WCfe kil,cd at random in
details of dte Liocid' . J ^ ^ baad account of the
orders of the President of by tbe Pakistan army on the
The scale and brutality of ^ k ' Slan wilich wc will publish shortly,
in the civilised world. ° action exceeds anything perpetrated
General Yahya himself lefi n- n
after having unleashed till Pakistan ! ^ " ighl ° f March 25
commit genocide on all Bengalis «•' ' VUh an 0pcn ,icL ‘ ncc t0
of barbarism was not forthcoming UllTo Td™”" ** ““
the world was given its fin,, . pm ' le next da y when
this holocaust.’ The statemr* P anation for the unleashing ‘of
with positive lies. His branding of a Sdf ' conlradic tory and laced
with whom he had onlv 48 I party as lra itors and outlaws,
Peaceful transfer of power bon^rT dS ,° becn ne S otiali, if! for a '.
in Bangla Desh or to the" course to the situation
to hand over power to t h e clccterl nL S ot,a <'ons. His promise
after banning the Awami Lei,.,,. . • ? prcsental,v es of the people
°t Bungla Desh and h Id 7 m Was l ' K *>'■= representative
bold a majority of seats in the National
APPENDIX 6
225
Assembly was a mockery of the freely recorded voice of 75
million Bengalis. The crudity of the statement was clear evidence
that General Yahya was no longer interested in taking shelter
behind either logic or morality and had reverted to the law of
the jungle in his bid to crush the people of Bangla Desh
Pakistan is now dead and buned under a mountain of corpses
The hundreds and thousands of people murdered by the army in
Bangla Desh will act as an impenetrable barrier between West
Pakistan and the people of Bangla Desh By resorting to pre-
planned genocide Gen Yahya must have known that he was
himself digging Pakistan's grave The subsequent massacres
perpetrated on hts orders by his licensed killers on the people
were not designed to preserve the unity of a nation They were
acts of racial hatred and sadism devoid of even the elements of
humanity. Professional soldiers on order, violated their code of
military honour and were seen as beasts of prey who indulged in
an orgy of murder, rape, loot, arson and destruction unequal in
the annals of civilisation These acts indicate that the concept of
two countries is already deeply rooted in the minds of General
Yahya and his associates, who would not dare commit such
atrocities on their own countrymen.
General Yahya’s genocide is thus without political purpose It
serves only as the last act in the tragic history of Pakistan, which
General Yahya has chosen to write with the blood of the people
of Bangla Desh. The objective is genocide and scorched-earth,
before his troops are cither driven out or perish In this time, e
hopes to liquidate our political leadership, intelligentsia and
administration, to destroy our industries and public amenities,
and as a final act, he intends to raze our cities to e groun
Already his occupation army has made substantial progress
towards this objective. Bangla Desh will be set bac y > e
as West Pakistan's parting gift to a people they ave e*p i
for twenty-three years for their own benefit.
This is a point of major significance to those great
choose to ignore this largest single act of genoci e sini " .
of Belsen and Ansel™*. If .hey tbnL .hay nre P
unity of Pakistan, they can forget it because ene
himself has no illusions about the future of Pakistan
They must rcal.su .ha. Patman .s dead and mmd a^»P “
Yaliya — and that independent Bangla Desh is rea y
226
PAK COLONIALISM IN LAST ULNGAL
the indestructible will and courage of 75 million Bengalis who are
daily nurturing the roots of this new nationhood with their blood.
No power on earth can unmake this new nation and sooner or
later both big and small powers will have to accept it into the
world fraternity.
It, is, therefore, in the interest of politics as much as humanity
for the big powers to put their full pressure on General Yahya
to cage his killers and bring them back to West Pakistan. We
will be eternally grateful to the people of the USSR and India
and the freedom loving people of all the countries for their full
support they have already given us in this struggle. We would
welcome similar support from the People’s Republic of China,
the USA, France. Great Britain and all Afro-Asian countries who
have freed themselves from colonial rule and from all freedom
loving countries. Each in their own way should exercise con-
siderable leverage on West Pakistan and were they to exercise
this influence. General Yahya could not sustain his war of aggres-
sion against Bangla Desh for a single day longer.
Bangla Desh will be the eighth most populous country in the
world. Its only goal will be to rebuild a new nation from the
ashes and carnage left behind by General Yahya’s occupation
army. It will be a stupendous task because of the destruction of
the economy by General Yahya's army in our already under-
developed and overpopulated region- But we now have a cause
and a people who have been hardened in the resistance, who have
shed their blood for their nation and won their freedom in an epic
struggle which pitted unarmed people against a modern army.
Such a nation cannot fail in its task of securing the foundations
of its nationhood.
In our struggle for survival we seek the friendship of all people,
the big powers and the small. We do not aspire to join any bloc
or pact but will seek assistance from those who give it in a spirit
of goodwill free from any desire to control our destinies. We have
struggled far too long to permit ourselves to become anyone’s
satellite.
We now appeal to the nations of the world for recognition
and assistance both material and moral in our struggle for
nationhood. Every day this is delayed a thousand lives arc lost
and more of Bangla Desh’s vital assets are destroyed. In the
name of humanity, act now and earn our undying friendship.
APPENDIX 6
227
This we now present to the world as the case of the people of
Dangla Desh Bangla Desh has earned her right to recognition at
great cost, as the people of Bangla Desh made sacrifices of
unequal magnitude and fought hard in order to establish the
rightful place for Bangla Desh in the comity of nations
APPENDIX 7
INDIAN POLICY
Parliament Resolves
m bM ” '" c H ““ “ f
Gandhi, said : 97 ’ 1C Pnmc Minislc r. Shrimati Indira
East Bengal ro^oon a f L r ° ^ ^ k C ° • ^ U f Va,iant nci ^ hbours in
victory has united us in „ • r C11 " [ e J olcin S over their electoral
wanton destruction of the^h ^ SufIcrin S* c °nccm for tile
future. f t,1Clr beaullfl11 Jaad and anxiety for their
r “ wilh "3
unanimously: m k lacJ ° sa A approved
Text of Resolution
^ — ■■ -
forces, despatched from West p-.kL/ , “ ive allack b y armed
the entire people of East Bengal wUh^J ^ Unhashcd a t' ains ‘
urges and aspirations. 8 1 view to suppressing theii
Instead of respecting the will of the i
expressed through the elenton • D , . pL0 P ,e so unmistakably
Government of Pa Sum h « ^ Pat ' S ‘ an in D “‘"^ J970. .he
people. Un has chosc " to flout tile mandate of the
The Government of PakisHn r,,„
Pakistan has not only refused to transfer
228
APPENDIX 7
229
power to legally elected representatives but has arbitrarily pre-
vented the National Assembly from assuming its rightful and
sovereign role. The people of East Bengal are being sought to be
suppressed by the naked use of force, by bayonets, machine guns,
tanks, artillery and aircraft
The Government and people of India have always desired and
worked for peaceful, normal and fraternal relations with Pakistan
However, situated as India is and bound as the peoples of the
subcontinent arc by centuries old ties of history, culture and tradi-
tion, this House cannot remain indifferent to the macabre tragedy
being enacted so close to our border Throughout the length
and breadth of our land, our people have condemned, in un-
mistakable terms, the atrocities now being perpetrated on an
unprecedented scale upon an unarmed and innocent people
This House expresses us profound sympathy for and solidarity
with the people of East Bengal in their struggle for a democratic
way of life
Bearing in mind the permanent interests which India has in
peace, and committed as we are to uphold and defend human
rights, this House demands immediate cessation of the use of
torcc and the massacre of defenceless people This House calls
upon all peoples and Governments of the world to take urgent and
constructive steps to prevail upon the Government of Pakistan to
put an end immediately to the systematic decimation of people
which amounts to genocide
This House records ns profound conviction that the historic
upsurge of the 75 million people of East Bengal will triumph
The House wishes to assure them that their struggle and sacrifices
will receive the wholehearted sympathy and support of the people
of India.
APPENDIX 8
IDENTICAL VALUES
( Stciumau by Suit. Indira Gandhi in Rajya Sabha. 29 March. 1971)
ftikistan^i 5 ha ' rman : Sir ‘ wc havc watched the happenings in
- rher, that is. the election in East Bengal with great
t hope that h was thc
more united U ? 3 fUtUre Which would '”ake them
has said far frn U -' 35 my collca S ue - Shri Swaran Singh,
along a ’dark n?!h k^'" 8 V” 0 th ‘ S brightness they have turned
perhaps suffering k ^ Path ' brin S in S suffering— in fact.
I am' sure Hon M “k!”" 3 W ° rd -. t0 an cntirc P*°ple.
our hearts mav be h C °! , Wi11 ap P rcciaIC that however heavy
of the people there’ • °. WcVcr cc P I y we may be sharing the agony
in the same words as Hon^lJT^K 516 ^ th * Govcrnmcnt to speak
wc are so deenlv ln° ^ T d ° ’ In '**• it is because
moment that we are at th° US °, ^ blstonc importance of this
the situation when a wrn Ume ’ awarc of dlc seriousness of
effect entirely different from th^' 3 T" 8 W ° rd ’ can have an
The House is ZZ T? "V"* Which we a » intend,
national norms It is good m ^ | 3VC [ ° 3Ct witbin certa,n inter-
- certain views ££££“3 ” ,hc P ""'“ have expres-
admiration for the socialist nrn Watantra Party has expressed
The Jan Sangh have sup InTb™™ ^ Mu ^ Rabman '
said that the people of^st BcnLl^ 113 ' t P ° ,1Cy a ° d haVe a,S °
gal are their brothers. I hope
230
APPENDIX 8 231
ihcy will extend the same sympathy to all the people of our own
couotxy too
As I said earlier, we are not unaware of what is taking place
in East Pakistan and of what it means not only to the people there
but the danger that it holds for us, not for any one part of our
country, but for the entire country So we are interested m this
matter for many reasons, firstly as one Member has said that Shn
Mujibur Rahman has stood for the values which we ourselves
cherish, the values of democracy, the values of secularism and the
values of socialism
We are also concerned with the truly wonderful and unique
way in which the people there had stood behind him and behind
these values We are no less full of sorrow and grave concern
and even agony at what is happening there but I can only appeal
to the Hon Members that this is not a moment when the Govern-
ment can say anything more and whatever the Government may
or may not be able to do it would not be wise if this becomes a
matter for public debate.
I do not think that Hon Members expect us to give replies
to the various questions that were asked 1 think the purpose of
this discussion was more that we should know their mind and
hear their suggestions As Hon. Members know. I held a meeting
this morning wuh the Leaders of the Opposition which I hope
to continue. We are as closely in touch with the happenings in
East Bengal as is possible in this situation and I hope to keep
closely in touch with the Leaders of the Opposition as well as
oiher Members who would like to come and meet us so that we
can know their mind. We cannot always, I must admit, give our
mind but we will certainly tell them as much as is possible in this
situation.
APPENDIX 9
TEXT OF INDO-SOVIET TREATY
^r/J.„^ranon:°' "" ° f pca “- W “ d '
cxislins R,|a ' io " s
operauon' 1 mce[s I ,hA rUnl ' L ' r . dcvtlo P mc “ 1 ot friendship and co-
Of colonialism flnai of the remnams
existed XSon t “ "% r dpkS ° f P-cefu, co.
and social systems. L WCCn ta,CS wit)l t, ' fferent political
principles of\l!e Unf,e7Na”iolTci°anei d,: ^ P “ rP ° XS “ d
Socia^S^rr £ °"‘ f d r- Md ,he Uni “" “ f S -ie,
•Ire present treaty for Jteh ‘Y S ' dC UV ' d “ idcd ■» conclude
rfes have been appotaed r ° ll0 "' in8 "“W-
Minister of Eaerral Affairs." 'on Si'
ocnair of the Union of Soviet
APPENDIX 9
233
Socialist Republics. Mr A A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign
Affairs who. having each presented their credentials, which are
found to be in proper form and due order, have agreed as follows
Article /: The high contracting parties solemnly declare that
enduring peace and fnendship shall prevail between the two
countries and their peoples Each party shall respect the indepen-
dence. sovereignly and territorial integrity of the other party and
refrain from interfering in the other’s internal affairs The high
contracting parties shall continue to develop and consolidate the
relations of sincere friendship, good neighbourhness and com-
prehensive co-opcration existing between them on the basis of
the aforesaid principles as well as those of equality and mutual
benefit
Article //; Guided by the desire to contribute in every possible
way to ensure enduring peace and security of their people, the
high contracting parties declare their determination to continue
their efforts to preserve and to strengthen peace in Asia and
throughout (he world, to halt the arms race and 10 achieve general
and complete disarmament, including both nuclear and conven-
tional, under effective international control
Article III: Guided by their loyahty to (he lofty ideal of
equality of all peoples and nations, irrespective of race or creed,
the high contracting parties condemn colonialism and racialism m
all forms and manifestations, and reaffirm their determination to
strive for their final and complete elimination
The high contracting parties shall co-operate with other States
to achieve these aims and to support the just aspirations of the
peoples in their struggle against colonialism and racial domination
Article IV The Republic of India respects the peace loving
policy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics aimed at streng-
thening friendship and co-opcration with all nations.
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respects India’s policy
of non-alignment and reaffirms that (his policy constitutes an
important factor in the maintenance of universal peace and inter-
national security and in the lessening of tensions in the world.
Regular Contacts
Article V: Deeply interested in ensuring universal peace and
secunty, attaching great importance to their mutual co-operation
m the international field for achieving these aims, the high
234
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
contracting parlies will maintain regular contacts with each other
on major international problems affecting the interests of both
the States by means of meetings anti exchange of views between
their leading statesmen, visits by official delegations and special
envoys of the two Governments, and through diplomatic channels.
Article VI: Attaching great importance to economic, scientific
and technological co-operation between them, the high contracting
parties will continue to consolidate and expand mutually
advantageous and comprehensive co-operation in these fields as
well as expand trade, transport and communications between them
on the basis of ihe principles of equality, mutual benefit and
most-favoured-nation treatment, subject to the existing agreements
and the special arrangements with contiguous countries as specified
in the Indo-Soviet trade agreement of December 26, 1970.
Article VII: The high contracting parties shall promote further
development of ties and contacts between them in the fields of
science, art, literature, education, public health, press, radio,
television, cinema, tourism and sports.
Article VIII : In accordance with the traditional friendship
established between the two countries, each of the high contracting
parties solemnly declares that it shall not enter into or participate
in any military alliance directed against the other party.
Each high contracting party undertakes to abstain from any
aggression against the other party and to prevent the use of its
territory for the commission of any act which might inflict mili-
tary damage on the other high contracting party.
Article IX: Each high contracting party undertakes to abstain
from providing any assistance to any third party that engages in
armed conflict with the other party. In the event of either party
being subjected to an attack or threat thereof, the high contracting
parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultations in order
to remove such threat and to take appropriate effective measures
to ensure peace and the security of their countries.
Article X: Each high contracting party solemnly declares that
it shall not enter into any obligation, secret or public, with one or
more States, which is incompatible with this treaty. Each high
contracting party further declares that no obligation exists, nor
shall any obligation be entered into, between itself and any other
State or States, which might cause military damage to the other
party.
APPENDIX 9
235
Article XI This treaty is concluded for the duration of 20 years
and will be automatically extended for each successive period of
five years unless either high contracting party declares its desire to
terminate it by giving notice to the other contracting party 12
months prior to the expiration of the treaty The treaty will be
subject to ratification and will come into force on the date of
the exchange of instruments of ratification which will take place
in Moscow within one month of the signing of this treaty
Article XU Any difference of interpretation of any Article or
Articles of this treaty which may arise between the high con-
tracting parties will be settled bilaterally by peaceful means in a
spirit of mutual respect and understanding
The said plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty in
Hindi, Russian and English, all texts being equally authentic
and have affixed thereto their seals
Done in New Delhi on the 9lh day of August in the year 1971
APPENDIX 10
LEADERS
■ = “ I 8 ™, : fl "' ?\ o! lhc ,nd “- s “ iota
On £ to" 2To < ZT 1 Emcm -" A,,airs ° r "’ d “ :
Foreign Alfairs of ibe USSR M °‘ I,ldla - lllc Mm 'stc r of
Paid an official visii 10 T„di ’, f ' !*" Cy Mr ' A ' A - Gro,n > ko '
Daring bis s ,ay i„ "] ?‘ * ,2 - " J7L
Of the USSR call -d on tin- Pr • i’ L Min,stcr of Foreign Affairs
and was received by the Pr a? ° f India - Shri V - V - Gin, aild
Gandhi. He also met the linmcr of India, Shrimali Indira
Falchruddin Ali Ahmed the r° ^ Agr,culturc Minister. Shri
and the Defence SJr siTT ^ Y ’ * C,iaVaa
meetings and talks with Stird-ir 9 Ram ’ Jlc liad several
nal Affairs of India Wdran Singh. Minister of Exter-
The meetings and talks were held
friendship and cordialiiv Ti . d ” an atmosphere of warn)
the friendly relations and fruitful deCp salisfaclion (ha(
Union and India in the nnlV ^ 0 ‘ 0 P erat,on between the Soviet
and scientific fields arc devci ^ ’ econorn ic. cultural, technical
Promise for further expansion °Th 8 succe ssfully and hold great
this co-operation is further «ir f P ° ddca i and legal basis for
friendship and co-operation bef 081 1CnCd ^ tIle lrca ty of peace,
was signed in New Delln bv T'n ^ USSR and India - which
ar ar Swaran Singh Minister of
236
APPENDIX 10 237
External Affairs of India and Mr A. A Gromyko. Minister of
Foreign Affairs of the USSR.
Historic Event
Both sides consider that the conclusion of the treaty is an out-
standing historic event for their two countries The treaty is a
logical outcome of the relations of sincere friendship, respect,
mutual trust and the varied ties which have been established be-
tween the Soviet Union and India in the course of many years
and have stood the test of time
It corresponds to the basic interests of the Indian and Soviet
peoples and opens up wide prospects for raising the fruitful co-
operation between the USSR and India to a higher level Along-
side other provisions concerning bilateral Soviet-India relations
the treaty provides for the two sides maintaining regular contacts
with each other on major international problems and holding
mutual consultations with a view to taking appropriate effective
measures to safeguard the peace and security of their countries
The treaty between the USSR and India is a real act of peace
expressing the community of policy and aspirations of (he USSR
and India in the struggle to strengthen peace in Asia and through-
out the world and for safeguarding international security. All
provisions of the treaty serve these purposes The treaty is not
directed against anyone It is meant to be a factor in developing
friendship and good-neighbourliness, in keeping with the prin-
ciples of the U N Charter
The Governments of India and the USSR are confident that
the conclusion of the treaty of peace, friendship and co-operation
will meet with complete approval on the part of all those who are
really interested in the preservation of peace in Asia and through-
out the world and on the part of the Governments of all peace-
loving States.
Identical Vicks
In the course of the meetings and talks, both sides noted with
satisfaction that their positions on various problems discussed
were identical or very close.
The Minister of External Affairs of India explained the heavy
burden placed on India's re'ources due to over 7 million refugees
who had entered India
238
I>AK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
Both sides, after a detailed discussion reiterated their firm con-
viction that there can be no military solution and considered it
necessary that urgent steps be taken in East Pakistan for the
achievement of a political solution and for the creation of condi-
tions of safety for the return of the refugees to their homes which
alone would answer the interests of the entire people of Pakistan
and the cause of the preservation of peace in the area.
The Indian side expressed its gratitude for the understanding
of the problem shown by the Soviet Union as was evident from
the appeal addressed on April 2, 1971 to the President of Pakis-
tan by the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Mr.
N. V. Podgorny.
Both sides held the view that outside interference in the affairs
of Indo-China should immediately cease. They consider that it
will be futile to attempt to impose any settlement not acceptable
to the peoples of the area. They welcomed the recent 7-point pro-
posal of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Viet-
nam as a concrete step forward which could form the basis of a
peaceful political settlement.
On West Asia, both sides were convinced of the urgent need
for the implementation of the resolution of the Security Council
of November 22, 1967, so that the consequences of aggression arc
liquidated.
Both sides considered that all international problems, including
border disputes, must be settled by peaceful negotiations and that
the use of force or the threat of use of force is impermissible for
their settlement.
Both sides declare that they are strongly in favour of an early
agreement on general and complete disarmament, including both
nuclear and conventional weapons under effective international
control.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR expressed his
gratitude for the cordial reception given to him by the Govern-
ment of India.
Meet with Chavan
UNI adds: The need to strengthen and diversify the economic
relations between India and the Soviet Union was underlined dur-
ing an hour-long meeting between Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Chavan
here today.
APPENDIX 10
239
During the discussion, Mr Chavan thanked the Soviet Govern-
ment for the assistance it had already given towards the rehabili-
tation of the seven and a half million refugees from Bangla Desh,
and dwelt on the adverse impact that this huge economic burden
had on the country's development plans India would welcome
more international assistance, he indicated
Mr Chavan also referred to the shortage of steel, which had
been further aggravated by the roof collapse in Rourkela, and of
non-ferrous metals The Finance Minister indicated that if India
could secure these items from the Soviet Union in large quanti-
ties, it would help in maintaining and accelerating the tempo of
industrial production
The Soviet Foreign Minister reiterated his Government’s con-
cern about the burden faced by India owing to the refugee influx
He also evinced keen interest in the progress of the State-owned
steel plants and industrial development in general
Mr Gromyko later told newsmen that his talks with Mr
Chavan covered both political relations and economic ties and
they were agTeed that these should be strengthened
Rs Forty Crore Expense
The Finance Minister told Mr Gromyko that India had to
spend about Rs 40 crores a month for looking after seven and a
half million refugees, five million of whom were in the camps. The
number could go up, depending on the internal conditions in East
Bengal
The Soviet Union has given 50,000 tonnes of ncc valued at
about Rs. 7 5 crores so far, excluding supplies of medicine and
other items, as assistance for the purpose.
The Finance Minister reportedly told Mr Gromyko that the
general economic condition in India was quite ''good" but indus-
trial production had to be given a push.
Mr. Chavan also referred to the difficulties in meeung the re-
quirements of cotton The position in vegetable oils, too, was
marginally good, with the arrangements made for the import of
Soyabean oil.
Mr. Gromyko also called on Mr. Fakhruddin Ah Ahmed here
this evening to hear a first-hand account of the current food situa-
uon in India.
Mr Ahmed told the Soviet Minister that last year’s production
240
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
of foodgrains in India was about 107.3 million tonnes represent-
ing an 8.5 per cent increase over the previous year. Though the
weather had been erratic in some parts of the country Mr. Ahmed
was confident that the current year’s production would still be
better-
Mr. Gromyko also made enquiries about the arrangements be-
ing made for the supply of food to the Bangla Desh refugees.
APPENDIX 11
INDIA AND RUSSIA CALL FOR
POLITICAL SOLUTION
India and the Soviet Union called for an urgent political solu-
tion to the problems, created by the developments in East Den-
gal. in keeping with "the wishes, (he inalienable rights and lawful
interests" of its people
A joint statement issued here at the end of the discussions be-
tween the Prime Minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi, and the Soviet
leaders — Mr. Brezhnev. Mr Podgomy and Mr. Kosygin — also
made it dear that such a solution should ensure the speediest
return of the millions of refugees, now in India, to their homes
Taking into account “the seriousness of the situation which has
developed in the Indian sub-continent the two sides agreed to
maintain further mutual contacts and continue to exchange views
on the questions arising in this connection ”
The Soviet Government appreciated the "humane approach”
adopted by India towards the problem created by the refugee
influx and reiterated the statement made by President N. V
Podgomy on April 2
Text Of Stati mint
The following is the text of the Sovict-lndian joint statement
on Mrs. Gandhi's talks with the Soviet leaders:
At the invitation of the Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, Mrs. Indira Gandhi. Prime Minister of the
241
242
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
Repubhc of India, paid a visit to the USSR from September 27
The Head of the Government of friendly India and her party
in's C oTdn Cd a f W T. WClCOn,C tCStif >’ in 8 10 thc Profound feel-
wards the , friendship and respect of the Soviet people to-
wards the great Indian people and India’s leaders.
the m"? I"' Stay lrl Moscow. the Prime Minister laid wreaths at
Soldier. 1 ° f ' 1 LcnU1 and tllc Tomb of die Unknown
So^i‘i a M ICmn mCCt ‘ ng ° f Inc, °-Soviet Friendship Society, the
The omonn * firCC,cd ,he hcad of ihc ^ian Government.
Indira T ° f Moscow conferred on Mrs.
The Prim ' • tgfCC ° f Doctor of Science. honoris causa,
and disL sl ' ndia ’ Mrs ‘ ^ira Gandhi, had talks
mittcc of th' r W,t1 tlC Gcncral Sccr dary of the Central Com-
Brczhncv tt Party of die Soviet Union. Mr. L. I.
Mr. N. V. p od01 airman . °. f ‘ he Su P rcmt: Soviet of the USSR.
ters. Mr. A. N .Yasygto. ' ^ Cl ’ airman ° f the Council of Minis ’
chev s'^'skmcl!^ ° n the Sovict sidc: N ’ s - Patoli-
^ Kuznc ' sov - K R Firyubin - R M '
R. D. Sathe. d K n p. ,d S C MMo P n A^P V ^ KaUl ' K ' S ' Shclvankar ’
daran. K. K Bharmv - s v' „ ' Venkat ^waran. A. K. Damo-
The talks, which" J d PurUS " M “"' M. M. Malltotra.
mutual understanding covered Jlmosphcrc ot mrdialily and
Indian bilateral relations t .n ranfiC of sub J ccts of Soviet-
al problems of mutual interest ^ ' mp ° rtant currcnt internation-
ful developmcnt^trcllatb'H Pr f 0 J.° und sa dsfaction at the success-
don between tt So i"- ° f f " endsh, ' P and fruitfuJ Co-opera-
tic. ^ade. sciemific S" "u 'T* “ the P ° liliCa '’ —
They declared their J ’• Cultural a °d other fields.
•still more firm political andtee Zh 1 ' th ' S co '°P cration acquires
friendship and co dotuin T ***'* in thc tr eaty of peace. *
signed in New Delhi on August 9N971. ^ USSR a " d
an event of ’outs/andin^tnd histtr/r - C ° nclusion of die treaty is
lr,cs and - — -n 8 thr;;~ c : f f ir f -r
APPENDIX 11
243
ship, respect, mutual confidence and good-neighbourly co-opera-
tion existing between the Soviet Union and India
The conclusion of the treaty reaffirms that Soviet Union-Indian
friendship is based not on any transient factor, but on long-term
vital interests of the peoples of both countries and their desire to
develop to the utmost many-sided co-operation with each other
for the purpose of economic and social progress, for safeguard-
ing peace as well as the security of both countries
Both sides declared their firm determination to be guided by
the letter and spirit of the treaty in regard to the further develop-
ment of Soviet-Indian relations
They expressed their satisfaction at the fact that the treaty has
met with the full and unreserved support of the peoples of the
Soviet Union and India and has been widely welcomed through-
out the world
They noted with satisfaction the successful development of
mutually beneficial economic and technical co-operation between
the two countries and emphasised the fact that there are favour-
able prospects for the further expansion and deepening of such
co-operation, particularly in the fields of iron and steel industry,
including special steel, alloys and non-ferrous metallurgy, survey,
exploration, and refining of oil and natural gas and in the field
of petro-chemical industry.
The two sides expressed satisfaction at the recent steps taken
by them to identify new forms of mutual co-operation m the
economic and technical fields, including such spheres as space
research, utilisation of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, pro-
ductive co-operation between industrial enterprises of both coun-
tries, etc. They consider it necessary to identify additional new
fields in which such mutual co-operation could be expanded
In this connection agreement was reached that experts of both
countries would meet and work out specific proposals on the
above-mentioned questions.
The two sides decided to set up an inter-governmental commis-
sion on economic, scientific and technical co-operation Both sides
recognised the need, in accordance with the treaty, to develop con-
tacts and ties at different levels, to enlarge and to make more com-
prehensive the exchange of views between the Governments of the
USSR and India on major international problems
The Soviet side expressed its respect for India s policy of non-
244
PAK COLONIALISM IN EAST BENGAL
alignment aimed at lessening tensions in Asia and throughout the
world for strengthening peace and international co-operation.
The Indian side expressed its respect for the Soviet Union's
peaceful foreign policy aimed at strengthening peace, friendship
and international co-operation.
The two sides paid primary attention to the development of the
situation in Asia, to the hotbeds of tensions and military conflicts
existing there, to the discussion of ways to stop and prevent the
acts of aggression and to consolidate the foundations of peace on
the Asian continent.
The two sides expressed their concern over the grave situation
which has arisen on the Indian sub-continent as a result of the
recent events in East Bengal and declared their determination to
continue efforts aimed at the preservation of peace in that region.
The Prime Minister of India informed the Soviet side that the
presence in India of over nine million refugees from East Bengal
had engendered serious social and political tensions and economic
strains in India.
This has caused a serious setback to the socio-economic pro-
grammes of India.
The Soviet side highly appreciated India’s humane approach to
the problem created by the influx of these refugees from East
Bengal and expressed its understanding of the difficulties con-
fronting friendly India in connection with the mass inflow of
refugees.
The Soviet side took into account the statement by the Prime
Minister that the Government of India is fully determined to take
all necessary measures to stop the inflow of refugees from East
Bengal to India and to ensure that those refugees who arc already
in India return to their homeland without delay.
The Soviet side re-affirmed its position regarding the problem
of refugees and other questions which have arisen as a result of
the events in East Bengal as laid down in the appeal of the Chair-
man of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Mr. N. V.
Podgorny, to the President of Pakistan, Gen. Yahya Khan, on
April 2, 1971.
Taking note of the developments in East Bengal since March
25, 1971, both sides consider that the interests of the preservation
of peace demand that urgent measures should be taken to reach a
political solution of the problems which have arisen there paying
APPENDIX 11
245
regard to the wishes, the inalienable rights and lawful interests of
the people of East Bengal as well as the speediest and safe return
of the refugees to their homeland in conditions safeguarding their
honour and dignity
Takmg into account the seriousness of the situation which has
developed in the Indian sub-continent the two sides agreed to
maintain further mutual contacts and to continue to exchange
views on the questions arising m this connection
The two sides expressed their profound concern over the situa-
tion in South-East Asia and pronounced themselves m favour of
the necessity to withdraw all foreign troops from Indo-Chma in
order to ensure peace and security for the people of that region,
the realisation of their legitimate rights to shape their own future
m accordance with their national interests and without any foreign
interference.
They welcomed the recent seven-point proposal by the Pro-
visional Revolutionary Government of South Viet Nam as an im-
portant step towards the creation of a basis for a peaceful politi-
cal settlement and declared their support for these proposals
The two sides expressed their serious concern over the
tense situation m West Asia They stressed the need for all States
concerned to make efforts with a view to achieve a lasting, stable
and just peace on the basts of the full implementation of the 1/ N
Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967
Desirous of contributing to the improvement of the inter-
national situation, the Government of India highly appreciates
the proposal to convene an all-European conference on the ques-
tions of security and co-operation as an important step aimed
at the relaxation of tensions not only on the European continent
but throughout the world
Both sides believe that the cessation of the arms race and the
achievement of general and complete disarmament, covering both
nuclear and conventional types of weapons under stnet and effec-
tive international control, are of primary importance for the pre-
servation and strengthening of peace and security
In the opinion of the two sides the convening of a world dis-
armament conference with the participation of all countries for
achieving practicable and generally acceptable ways of solving
pressing disarmament problems could be of great importance. The
two sides consider it important to achieve in the near future an
246
I»AK COLONIALISM IN LAST IJLNGAL
agreement on the prohibition of the development, production and
stockpiling of biological weapons and toxins and on their destruc-
tion, as the first step on the way to the complete prohibition of
chemical and biological methods of warfare.
The Prime Minister of India reaffirmed that the Indian Ocean
area should be made a zone of peace. The Soviet side expressed
its readiness to study this question and to solve it together with
other powers on an equal basis.
The Soviet Union and India call for the speedy and complete
elimination of the vestiges of colonialism and unqualified imple-
mentation of the U.N. declaration on the granting of independ-
ence to colonial countries and peoples. They unequivocally con-
demn racism and apartheid in all forms and manifestations.
The two sides re-affirmed their adherence to the principles of
peaceful co-existence among States with different social systems
and pronounced themselves in favour of all questions at issue in
relations between countries being solved by peaceful means.
The Soviet Union and India attach great importance to the
United Nations. Both sides confirmed their determination to seek
the strengthening of the U.N.O. and the enhancing of its effective-
ness in maintaining universal peace and security in accordance
with the U.N- Charter.
Both sides expressed their confidence that the visit of the Prime
Minister of India to the Soviet Union and the talks and discus-
sions which were held with Soviet leaders during the visit, will
promote the further development of friendly co-operation between
the two countries and the strengthening of peace and international
security.
The Prime Minister of India extended a cordial invitation to
the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Mr.
L. I. Brezhnev, and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of
the USSR, Mr. A. N. Kosygin, to visit India. The invitations
were accepted with thanks.
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